US Operations - Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM) Wargame
As the situation continued to worsen, the global economy - especially in Japan, Korea, Western Europe, and the US - began to show the strain from the increased oil prices. Accordingly, the NCA issued a Presidential Directive to deal with the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
The planners assumed four ships in the shipyards, and nine ships dedicated to ARG/MEU support (31st MEU, Mediterranean MEU and one MEU in the AO). Of the landing craft within the amphibious shipping fifty-eight (58) were LCAC that had undergone the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and eleven (11) were the new Future Family of Lighterage craft. In addition to the amphibious shipping, the scenario assumed the presence of two (2) carrier battle groups (CVBG) and a mix of sixteen (16) naval surface fire support (NSFS) ships. The NSFS ship mix was six (6) DD-21s and ten (10) DDGs. These figures were based on the projections that there will be thirty-two (32) DD-21s and fifty-four (54) DDGs/CGs equipped with the 5in/62 gun by the end of the 201X timeframe.
The overall MEF structure as it exists today will remain largely sufficient for STOM operations. Within each of the major subordinate elements there may be some changes. Force structure changes will be driven by the need to reduce the footprint ashore. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) will continue to be built around the appropriate standing unit (division, regiment or battalion). For the STOM scenario, the MEF GCE was a Marine division. As with the GCE, the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) will continue to be based on the appropriate standing aviation unit (wing, group or squadron). For the STOM scenario, the MEF ACE was a Marine Air Wing.
Given this MEF organization, the MEF had a total force size of roughly 51,000 personnel. The GCE was further subdivided into four Regimental Landing Teams (RLTs). Two RLTs are configured for surface assault, one is configured for vertical assault and one is configured as a reserve with 2 battalions configured for surface assault and one battalion configured for vertical assault.
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force provides the only sustainable forced-entry capability in the Department of Defense. However, the Marine Corps and the Navy do not have sufficient assets to be forward deployed in MEF size throughout the world. Given the notional locations of forces, likely shipping availability and decision times in the scenario, it would have taken between fifty to sixty-five days for all forces to be in-place and ready to commence operations. This time represents the time required to assemble and load the twenty-six, globally-sourced amphibious ships and the two Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons.
During JTF Phase I (C to C+50) lead elements of the MAGTF arrived in theater. During JTF Phase II the assembled MEB with a subordinate MEU conducted "Enabling Operations" to support the introduction of U.S. Army forces. This scenario is primarily concerned with the events of JTF Phase III. During this phase, the MAGTF executes a "Littoral Penetration" and conducts "Decisive Operations."
Once the entire MAGTF (I MEF(-)(+)) arrived in theater, it was assigned the following mission: " On order, I MEF(-)(+) conducts littoral penetrations in the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz to defeat Iranian forces threatening international shipping. Be prepared to conduct offensive operations to support the seizure of Bandar-e Abbas and conduct battle handover with follow-on forces."
Based on that mission, the following concept of operations was developed. At H-hour on D-day, I MEF conducts an initial littoral penetration to defeat the enemy mechanized division in the vicinity of Kuhestak. On order, continue the attack in support of JTF offensive operations. During this phase, the GCE is the main effort and will conduct a regimental surface and a regimental vertical attack to defeat elements of the mechanized division and to delay possible counterattacks by other enemy units. On order, another regimental sized unit will conduct a second surface assault. On order, the ACE becomes the main effort and attacks to destroy enemy forces east of Bandar-e Abbas. MEF reserve will consist of one regimental-sized unit.
NAVSPECWAR elements will locate shallow water and coastal minefields, conduct hydrographic and beach surveys, and observe beach defenses. Force Reconnaissance teams will conduct amphibious reconnaissance missions in the areas of LPSs to determine defenses and to confirm suitability of beach exits. Ground reconnaissance assets will conduct distant reconnaissance of potential objectives, obstacles, enemy forces, and exploitable gaps.
The first RLT surface assault took place in three cycles across two Littoral Penetration Sites (LPS). The first cycle used 173 AAAVs, 56 LCAC lifts, 11 LCU(X) lifts from the ATF and 10 LCU(X) lifts from the MPF squadrons to get ashore. The second cycle used 53 LCAC lifts and 10 LCU(X) lifts to get ashore. The third cycle completes the initial assault with 8 LCAC lifts. Two LCACs are not pre-boated to retain some flexibility to reconfigure loads, land on-call serials or replace down craft. The surface assault was estimated to have taken between 4-9 hours to complete.
The first units ashore are the infantry battalions that have the ability to land in the face of resistance (particularly those mounted in AAAVs). Once ashore, however, the force will often adjust to a movement-to-contact configuration, with screening elements in the lead. This small-scale passage of lines will take place "on the fly" through the use of improved information sharing between the affected units.
The initial landing in a STOM operation may take place at some distance from the objective. Exploitable gaps in the enemy's defenses will often be located at sufficient distance that the enemy feels he has sufficient reaction time. The MAGTF must cover this distance faster than the enemy can react. The scheme of maneuver for the southern RLT (RLT-1) has the RLT travel over 30 kilometers and its lead elements engage the enemy security force by the end of the first day.
The vertical insertion of forces requires careful planning. Vertically inserted forces are most effective where they achieve surprise in their placement. To achieve this surprise the force must be transported quickly. Each BLT is able to land its "A" command group, two rifle companies, its 81mm Mortar Platoon and the majority of its Anti-tank Section in the first wave. Similarly, the artillery battalion is able to land two firing batteries and the LAAD platoon is able to land two of its sections. The battalions of the RLT move from their initial valley positions to secure the pass to the north and begin threatening enemy's rear. The skillful initial placement and precision fire support will allow a vertically inserted force to be safely inserted up to 90 nautical miles inland and supported for up to 96 hours. That force may then be re-positioned, withdrawn or (as was done for this scenario) linked with another force.
The STOM MEF assumed that local air and maritime superiority had been achieved as called for in Phase I of the CJTF plan. This assumption was tempered by the belief that although the enemy's integrated air defense system (IADS) was severely degraded, he still possessed a non-integrated capability. One of the greatest threats on the future battlefield will continue to be weapons of mass effects (WME). That threat existed in this scenario but the assumption was made that the enemy would not employ WME unless his regime was directly threatened.
Following the US seizure of Chah Bahar on S+75 (C+55), the Iranians re-oriented their forces in southern Iran. One IRGCGF infantry division deployed to secure the LOCs north to Sirjan, replacing the SF brigade and the airborne brigade. These latter two units deployed farther south to support the forces already deployed along the Strait. One armor brigade from the IRIGF armor division and one independent infantry brigade also deployed farther south to augment the IRGCGF defense around Jask.
By S+85 (C+65), offensive US air operations have degraded Iranian ground forces to such an extent that they were no longer capable of offensive operations. Heavy units are assessed to be at 50-65% strength, artillery units are assessed to be at 65% strength, and light forces are assessed to be around 75-80% strength.
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