Military

CSS staff officers are reacting, rather than acting to support requirements.
S-4s cannot track resources nor have a systematic process to collect these resource/logistic factors.
S-4s and S-3s do not integrate the CSS plan into the wargaming process for operations. Without this integration, the CSS plan becomes unsynchronized and does not help to weight the main effort.

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force S-4s normally are not prepared to provide the task force commander and staff with the current logistical status of the task force prior to course of action (COA) selection. S-4s do not routinely use informal estimates or receive estimates from the key CSS leaders in the task force. Once wargaming does begin, S-4s are normally not included and are left to produce the CSS plan without the benefit of BOS synchronization.

PROBLEM 1-3: The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness. Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 1-4: Task forces have difficulty estimating Class V requirements.

1. Task force leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on-hand.
2. Munitions available for draw are not being tracked.
3. Ammunition haulers are not being tracked by bumper number.
4. The task force FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures he has determined.
5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the artillery battalion's critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).
6. Units down to battery level are not being resourced to fulfill CFSTs.
7. Triggers are not being established for backup supply to the battery or to the alternate shooter.

Units are not correctly resourced to accomplish their mission.
Resupply considerations are occurring too late to prevent mission interruption.
CSS and operations planners do not have accurate information about where ammo is, on which truck, and how long it will take to resupply a unit that needs the ammunition.

PROBLEM 1-5: (Repeat of Problem 1-3) The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness.

PROBLEM 1-6: Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements, including the reporting of casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control) and daily LOGSTAT reports.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problem 1-4) Units are not conducting Class V estimates to determine their required supply rate (RSR), then comparing it to their controlled supply rate (CSR) and schedule of fires to plan resupply operations based on priorities and resupply triggers.

1. Battalion leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on hand, tracking munitions available for draw, and managing ammo haulers by bumper number.
2. The battalion FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures.
3. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the battalions critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

PROBLEM 1-8: In many task forces, the logistical requirements of the 10 HMMWV-equipped scout platoon has necessitated that the scout platoon sergeant be responsible for the planning and execution of scout CSS.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 1-9: (Repeat of Problem 1-8) Too often the CSS for the scout platoon is an afterthought by the task force battle staff. Scout platoon leaders are often forced to try and coordinate with internal and external elements for support, without command emphasis from the task force.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problems 1-4 and 1-7) Task force level leaders and CSS planners are experiencing problems with Class V estimates.

1. Accurate Class V on-hand inventories are not being conducted.
2. Failure to track ammunition available to draw.
3. Poor management of ammunition haulers.
4. Planners fail to consult the battalion FDO about the scheme of fires for artillery, and the expected consumption based on the mission.
5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements with battalion critical fire support tasks (CFST).
6. Too many units are not being considered for resupply until it is too late to rearm in time to prevent mission failure.
7. When resupply is required, CSS and operations personnel do not have accurate information about:

PROBLEM 1-11: Rotational units do not consistently develop timely forecasts of logistical requirements. Many units have difficulty reporting casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control), and submitting daily LOGSTAT reports.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-12: The recovery plan for not mission capable (NMC) vehicles (specifically during task force missions) lack essential detail. Units do not plan collection points, and when they do, the collection points do not support the task force mission.

Company teams are often confused or lack any knowledge of the recovery plan.
Units lose valuable time in generating combat power during the task force mission and often only begin collecting vehicles after the change of the mission.

PROBLEM 1-13: An S-1 casualty estimate is not consistently made during the planning process.

PROBLEM 1-14: (Repeat of Problem 1-11) Most units experienced difficulty executing the timely development and reporting of future logistics requirements, to include reporting of casualties, damaged or destroyed equipment, and daily LOGSTAT reports.

PROBLEM 1-15: (Repeat of Problem 1-1)

1. The brigade Main CP CSS planner too often prepares CSS plans based upon guidance received from the TOC, without input from the FSB SPO or even the brigade S-4.
2. The CSS staffs generally need to use METT-T more frequently in developing its plans to support a task force.
3. The CSS staff still needs to work on integrating the CSS plan with the maneuver plan.
4. CSS key leaders need to be more involved in the planning process:
   - to ensure their plan is doctrinally sound
   - to ensure key leaders fully understand the plan, to include tasks and purpose of the task force

   The S-4 and the combat trains command post (CTCP) must anticipate the task force's needs during battle in order to push supplies to the companies.

   Task force S-1 and S-4 are not integrated into the planning process.

The CSS annex developed does not contain adequate detail and is not synchronized with FSB/MSB resupply actions.
CSS plan is not synchronized with the maneuver plan and is not doctrinally sound.
Companies do not receive supplies or else receive them too late.

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 8
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 10