Path to War - Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM) Wargame
Around the year 2000, Iran was faced with several difficulties. First, internal politics had fragmented society into two factions: those who supported reform of the Islamic Republic and who advocated less control by the clerics (about 70% of the population), and those who supported the continued rule of the clerics and strict adherence to militant ideals (about 30% of the population).
Second, Iran's economy was doing poorly. Low oil prices had reduced Iran's incoming revenues. Development of the economy had stagnated, since Iran had not developed a situation that was attractive to either foreign or internal investors. Iran's social and infrastructure development programs were falling victim to the increasing expenditures on military programs.
Thirdly, Iran was still politically isolated on the international scene, despite its efforts at rapprochement with neighboring countries. Iran also felt increasingly surrounded by enemies. Iraq began rearming shortly after sanctions were lifted in 1999. The Taliban defeated the remaining opposition forces in Afghanistan and created a militant Sunni regime that was at odds with the regime in Tehran. Pakistan's regime became increasingly Islamicized, and as a predominantly Sunni nation, became more and more at odds with the Shia regime of Iran. Turkey's problems with the Kurds continued in the northwest, as did the Azerbaijani - Armenian conflict. The Central Asian Republics also remained unstable, casting doubt in the minds of the Iranians about the security of their northeastern border.
By 2001, oil prices began to rebound. However, the population saw little of the increased revenue, since debt repayments and military expenditures used up much of the funding.
President Khatami was re-elected in 2001, but his inability to push reform past conservative roadblocks frustrated the populace. More and more clashes in the streets began to occur between the supporters of the reformists and the supporters of the conservatives. Some headway on foreign investment was also made, but the few companies that did invest in Iran found themselves to be very limited by the restrictions levied upon them by conservative elements in regime.
In 2005, Khatami's second and final term in office expired. The election for President became a hotly contested race between Khatami's handpicked successor and the conservative candidate, Ayatollah Mehdi Karubi. While about 70% of the population supported the reformers, when the election took place Karubi received 70% of the vote. The population was aware that the election results were fraudulent and part of a conservative scheme to reassert control over the executive branch. As a result, large riots began to occur, especially in Tehran. The conservatives used the security forces and Revolutionary Guard to squash these riots. The people in Iran quickly divided into four camps: those who were willing to fight for reform (30%), those who were willing to fight for the status quo (30%), those who feared that a counter-revolution would destroy all that had been gained since 1979 (20%), and those who were trying to keep out of the struggle (20%).
The unrest generated by the rigged election spread country-wide into a general "Counter-Revolution." Conservatives used a propaganda campaign that portrayed Iran, should the reformists prevail, as a country subjected to anarchy and western imperialism. As a result, many people who sympathized with the reformers actually came out in support of the conservatives. Also, the idea of preserving the 1979 Revolution swayed those people who were on the fence between reform and conservatism.
Consequently, after two years of back and forth internal strife, the conservatives emerged victorious in 2007. The conservative victory resulted in a society that was radicalized and filled with the militant Islamic ideas of the conservatives. Those people with reformist sympathies hid their true feelings so as to escape the retribution and purges of the conservatives. Iranian society became very restrictive once again; women were not allowed to work or be educated outside the home, Revolutionary Guards arrested anyone suspected of "counter-revolutionary" activities or ideas, and contact with the western world was cut off entirely.
Economically, the Iranians faced some improvements in their economy. The development of Iran's gas reserves brought in much needed income, as did an increase in the price of oil worldwide. However, the development of the economy was hindered by the conservative regime's negative attitudes toward foreign investors. As a result, Iran's economy met the demands of its government and people, but did not grow or expand. This lack of economic growth limited the expenditures that the Iranians were able to set aside for military rearmament.
The Iranian military between 2000 and 2015 faced several ups and downs. Up until the Counter-Revolution, it had received enough funding to continue its modernization process. Iran set up a few manufacturing plants to indigenously produce artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks, but purchased some of these systems abroad as well. WMD programs still received priority, but the threat of a re-arming Iraq forced the Iranians to focus many efforts on their ground forces. Before 2005, the Iranians purchased and built about 1,000 main battle tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, and 500 artillery tubes.
During the Counter-Revolution, some military forces joined the rebelling reformists, but for the most part, the military remained loyal. As a result, relatively few military systems were destroyed in the internal fighting. When the conservatives emerged victorious, they purged the military of anyone with reformist sympathies and continued with a re-armament and modernization program. The main focus was on filling out the T/E of the existing units and overcoming logistics and transportation deficiencies in the ground forces. Iran purchased and built another 1,000 main battle tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, and 500 artillery tubes. The Iranians also purchased Mi-24 HINDS from Russia to augment their aging AH-1J COBRA attack helos. On the air defense side, Iran learned from Iraq's lessons against the US and spent a great deal of money purchasing the SA-10C SAM system from the Russians. However, they still relied heavily on older systems to provide redundant coverage. On the naval side, Iran purchased and built more C-802 ASCMs and refitted its existing ship inventory to make all its vessels operational.
Overall, by 2015, Iran's military had not become a truly modern force. It had reached the goals the Iranians had set for it in the 1990's, but had not progressed into the 21st Century. Essentially, the Iranians had a fully equipped force that was still heavily dependent on older systems (for example, the F-4 fighter, the HAWK SAM, existing naval vessels, and BMP-1 IFVs.) Iran did have other newer systems, such as the C-802 ASCM, the SAHAHAB-3 MRBM, and upgraded T-72s, to make their force more effective, but economic limitations prevented them from purchasing the newest cutting edge systems.
By 2010, Iran had re-asserted itself on the international stage as a radical voice of discord. Feeling surrounded by enemies, Iran continued to support covert action and terrorism abroad to further its goals. The Iranians also became increasingly critical of their neighbor's policies to the point of antagonizing the neighboring states. The GCC countries looked on this revival of Iranian belligerence with alarm. However, their reliance on the US for regional security had waned significantly since the year 2000. This increased resistance to a long-term US presence in the Persian Gulf occurred for several reasons. Most of this resistance was culturally-based, since most of the region's regimes feared an erosion of their culture and religious principles due to increased Western exposure. Also, these regimes wanted to avoid giving impetus to their restive Shia minorities and other Muslim extremists in the region by openly supporting a Western presence. As a result, the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea was significantly reduced, and NAVCENT moved its staff to Muscat, Oman.
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