Operation Trail Dust
Operation Ranch Hand
1970-1971
In January 1970, only 346 sorties were flown in the Republic of Vietnam, even though the RVNAF JGS added Phu Bon and Kien Giang Provinces to the spray target areas. Further reductions were forecast when in February 1970 the USAF was notified that the US Secretary of Defense had approved only 3 million dollars of the 27 million dollars requested by MACV for herbicide operations in FY71. Based on this budget the USAF Chief of Staff advised CINCPACAF that all herbicide stocks would be depleted by 30 November 1970 at the programmed consumption rate. CINCPACAF was presented with 3 alternatives. The first option was that operations could continue at the programed rate until herbicide stocks were depleted, after which the 12th Special Operations Squadron would be withdrawn. The second option outlined that operations could continue at the programmed rate through FY70, at which time the 12th Special Operations Squadron could be reduced to a minimum level for emergency needs, consistent with the approved budget. Lastly, actions could be taken to immediately reduce the 12th SOS to 8 aircraft and control herbicide expenditure so as to deplete the stock (within the approved budget) at the end of FY71.
CINCPACAF advised the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) who in turn notified COMUSMACV of the budget cuts and the resultant program adjustments. CINCPACAF then responded to the Chief of Staff, USAF, recommending that the 12th Special Operations Squadron be reduced to 8 aircraft, and that these be used only for high priority targets. The recommendation was approved and by 30 June 1970 the 12th Special Operations Squadron was reduced to eight aircraft, with 2 configured for insecticide spraying. Thus herbicide operations were reduced to 132 sorties per month to spray high priority targets.
On 6 April 1970, the 12th Special Operation Squadron was directed by Headquarters, Seventh Air Force to deploy 3 aircraft to Da Nang, augmenting the 5 plane detachment already there for operations scheduled on 10-11 April 1970. The Bien Hoa aircraft departed on 9 April 1970 to participate in one of the Ranch Hand's most challenging operations, a 7-ship spray operation, with 4 F-lO0 fighters, 6 UH-1 gunships, and 10 Cobra gunships providing armed escort. The targets were enemy crops in the Song Be Valley, Quang Ngai Province. The mission was successful, but the formation took 37 hits from enemy ground fire. Upon completion of the operation, the 3 specially deployed aircraft returned to Bien Hoa.
On 21 April 1970, the Da Nang detachment of the 12th Special Operations Squadron, known as "Mountain Ranch," was recalled to Bien Hoa. This detachment was deactivated, its aircraft deconfigured, and transferred to the 315th Tactical Air Wing at Phan Rang Air Base.
It was during this time period that laboratory studies in the United States concluded that dioxin, a trace contaminant in Agent Orange, might cause birth defects or abnormalities in human beings: the teratogenic effect. Although response by laboratory animals was not uniform and all species did not evidence effects, a temporary suspension order on the use of Orange was issued in April 1970.
With the suspension of Orange, Ranch Hand personnel foresaw problems in targeting. There was only a limited number of targets which could be sprayed with Agent Blue. Also, all targets previously scheduled for Orange had been switched to Agent White, and the supply was nearly exhausted by early May 1970. The phase-down of herbicide operations was now apparent to all, with a decrease in sorties flown from 346 in January 1970 to 132 to April 1970.
During the Cambodian incursion, the Ranch Hand crews suspended herbicide operations. On 9 May 1970, the 12th Special Operations Squadron received a message from Headquarters, Seventh Air Force conveying the possibility of using Ranch Hand aircraft on psychological warfare missions, such as leaflet drops, as directed by MACV and for night flare drops in support of Cambodian operations. Upon receipt of the message, the 12th Special Operations Squadron began to reconfigure the spray planes for flare capability. Headquarters, Seventh Air Force had expected the conversion to require 17 days. However, Ranch Hand crews accomplished the task in 6 days.
On 11 May 1970, the 12th Special Operations Squadron sent aircrews and support personnel on temporary duty assignments to Kakhon Phanom Air Base, Thailand, to study flare operations with the 606th Special Operations Squadron. Upon their return they participated in several briefings and helped to establish some basic operational procedures for flare missions. Mark 24 flares were to be used in the operations, each having a 24 million candle power brightness and an illumination period of 3 minutes. The Mark 16 white phosphorus marking flares were also used as navigational aids in positioning the Mark 24 flares over the desired area.
Their first flare mission was flown on 16 May 1970 in the northeastern part of Military Region (MR) IV, where 27 flares were dropped. The second mission was flown over Cambodia where 96 flares were dropped. Flare operations generally involved the scheduling of 3 aircraft. Two were launched before midnight and the third was kept on alert with a 20 minute launch capability from midnight to 0600 hours. Operations continued in this manner until 11 June 1970. The squadron received fragmentary orders directing the deployment of one flare aircraft to Pleiku on the afternoon of 11 June 1970 to operate there for 5 days. After 5 days, another crew arrived from Bien Hoa to replace the earlier one. Operations continued out of Pleiku until 29 June 1970, when the aircraft and crew were directed to return to Bien Hoa.
The primary purpose of flare missions was to support the Cambodian operation. With the withdrawal of US forces from Cambodia by 30 June 1970, the Ranch Hand flare missions decreased. The last flare mission was flown on 6 July 1970.
Throughout this period, 12th Special Operations Squadron aircraft also flew psychological warfare missions. The 12th Special Operations Squadron was assigned leaflet drop missions under the direct control of the 9th Special Operations Squadron at Bien Hoa Air Base. The Ranch Hand crews flew their first psyops mission on 11 May 1970 in MR III. For the next 15 days the squadron was scheduled for 2 missions daily. On 25 May 1970, the psychological warfare requirement was decreased to one mission daily and on 6 July 1970 the last leaflet mission was flown. The majority of these missions were flown into Cambodia, but some leaflets were also dispersed throughout MRs II, III, and IV of the Repubilc of Vietnam.
On 13 June 1970, a request was made to CINCPACAF for the inactivation of the 12th Special Operations Squadron. Seventh Air Force authority to relocate the Ranch Hand aircraft at Phan Rang Air Base was granted on 28 June 1970. The move was conpleted by 10 July 1970. CINCPACAF approval for inactivation of the 12th Special Operation Squadron was received on 2 July 1970. The 12th Special Operations Squadron was formally inactivated on 31 July 1970, and the Ranch Hand unit assigned to Phan Rang was designated as "A Flight" of the 310th Tactical Airlift Squadron.
On 17 July 1970, COMUSMACV cancelled all fixed wing defoliation missions. However, fixed wing crop denial missions with Agents Blue and White were to be continued. Thus with inactivation of the 12th Special Operations Squadron, reduction in the number of aircraft, and cancellation of defoliation missions, the phaseout of Ranch Hand mission continued. However, there were 2 reservations attached to the inactivation order affecting the 12th Special Operations Squadron. The first was that the 315th Tactical Air Wing would maintain a defoliation (including crop denial) capability. The second was that the Wing would maintain 2 UC-123 aircraft and crews to continue spraying insecticide in support of the MACV malaria control program.
Herbicide activities designated as crop denial missions were ordered by MACV to begin on 20 July 1970 in MR II and III. However, it had been over 2 months since the last defoliation mission, and newer crew members were inexperienced in combat. Therefore, training flights were begun on 16 July 1970. The training area was located just north of Nha Trang Air Base over a "pacified area." However, when an aircraft was hit on 21 August 1970, training was switched to another region. The new training area was over water, and while it provided low altitude flight experience to new crew members it was unrealistic considering the nature of the Ranch Hand mission. Therefore most crop denial missions served 2 purposes: destruction of enemy crop supplies and training of aircrew members in Ranch Hand techniques.
The general situation at Phan Rang Air Base produced still more problems for Ranch Hand operations. The storage of herbicides at Phan Rang Air Base was not permitted by agreement with the local province chief. Storage facilities were located at Da Nang, Phu Cat, and Bien Hoa Air Bases. Thus, missions could be scheduled only every other day, using the day between missions to fly to one of the storage locations to reload the aircraft with herbicide.
The first crop mission flown by the newly formed A Flight, 310th Tactical Airlift Squadron was on 20 July 1970. The formation sustained 23 hits from enemy ground fire. A second mission on 22 July 1970 against a target 20 miles west of Nha Trang Air Base resulted in 46 hits. As a result of these hits, Headquarters, Seventh Air Force formally designated all crop targets as "high threat" targets, thereby requiring heavy weapons suppression tactics. From that time on, all herbicide missions were preceded by fighters, which dispensed cluster munitions to suppress enemy ground fire. This tactic was successful: in subsequent missions involving 33 aircraft only 11 hits were sustained. The requirement for heavy suppression created problems. As previously stated some cluster munitions had about a 2 percent dud rate and represented a hazard to friendly ground forces operating in the area. Thus many crop destruction missions were cancelled because clearance was denied by ground commanders or province chiefs. For example, the US 23rd Infantry Division (AMERICAL) denied clearance for cluster munitions in all of their operational areas. The crop mission could not be flown without clearance for heavy suppression.
In the summer of 1970, public pressure was building in the United States against herbicide operations in Vietnam as well. Politicians and academicians began publicly to condemn the program. Even within the military community there were mixed views concerning herbicides. Regardless of the validity of these views, the herbicide program in Vietnam was destined to terminate. Various cost analyses showed that the program was uneconomical.
Crop destruction missions continued through the summer and early fall of 1970, averaging 19 sorties per month, down from the peak of over 430 sorties during 1967-1969. At this point, there was legitimate reason to question the cost-effectiveness of the program. It became increasingly more difficult to justify 6 herbicide aircraft for only 19 sorties a month. Problems were also encountered in target selection. The Ranch Hand units had always relied on MACV for target selection, but made their own occasional survey within approved target boxes to recommend specific areas. In the last 3 months of herbicide operations, Ranch Hand surveys failed on 2 occasions to locate any crop within designated target boxes. In these instances, the entire target areas consisted of either virgin timber or barren rock plateaus.
In October 1970, COMUSMACV requested that all Agent Orange stocks be consolidated and stored at locations where positive control could be exercised. Attempts at lifting the suspension on Orange based on the inconsistency of the available scientific evidence had failed. COMUSMACV repeated in November 1970 that Orange would not be used and listed the crop destruction targets which had been approved for the following year. However, with the cancellation of further Blue shipemts in December 1970 the fate of herbicide operations appeared to be sealed. Existing stocks of Blue were insufficient to cover all of the approved targets.
January 1971 brought increased pressure against herbicide operations from many fronts. Heavy pressure from ecologically-minded individuals, high costs of operation, and a continuous lack of clearance into designated target areas were severely limiting factors on continuing the missions. On 3 January 1971, the 834th Air Division requested that Headquarters, Seventh Air Force reevaluate the requirements of the herbicide mission to determine if any of the aircraft could be released for airlift operations. The 834th Air Division received its answer on 9 January 1970: the Air Force crop destruction program was to be phased out by May 1971. Furthermore, crop destruction would be limited to specific projects desginated by Seventh Air Force, and no new projects would be forthcoming.
The last crop destruction mission was flown on 7 January 1971, and on 28 January 1971, JCS officially terminated all USAF crop destruction missions. The aircraft and spray systems were to be retained by the 315th Tactical Air Wing until final determination was made on the possible turnover of herbicide capability to the VNAF. The 315th could deconfigure the spray aircraft as necessary for utilization in airlift operations. However, all spray equipment was to be maintained in ready configuration for possible turnover to the VNAF. The insecticide mission was to be retained. Thus the herbicide mission of the USAF was terminated.
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