Military

1QFY95
PROBLEM 2-2: Field artillery units experience difficulty forecasting, managing, and resupplying FA battery ammunition because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts.

1. Battery leaders are not conducting ammunition accounting.
2. A lack of command emphasis and loose accountability at the initial issue contributes to units starting their rotation with poor ammunition numbers.
3. With subsequent deliveries, batteries fail to adjust their ammo status quickly.
4. Batteries then fail to report all ammunition received on their status board and also fail to inform battalion.
5. The accountability worsens further as units begin to cross level ammunition and manage individual rounds.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 2-3: Resupply operations between main support battalion (MSB), forward support battalion (FSB) and maneuver task forces lack the necessary synchronization to be effective, resulting in the FSB and the task forces having difficulty in reaching capacity from resupply operations. Resupply windows within the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods versus event driven, and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

PROBLEM 2-4: Task force S-4s experience difficulty with supply of either Class III or Class V, and sometimes both, yet the task force S-4s are not informing brigade about their problems. In come cases combat vehicles ran out of fuel during offensive operations; fuel was not available to top off equipment prior to LD. During a planned tactical pause task forces did not conduct refueling and rearming operations.

PROBLEM 2-5: Electronic warfare teams' ability to get resupplies and stay in operation are often hindered by having to drive extreme distances to a rearward trains area to get fuel, water and food. After resupply, the teams must deploy to a new site, usually farther forward.

PROBLEM 2-6:

1. Battery commanders often go into battle with no apparent ammo plan.
   EXAMPLE: Before a day defend mission, one platoon had 127 HE rounds on hand, while another platoon in the same battery had only 35 HE rounds. One platoon had almost all the green bag propellant, while the other platoon had almost zero balance on green bag.
   EXAMPLE: Another battery had an unequal distribution of calibrated white bag propellant, resulting in guns quickly expending calibrated white bag propellant and being called out of missions because of their inability to meet the conditions for accurate predicted fires.

   While platoon leaders often know how much total ammo they have prior to a battle, the ammo is not managed at battery level.

   Most battalion FASPS establish ammo resupply triggers, but the triggers are ineffective because the platoons could not track ammo expenditure during the battle.

   Batteries with Platoon Operation Centers (POCs): POCs had an accurate count of ammo prior to battle, but the ammo count was often never updated until sometime after the mission.

   Batteries without POCs: FDOs or platoon leaders were to track ammo, but they do not have the time to accurately do so. RESULT: Batteries run out of extended range ammunition, for example, before requesting resupply; other batteries run out of DPICM before requesting resupply.

   Battery commanders are often unaware of the ammo they will receive until it arrives in positions. This causes a delay as the commander decides on a distribution plan.

   In batteries where the commander delegated ammo resupply to platoon leaders, the platoon leaders often took the ammo they needed from the nearest truck available. RESULT: Ammo trucks have incomplete rounds, making ammo management and tracking by pre-configured combat load impossible at battalion level.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 2-7: (Repeat of Problem 2-2) Units are having difficulty forecasting, managing and resupplying ammunition because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts. Battery leaders are not actively conducting ammunition accounting, and fail to place emphasis on the importance of accurate counting. Subsequent resupply further worsens the overall accounting problems.

Units begin their deployment into combat with inaccurate counts.
Inaccurate reporting and mismanagement hampers the S-3, S-4, FDO and Battery Ammunition Officer (BAO) in accurately forecasting ammunition for subsequent operations.

PROBLEM 2-8: (Repeat of Problem 2-3) Class III resupply operations are too often not synchronized between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB) and the maneuver task forces. Resupply windows for the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods rather than event driven.

The FSB and the maneuver task forces have difficulty reaching their required capacity from resupply operations.
The time driven, rather than event driven resupply too often causes less than full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 2-9: Health service support (HSS) units are not doing a very good job managing fuel and petroleum products.

PROBLEM 2-10: (Repeat of Problems 2-3 and 2-8)

1. There is a lack of synchronization in Class III(B) resupply operations between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB) and maneuver task forces.
2. Resupply windows within the Brigade Combat Team IBCT) tend to be rigid time periods versus event-driven and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.
3. The forecasting of Class III(B) by the BCT through the use of LOGSTATS is poor and contributes to the lack of CLASS III(B) resupply synchronization.

PROBLEM 2-11: (Repeat of Problem 2-4) The task force is not able to manage or track Class III/III(P) or Class V on-hand status. Orange reports submitted to the S-4 are not completely filled out.

TA.7 Negative Trend 3: Materiel Readiness

PROBLEM 3-2: This quarter, task forces had less than 15% of their Class IX part requisitions on valid status. WHY?

1. Prescribed load list (PLL) clerks and maintenance managers did not reconcile their document registers with technical supply.
2. Units did not ensure that all requisitions were immediately read into the SARSS upon delivery of the ULLS.
3. Long delays in identifying disk/formatting problems.
4. Failure to follow-up requisitions that went longer than 48-72 hours without a valid status.
5. Units did not create a demand history for walk-thru requisitions by manually posting them in ULLS.
6. Some PLL clerks failed to use the status disk received from technical supply to update their parts status.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 3-3: (Repeat of Problem 3-1) Units experience difficulty transitioning the use of ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS from garrison to a field environment.

PROBLEM 3-4: Forward support battalions (FSBs) have difficulty tracking the flow of high priority requisitioned parts. Manual transportation manifests are either not used or not accurate when used.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 3-5: Task force level Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) operations need to be improved. Doctrinal repair evacuation criteria are not followed, nor are METT-T factors used to produce mission specific criteria.

PROBLEM 3-6: Task force DA Form 2406 reporting lacks accuracy.

1. Units habitually delay reporting combat vehicles which are not fully mission capable.
2. Units delete vehicles from report in anticipation of arrival of repair part which will restore vehicle to FMC status.
3. Circle X delegation below task force level clouds accuracy of report.

False representation of task force's combat power.
Loss of accuracy and visibility of units' maintenance status.

PROBLEM 3-7: (Repeat of Problems 3-1 and 3-3) Rotational units frequently have an inaccurate picture of equipment materiel readiness and status of open repair parts requisitions. They do not transition well from garrison to the field environment and requirements in using ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS. Accomplishment and tracking of DA Form 2404 flow requires more emphasis.

PROBLEM 3-8: (Repeat of Problem 3-4) Main Support Battalion (MSB) tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests remains inconsistent. MSBs use manual transportation manifests inconsistently to maintain visibility of in transit high priority parts. They do not get manifests to Forward Support Battalions' support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 3-9: In field maintenance operations, units, leaders and individuals fail to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988. Many unit technical SOPs do not address the basics of DA Forms 2404 and 5988 completion to include format, submittal and collection process/method, maintenance section form flow and actions and return of form/parts to equipment operator.

Reduced preventive maintenance.
Reduced parts ordering.
Lower Operations Readiness (OR) rates.

PROBLEM 3-10: (Repeat of Problems 3-1, 3-3 and 3-7) Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions upon arrival into Theater. CSS units have difficulty transitioning their Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) (i.e., ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS) from garrison to a field environment because of a lack of manual tracking system while the STAMIS are off-line.

PROBLEM 3-11: (Repeat of Problems 3-4 and 3-8) Manual transportation manifests were used inconsistently by main support battalions (MSBs) to maintain visibility of in-transit high priority parts. Transportation manifests do not get to forward support battalion (FSB) support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the brigade support area (BSA).

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 9
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 11