Military

PROBLEM 4-6: The forward evacuation of scout platoon casualties is normally not considered during the task force planning process. When evacuation is required, the lack of planning results in additional DOWs.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 4-7: There is inadequate casualty evacuation planning at brigade, task force and company/team level. This includes combat service elements as well. The assets necessary to execute CASEVAC are too often not correctly positioned for timely execution. It is apparent that too many units are inadequately trained in CASEVAC procedures, to include self/buddy aid.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 4-8: Many units do not know what to do with their chemical casualties and KIAs. During evacuation numerous field litter ambulances (FLA) are needlessly contaminated. Casualties are brought to the decon site or to the clean main aid station/forward aid station (MAS/FAS).

PROBLEM 4-9: Units, specifically the logistics planners, do not sufficiently plan for air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) assets when they have them available.

TA.7 Negative Trend 5: Religious support / UMT deficiencies

1. No chaplain assistant.
2. Chaplains with poor basic soldier skills.
3. Religious support not integrated into plans/OPORDS.
4. Too few religious support plans in tactical SOPs.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 5-2:

1. Lack of coordination at Home Station often results in Unit Ministry Team (UMT) members not being listed with those scheduled to draw equipment at the NTC.
2. UMTs continue to deploy without adequate coverage for Catholic soldiers. This results from a lack of priority in using priests to support deployments and NTC rotational deployments.
3. Brigade UMTs do not adequately understand the importance of staff supervision and coordination and control of religious support assets on the battlefield.
4. Units continue to deploy to the NTC without their chaplains.
5. UMTs arrive at the NTC without the necessary basic soldier skills to survive in a combat environment.
6. UMTs do not know how to use communications equipment.
7. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are not being allowed to drive because of an NTC policy prohibiting officers from driving. Chaplains are also not being allowed to move to critical areas on the battlefield because commanders fear they will get lost or injured.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 5-3:

1. Commanders do not adequately understand religious support and its potential to help soldiers maximize their potential on the battlefield. Too many commanders neglect the potentially valuable support the unit ministry team provides.
2. Chaplains are not functioning adequately as staff officers in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP). A lack of understanding about TDMP by chaplains hinders their efforts to be proactive as plans are formulated. This is another reason the problem above continues. Chaplains need to be able to produce a religious support plan, and articulate it to the supported commander.
3. Division chaplains and NCOICs are generally not involved with unit training before, during or after unit deployments.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 5-4: Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) struggle with synchronization of religious support assets on the battlefield. The current FM 16-1 gives a cursory discussion of the religious support duties of brigade chaplains and ministry team NCOICs, but does not provide a how-to on synchronization of religious support assets.
PROBLEM 5-5: Units tend to omit the chaplain assistant on their Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs). The commander does not understand the importance of what the chaplain assistant does on the battlefield. Chaplain assistant NCO supervisors do not aggressively strive to get chaplain assistants to training.

PROBLEM 5-6: Units tend to have inadequate religious support for rear elements, i.e., the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and the hospital. Units deploying to combat training centers do not configure their Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) IAW FM 16-1, and therefore, are not able to support all elements of the battlefield.

PROBLEM 5-7: Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) often do not understand their role

TA.7 Negative Trend 6: Medical support planning and execution

1. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) medical company commander is often unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities; the FSB support operations officer normally lack the experience in medical operations.
2. RESULT: Medical operations are not being properly synchronized into the overall operation.
3. There is a lack of consistency in how FSB medical companies establish treatment facilities. Some units use tracked or wheeled vehicles; others use various shapes and sizes of tentage for treatment space.
4. RESULT: This situation detracts from the smooth flow of patients through the medical company because of either a lack of space, or dysfunctional layout.
5. FSB medical company facilities are poorly marked.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 6-2:

1. Combat health support planners develop combat health support plans without understanding the maneuver plan.
2. Brigades do not conduct parallel planning, i.e., combat health support planners are not present for mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.
3. Planners continue to write the combat health support plans without doing a casualty estimate, and without knowledge of medical asset status and capabilities.

PROBLEM 6-3: Casualties feeder cards are too often incorrectly filled out. Medical company personnel do not have the information necessary to complete and/or correct the cards.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 6-4: (Repeat of Problem 6-1) Medical units are generally deficient in the planning, management and execution of medical operations.

1. Combat Health Support (CHS) planning is not integrated into the brigade planning process.
2. Too often the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) medical company commander is unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities.
3. The FSB support operations officer is often tasked to participate in the brigade orders process, but lacks the necessary experience in medical operations.
4. FSB medical companies do not establish standardized treatment facilities. Various shapes and sizes of tentage are used for treatment space.
5. FSB medical companies do not exhibit standardized blood management procedures.

Medical operations are usually not synchronized with BCT operations.
The set-up and layout of most treatment facilities hinder the smooth flow of patients because of either the size and/or layout of the treatment facility.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 6-5: The professional Filler System (PROFIS) physicians are not incorporated into medical platoon training and are not prepared to conduct tactical operations.

1. The majority of PROFIS doctors deploying to the combat training center have never trained with the unit they are supporting, and have been with the unit an average of about one week.
2. PROFIS physicians are too often not trained on common soldier skills.

PROBLEM 6-6: (Repeat of Problem 6-3) Units are challenged with preparing and submitting DA Form 1156 to standard.

1. Units are expected to quickly prepare and submit DA Form 1156 when they receive casualties.
2. DA Forms 1156 are frequently not completed with all pertinent information.
3. DA Forms 1156 for soldiers who are lightly wounded, treated, and immediately returned to duty (RTD), are not submitted to the task force S-1 or S-1 representative at the Forward Aid Station or Main Aid Station (FAS/MAS).

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 10
Section II: NT - Needs Emphasis Techniques