SECTION
II
N
- NEEDS EMPHASIS, PART 7
TA.5 INTELLIGENCE
TA.5 Negative Trend 3: Threat evaluation and Enemy COA development
Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
2 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
1QFY95
PROBLEM 3-1: Brigade S-2s rarely deploy to the NTC with complete threat models, particularly missing the description of tactics and options, as well as the identification of High Value Targets (HVT).
PROBLEM 3-2: SITEMPs produced by brigade S-2s are rarely complete; seldom will they produce an event template with a matrix.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
3-3: The delegation of the task of threat evaluation within the S-2 section
needs improvement.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
3-4: S-2s rarely deploy with threat models. Instead they deploy with situational
templates tailored to missions they believe they will execute.
PROBLEM 3-5: Too many brigade and battalion/task force S-2s are not referencing threat doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques and procedures when trying to determine threat capabilities and actions.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM
3-6:
- Too often, S-2s give perfunctory attention to the effects of terrain and weather on enemy COAs. The enemy's use of terrain to build engagement areas and the impact on friendly maneuver is rarely found in development of friendly COAs.
- S-2s do not incorporate terrain from the enemy's perspective when developing the situation template. Similar trends exist in the analysis of weather impact on smoke, air assault, and enemy chemical use.
PROBLEM 3-7: S-2s and battle staffs often design enemy COAs (ECOAs) that are scripts, reflecting "smart books" or checklist solutions, not dangerous, dynamic, unified plans.
- ECOAs do not regularly reflect how the enemy would see friendly forces and COAs.
- ECOAs do not reflect possible enemy COAs to different friendly COAs, i.e., enemy defense COAs if friendly unit attacks abreast versus in column or in one sector versus another.
TA.5 Negative Trend 4: S-2 Situation Template (SITEMP) development
Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 4-1: Brigade S-2s habitually enter the tactical decisionmaking process with only one SITEMP. By only submitting one SITEMP to the staff planning process, S-2s are not presenting the full range of enemy tactical options. The SITEMPs usually lack the necessary detail to portray the full spectrum of enemy battlefield operating systems (BOSs).
1QFY95
PROBLEM
4-2:
- S-2s are not routinely depicting the enemy's most dangerous course of action (COA). Very few S-2s develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight and what he will look like as he enters our potential engagement areas.
- S-2s SITEMPs do not graphically portray all the enemy's combat multipliers.
- During wargaming, the staff does not conduct a thorough action-reaction-counter- reaction drill of the fight based on a good SITEMP or threat model
- Without an accurate depiction of the threat in an engagement area, commanders have a more difficult time calculating the necessary number and type of weapon systems to employ to achieve the commander's intent in that engagement area.
- Task forces develop COAs and wargame them without a clear understanding of how the enemy will fight.
- Maneuver plans do not get synchronized with fire support or engineers, etc., to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities; we hamper our ability to gain and maintain the initiative.
- Without an accurate depiction of the threat in an engagement area, commanders have a more difficult time calculating the necessary number and type of weapon systems to employ to achieve the commander's intent in that engagement area.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
4-3: (Repeat of Problem 4-2) In an effort to shorten the deliberate planning
process, S-2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA). The
S-2 shortens enemy COA development by failing to depict the enemy's most dangerous
COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in engagement areas (EA).
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
4-4: (Repeat of Problems 4-2 and 4-3)
- Task force S-2 SITEMPS lack sufficient detail to assist the commander and battle staff to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.
- S-2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA), and possible enemy branch plans from the selected enemy COA.
- S-2 SITEMPs do not account for all the enemy combat multipliers.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM
4-5: (Repeat of Problems 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4) S-2's situation templates (SITEMPs)
frequently lack sufficient detail to assist the staff and commanders to visualize
how the enemy will fight at the critical point.
- S-2s are not depicting multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs).
- The S-2 fails to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs.
- S-2s do not prepare threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy would fight.
- S-2s do not show the staff how the enemy would look entering potential engagement areas (EAs).
- Task forces wargame selected friendly COAs without a clear understanding of how the enemy will react to or affect those COAs.
- Task forces cannot develop valid friendly branches and sequels which will hinder the enemy commander's decision making process.
- The task force becomes reactive to the enemy rather than holding the initiative.
- Task forces wargame selected friendly COAs without a clear understanding of how the enemy will react to or affect those COAs.
PROBLEM 4-6: Task force S-2 sections frequently do not use combat information to update their situation template in a timely manner.
- S-2 sections do not have a sequential system in place to receive reports, analyze reports, and confirm or deny the situation template.
- They do not update the situation template after the OPORD briefing.
- Units have an excellent "read" of the enemy but fail to realize this due to limited situation template refinement.
- Units do not refine their direct fire plan or scheme of maneuver as enemy information develops.
- Units have an excellent "read" of the enemy but fail to realize this due to limited situation template refinement.
TA.5 Negative Trend 5: Terrain analysis
Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
1 | 1 | 1 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 5-1: Brigade S-2 sections are not producing Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) for terrain analysis. Instead of a MCOO, brigade intelligence sections are producing a type of terrain analysis that focuses on topographical restriction only. This approach omits many critical aspects of the terrain that have a significant impact on military operations, i.e., intervisibility lines, axis of advance, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, etc.
1QFY95
PROBLEM
5-2:
- Enemy avenues of approach depicted into friendly sectors do not identify potential engagement areas, fire sacks, defensible terrain and specific system or equipment positions.
- Terrain analysis fails to identify where maneuver forces are most vulnerable to enemy observation and fires.
- Terrain analysis is not considered by the S-2 or the S-3 when developing threat and friendly COAs
- S-3s develop friendly COAs without considering terrain's impact of weapon system effects and/or enemy COAs.
- There is little staff integration between the S-2 and the supporting engineer.
- Vital information derived from terrain analysis is not incorporated into the decision making process.
- Staff develops COAs and wargame them without an adequate knowledge of how the enemy will use terrain to his advantage and a terrain based concept of the employment of mobility and counter-mobility assets.
- Vital information derived from terrain analysis is not incorporated into the decision making process.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
5-3: (Repeat of Problem 5-1) S-2s rarely use the modified combined obstacle
overlay (MCOO) developed at Home Station to assist terrain analysis.
TA.5 Negative Trend 6: S-2 analysis and reporting
Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
1 | 1 | 1 |
2QFY95
PROBLEM 6-1: Too often in field artillery (FA) battalions, by the time S-2s report "current" information, the information is outdated. Intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs) are designed to show where the enemy is now and predict the impact on future operations. The failure to either use these formats, or to graphically depict these events, will result in the S-2 failing to see critical enemy events and their impact on the battalion.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
6-2: (Repeat of Problem 6-1) Too many field artillery (FA) battalions fail
to use intelligence summaries (INTSUM) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREP)
to show where the enemy is now and to predict the impact the enemy will have
on future operations.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM
6-3: S-2s often mix analytic products and current situation products to the
commander and staff. They routinely use one map overlay for both "template"
and situation map. They do not routinely identify one source in brigade CP
for current situation assessments.
- Prevents rapid transmission of current assessments to commander and staff.
- Unable to provide on-call up-to-the-minute updates.
- Prevents rapid transmission of current assessments to commander and staff.
Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
1 | 1 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 7-1: Brigade S-2s rarely prepare event templates or an event matrix focused on critical enemy events. Failure to prepare these products results in inadequately focused reconnaissance and surveillance plans.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
7-2: S-2s experience difficulties developing and using an event template and
matrix. There are particular problems identifying critical enemy events and
then integrating them into an event template and matrix.
Table
of Contents
Section
II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 6
Section
II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 8
NEWSLETTER
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