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Military

SECTION II

N - NEEDS EMPHASIS, PART 8

TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

TA.6 Negative Trend 1: Breaching operations

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
11111

4QFY94
PROBLEM 1-1: Brigades fail to plan deliberate breach operations even when mission analysis clearly indicates that it is appropriate. Breaching tenets are seldom addressed in planning. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction are not fully addressed in OPORDs, or during brigade or task force level rehearsals. Rehearsals often become an extension of planning because of inadequate wargaming. Few units conduct mounted combined arms breaching rehearsals. Redundancy of breaching assets and a recovery capability to remove damaged vehicles from the breach lane are seldom considered. The support force is often not positioned to suppress enemy fire. The obscuration plan is generally not synchronized with the overall breach plan. Lack of obstacle intelligence contributes to failed missions.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 1-2: Maneuver task forces demonstrate a lack of understanding about the requirement differences between in-stride and deliberate breaching operations. Task force staffs do not provide company/teams with adequate support and/or planning in the areas of:

  1. Breach rehearsal sites
  2. Indirect fire planning
  3. Company/team task and purpose
  4. Task organization of breaching assets
  5. "Reverse" planning to wargame the type of breach necessary
  6. Determine assault force size/composition
  7. Number of breach lanes required
  8. Support force size/composition needed to achieve mass
  9. Task force level mounted breach rehearsals
RESULT: Company/team commanders do not know what conditions and triggers must be developed to achieve the synchronization necessary to accomplish the breach.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 1-3: Despite some indications of improvement, task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches. Specific problems:

  1. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in detail during the planning process.
  2. Wargaming for the breach operations lacks sufficient detail.
  3. Most units do not talk through the events setting conditions for a successful breach because they use the "box" technique, causing them to miss the events leading up to the breach.
  4. Breach rehearsals are lacking at all levels of the combined arms team. Task force "rock drills" typically gloss over all details of the actual breach.
  5. Rehearsals are often planned for, but rarely executed at task force level.
  6. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 1-4: (Repeat of Problem 1-3)

  1. Task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches.
  2. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in sufficient detail during the planning process.
  3. Wargaming for the breach operations is not sufficiently detailed.
  4. Criteria is not established for what determines when conditions are set, and when to commit the breach force.
  5. Breach rehearsals lack sufficient detail at all levels. EXAMPLES: 1) task force rock drills typically gloss over all details of the actual breach
    2) mounted rehearsals are often planned, but rarely executed.
  6. Rehearsals are often planned for, but rarely executed at task force level.
  7. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 1-5: Fundamentals of breaching operations are not understood or implemented at the task force level.

  1. 1. Task force Combined Arms Team members do not generally understand or apply breach tenants:
    - intelligence
    - synchronization
    - mass
    - organization (support, breach and assault forces)
    - fundamentals (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce) or characteristics of the offense:
    - surprise
    - concentration
    - speed
    - flexibility
    - audacity
  2. 2. Task forces and brigades often attempt to reduce without attaining appropriate level of suppression and obscuration of the enemy.
RESULT: Security of the obstacle breach site is not accomplished by either fire or force prior to the committal of the breach force with its local security element.

TA.6 Negative Trend 2: Use of M8A1 chemical alarm

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
111

1QFY95
PROBLEM 2-1: Units fail to perform pre-combat checks on M8A1 alarms prior to deployment. Many units fail to properly employ the alarms:
- alarms not connected to the battery
- alarms not positioned upwind
- alarms not connected to the M42
- omission of other critical steps Many units simply fail to emplace the alarm at all.
RESULT: Too many units receive no warning about enemy employment of chemical agents.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 2-2: (Repeat of Problem 2-1)

  1. Units fail to perform PCCs of M8A1 alarms prior to deployment, and therefore arrive with some unserviceable equipment.
  2. Units fail to properly employ the alarms:
    - not connected to the battery
    - not positioned upwind
    - not connected to the M42
  3. Many units fail to use the chemical agent alarm.
  4. Many units are not complying with the annual wipe tests requirement.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 2-3: Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their TACSOP for FM 3-4.

  1. Units do not identify threat level.
  2. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles.
  3. Units do not have adequate supply of WD-1 wire.
  4. Units tend to have battery shortages.
  5. Units often place M8A1 inside the unit's perimeter, and not IAW TM 3-6665-12-12.

TA.6 Negative Trend 3: Reaction to chemical attack

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
111

1QFY95
PROBLEM 3-1: Soldiers often fail to properly react to chemical attack. Soldiers fail to properly assume the appropriate MOPP level IAW FM 21-1-1-SMCT and as specified in unit SOP. Soldiers fail to put on boots, gloves and often fail to have the MOPP gear immediately available, IAW FM 3-4 or as specified in the unit SOP or the OPORD.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 3-2: Units react slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas. Soldiers rely too much on M256 kits; they do not use M8/M9 paper when they should.

RESULT: The failure to use all available detection techniques can cause false readings, unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 3-3: When units encounter persistent or non-persistent agents on the battlefield they do not have a plan to react. Maneuver units have stalled along their axis of advance for over 45 minutes while trying to confirm if the chemical agent is either persistent or non-persistent.

RESULT: Loss of momentum, and loss of entire company teams to enemy artillery and to chemical casualties.

TA.6 Negative Trend 4: Decontaminated unit operations

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
11

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 4-1: Task forces are generally unprepared to conduct thorough decontamination operations. Contaminated elements fail to provide the personnel to augment the detailed equipment decontamination element. Contaminated elements also fail to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct detailed troop decontamination.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 4-2:

  1. Deliberate decontamination sites and link-up points are usually identified in plans; however, the plan sites are rarely used, creating link-up problems between the contaminated unit and the decon platoon.
  2. Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem.
- most brigade NBC staffs fail to realize their staff coordination and supervisory responsibilities for decon operations
- units rarely task specific elements (such as Military Police, Engineer, and medical personnel and equipment) to reinforce decon operations
- units do not adequately stock equipment for Detailed Troop Decon (DTD) or plan for resupply after the operation
- task forces are limited in conducting decontamination operations due to lack of water hauling capabilities

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 7
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 9



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