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The 1992 Consensus

Taiwan and China agreed on "one China, two systems" as the basis for cross-Strait cooperation - "the 1992 Consensus". According to “the 92 consensus,” both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is only one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan are part of that China. The United States "opposed any unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait status quo". The United States "dual deterrence" warned China not to use force against Taiwan, and it warned Taiwan not to provoke Beijing into using force. The US reassured Taipei it would not sacrifice its interests for good relations with China, and it reassured Beijing that it did not support Taiwan independence. The US wanted Taiwan to stop publicly rejecting the one China principle. But President Tsai-Ing wen, first elected 2016 as the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), consistently refused this demand. In 2011, when Tsai was running for DPP chair, she declared "There is no 1992 Consensus".

Taiwan's quest for identity and international status continues to vex Beijing-Taipei and Beijing-US relations. The United States does not support Taiwanese independence, but it maintains strong trade ties with the island and is Taipei's biggest weapons supplier. Although it abides by a one-China policy, Washington has pledged to defend Taiwan against aggression from the mainland.

In 1982, during negotiations for the Third United States - China Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, the Taiwan government presented the United States with six points that it proposed the United States use as guidelines in conducting United States - Taiwan relations. According to former Ambassador John Holdridge, the United States agreed to these points, conveyed this assent to Taiwan, and, in late July 1982, informed the Congress of the agreement. The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan are:

1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.
5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

The 1992 consensus, in which Beijing and Taipei agreed to their own interpretations of the "one China" principle, led to talks, but they eventually broke down. On 30 January 1995, Jiang Zemin, then general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and president of the People's Republic, delivered a speech, entitled "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland," contained eight major points designed to achieve the unification of mainland China and Taiwan. Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, responded the following year with a six-point proposal in response to Jiang's proposition.

But cross-strait relations worsened after Lee made public his "two states" theory in 1998. And in 1999 Lee Teng-hui redefined ties as "special state-to-state" relations. In 1995, nearly half of Taiwan's residents considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, while as many as 25 per cent thought there were Chinese [by 2004 only 8 per cent of the island's residents regarded themselves as Chinese, while 42 per cent deemed themselves to be Taiwanese]. China suspended talks with Taiwan on eventual reunification in 1999, after Taiwan insisted negotiations be considered state-to-state.

By 2006, time was clearly not on the side of those who supported Taiwan's independence from the mainland. China's growing economic appeal to the island's business community, coupled with outreach to Pan-Blue politicians in 2005, suggested that over time Taiwan would inevitably be absorbed into the mainland. It would be argued that the window of opportunity for Taiwan to irrevocably assert its independence had closed. The "period of maximum danger" of a profound crisis appeared to be the summer of 2008. President Chen Shui-bian had pledged to push for a new constitution for Taiwan before the end of 2008. Pro-indepedence leaders might have calculated that Bejing would take no actions that would detract from the depiction of "peaceful rise" attending the 2008 Olympics, slated to open on 08 August 2008 in Beijing. But this moment came and went un-eventfully.

As of 2014, the prospects for military conflict across the Taiwan strait appeared nearly unthinkable. In the less than two months since President Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated as the chief executive of Taiwan in May 2008, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government had implemented or proposed numerous measures designed to tie Taiwan's future to the People's Republic of China. Regular weekend direct flights between five cities in China and eight airports in Taiwan had already commenced. Since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait has entered a period of relaxing tensions. Both Beijing and Taipei have emphasized enhancing people-to-people contacts and expanding economic ties. However, there had been no meaningful actions on the part of the Mainland to reduce its military presence directly opposite Taiwan.

At Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's regular Press Conference on October 22, 2021, he said "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The Taiwan question is purely China's internal affairs that allow no foreign interference. On issues that bear on China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and other core interests, no one shall expect China to make any compromise or trade-offs. No one should underestimate the resolve, the will and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Do not stand on the opposite side of the 1.4 billion people. We urge the US to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and stipulations in the three China-US joint communiques, be prudent with its words and actions on the Taiwan question, and avoid sending wrong signals to the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, lest it should seriously damage China-US relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait."

A September 2020 poll by Taiwan Thinktank found that only two percent of respondents identified as “Chinese”, while 62.6 percent considered themselves Taiwanese, and the rest identified as both. A rising number also support Taiwan’s “independence” from the Republic of China, reneging on any claims to mainland Asia. They also reject Beijing’s offer of “one country, two systems” – sceptical about Beijing’s promises of semi-autonomy after the crackdown in Hong Kong.

JIA Qingguo wrote "Beijing has been under increasing domestic political pressure to take tougher actions to defend China’s territorial integrity. The question of Taiwan has been one of the most sensitive issues in China. To almost everyone in China, the island is China’s province and a symbol of China’s century-long humiliation before 1949. Any effort to split that province away from China constitutes unacceptable insult and offense to the Chinese people and therefore must be countered against. Accordingly, Beijing is willing to accept the cost of war if necessary to prevent anyone from snatching the island province away—no matter whether it is the DPP or Washington.... as China’s defense capabilities grow, more people feel that it is time to think about the possibility of using force to address the problem of Taiwan separatism once and for all.... most people in Taiwan are rational and do not endorse independence at the risk of war with the Chinese mainland. It is possible that as more people realize that war is a real possibility, they will put enough pressure on the DPP authorities to make the necessary accommodations with Beijing....

"The cost of a military takeover remains prohibitive. It involves not only the direct cost of a military takeover of the island province, but also the cost of fighting a full-scale war with the US and maybe its allies, and almost inevitable international economic sanctions and a drastic deterioration of China’s international environment. Thus, Beijing is unlikely to consider the military option unless it feels cornered by provocations from Taipei and Washington.... Beijing’s growing military power can further enhance its belief that time is on its side and encourage it to adhere to its long-standing policy of peaceful unification."

Peter Beinart noted "the “one China” fiction helped Beijing imagine that peaceful reunification remained possible. Which gave it an excuse not to invade.... deterrence alone won’t work: China cares more. In 2017, mainland Chinese said that Taiwan topped their list of “concerns about the U.S.-China relationship.” Among Americans, by contrast, Taiwan didn’t make the top seven."