Operation Trail Dust
Operation Ranch Hand
1967
Although the number of aircraft allocated to the Ranch Hand units had increased to 19 by June 1967 (one of which was configured for spraying insecticide only), the increased spray requirements had already outstripped the available planes and herbicide supply. Accordingly, targets were rearranged and priorities adjusted during the early months of 1967. At that time the herbicides Orange and White were made interchangeable because the ultimate effect was the same.
By June 1967, 5 additional aircraft had been received, raising Ranch Hand's total to 19, all of which were UC-123 types. From March 1967 to June 1967, Ranch Hand crews participated in many sorties in IV Corps, II Corps, and War Zones C and D. Operations in II Corps included 10 active projects in support of Operations Francis Marion, Pershing, and Byrd, in addition to crop destruction missions. After operating in SEA for almost 6 years from January 1962 to June 1967, the Ranch Hand unit had lost only 4 aircraft. The 12th Air Commando Squadron continued to expand its operations in 1967. During the first 6 months of 1967, Ranch Hand crews flew 2,325 sorties dispensing 1,900,510 gallons of herbicide.
In September 1967, the 834th Air Division, parent organization of the 12th Air Commando Squadron, completed a study on Ranch Hand resources and accomplishments in order to assess their ability to support increased MACV requirements. The study concluded that the number of planes allocated for spray operations needed to be increased to 32 in order to meet the MACV objectives for the next 2 years. However, the increase in 12th Air Commando Squadron aircraft assets for spraying would not begin until May 1968.
Weather was a complicating factor in herbicide operations. Optimum effectiveness of the herbicides was achieved only during the peak growing season. That season coincided with the rainy season, which caused cancellation of missions either because of poor flying weather or heavy rain in the target area, which would render the herbicides ineffective. Thus the 834th Air Division report was skeptical about the 12th Air Commando Squadron's ability to meet MACV requirements at all. However, a gradual increase of aircraft assets for the 12th Air Commando Squadron was recommended. The 834th Air Division also recommended that the VNAF take over crop destruction missions completely, along with those of mosquito control. However, no action was taken on that recommendation.
In October 1967, the RAND Corporation published a damning report of the herbicide program, especially the crop destruction component, concluding that the operations counter-productive to the broader efforts of the US and the South Vietnamese government. The effects of the RAND report were immediate. Headquarters, MACV and Seventh Air Force pointed out that the program had been requested by the South Vietnamese government and that intelligence reports refuted the RAND conclusions. However, a civilian advisory group from headquarters, Pacific Command (PACOM) was called in to review and document the effects of crop destruction activities in 1967. The PACOM report, based upon captured documents and an analysis of 622 sorties flown in 1967, disclosed that crop destruction was a vital part of economic warfare. The enemy documents revealed that the VC had suffered serious personnel losses due to the lack of food. Troops normally used to fighting had to be detailed to crop raising, and in one case the 95th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army reportedly had to fast for 1-2 days on several occasions due to a lack of food. The overall conelusion of the PACOM report was that crop destruction was "an integral, essential and effective part of the total effort in South Vietnam."
Despite these findings, the Chief of Staff, USAF requested a thorough study of crop destruction operations in RVN. Headquarters, Seventh Air Force initiated the study through Project CHECO at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The CHECO report compiled from captured documents, interviews, and 12th Air Commando Squadron records detailed the crop destruction program and its overall effectiveness. There was evidence that the VC had been forced to reduce the size of their cultivated plots and switch to the "slash-and-burn" technique, attempting to conceal these smaller plots inside tree lines, on mountainsides, and in bombed-out structures. Their tactic was to have one unit move through an area, clear it and move on. A second unit followed to plow and plant, while a third unit was detailed to harvest the crop when ready. However, USAF crews were quite proficient in distinguishing the VC "slash-and-burn" areas from the cultivated Montagnard plots.
A second objective of the crop destruction program was to separate the VC from the people by forcing refugee movements into GVN controlled areas. Intelligence reports documented the success in achieving this objective. In many areas, crop destruction activities not only denied the VC food, but also the people contact so essential to the guerrilla-type operations employed by the VC. Captured enemy documents revealed that the crop destruction program was effective. In a letter signed by the Communist Command in III Corps, the VC were informed that their monthly ration of rice for October 1967 was restricted to 25 liters per person due to allied ground operations, bombing, defoliation, and the reducted contributions of the local populace.
A Seventh Air Force report on herbicide operations, prepared in 1967, stated that crop destruction forced the enemy to abandon base camps, seek out hidden areas for planting, expend money and personnel to buy and transport food, protect food caches and harass the local population for more food. Also, the report went on to note, that the previously discussed Rand paper was weak in 2 areas: (1) the period covered did not include the major changes in the crop destruction program made in June of 1967; and (2) the report did not consider the important interrelation of crop destruction and the overall MACV crop denial strategy. The Seventh Air Force report documented the value of crop destruction, was seen as refuting the RAND report, and justified the continuation of the crop destruction program in 1968 and 1969. However, the restrictions which had governed the program from its inception remained in effect.
In the end, from July to December 1967, Ranch Hand crews flew 2,856 sorties dispensing 2,676,080 gallons of herbicied. Crop destruction missions accounted for 415 of the sorties. During this time, Ranch Hand aircraft received a total of 296 hits and one aircraft was lost to enemy ground fire.
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