Military

Poor gunnery execution and inaccurate boresighting because of no PCC.
Breaching kits not functional at breach sites.
Vehicle breakdown due to poor operator-level maintenance.
M-8 Chemical alarms in non-mission capable status.
M26 boresight device in non-mission capable status.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 12-2: Company/team leaders are not regularly conducting pre-combat checks (PCCs), and platoon sergeants and leaders are not conducting pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Most units have SOPs on the conduct of PCCs and PCIs, but they are not often followed.

TA.4 Negative Trend 13: Planning for deep operations

1. Brigade staffs do not view missions within the battlefield framework - deep, close, rear, security and reserve. Thus the fire support plan is not designed around the deep, close, rear concept.
2. Plans which do incorporate deep fires, usually executed by COLTs, are written with no specific task, purpose or end state.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 13-2: (Repeat of Problem 13-1) The brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be fought with success.

1. Brigade staffs are not viewing the planning and execution of the mission according to the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear, security, and reserve).
2. The fire support plan is not designed around the concept of deep, close, rear. Routinely, the plans contain some amount of deep fires, usually executed by the Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs), but with no specific task, purpose, and end state determined.

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE

TA.5 Negative Trend 1: Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force commanders and S-3s "delegate" the responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 1-3:

1. Task force commanders are not giving guidance to scout platoon leaders until after they issue the TF OPORD, but they expect the scout platoon to LD prior to the task force.
2. The task force S-2/S-3 does not have the R& plan complete until after the TF OPORD.

PROBLEM 1-4: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) The majority of S-2s develop the R& plan without integrating the other staff elements. This process is not driven by the XO or the S-3 in support of the overall plan development

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. S-2s experience difficulties in developing and using the R& plan. Brigade S-2s rarely receive subordinate unit's R& plans, which results in poor identification of intelligence gaps.
2. S-2s rarely adjust priority intelligence requirements (PIR) during the recon effort or during the main battle.

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. S-2s will use the Situation Template (SITEMP) in developing NAIs, but usually fail to consider the exact composition and disposition of the enemy's counterrecon threat.
2. Collection plans consistently lack enough detail to identify the expected time and type of enemy activity at particular NAIs for the tasked asset.
3. S-2s have become the sole staff agency responsible for R& planning. Rarely is there adequate coordination between the S-2 and the S-3 to integrate the R& plan with the maneuver plan.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problems 1-1 and 1-5)

1. Lack of staff integration in development and execution of R& plan.
2. S-2s not receiving subordinate element R& plans.
3. PIRs not adjusted throughout the reconnaissance effort.
4. NAIs not updated and disseminated to subordinate elements.

PROBLEM 1-8: (Repeat of Problem 1-2) Too many units at task force level delegate the entire responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 1-9:

1. Too little staff integration into the R& planning process.
2. R & S plans too general, failing to focus on gaps in intelligence holdings.
3. Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) is often too general to focus the R& planning .
4. The scout platoon leader rarely knows the 1 or 2 items the commander absolutely needs to know in order to achieve success.

The scout platoon deploys over-tasked, with multiple objectives of supposed equal importance.
Scouts fail to accomplish their mission.

PROBLEM 1-10: (Repeat of Problems 1-2 and 1-8) Too many units at TF level "delegate" the entire responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S-2.

The staff cannot determine threat weaknesses and strengths.
Courses of action do not avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

PROBLEM 1-11:

1. Units do not prepare R& plans until after the TDMP is complete, losing 24-36 hours due to delays in planning between brigade and battalion.
2. Units use R & S matrices as the executing document. This document does not address:
   - penetration/infiltration of enemy security forces.
   - CSS
   - Command and control (C2) (especially long range comms).
   - terrain management
   - fratricide avoidance
   - clearance of fires.

   R& plans do not have enough operational flexibility:

   - insufficient planning in depth

   - lack of provisions for redirecting recon assets

   - no plan to reconstitute destroyed assets.

   Plans do not state missions in terms of task, purpose, objectives, and intent.

   Commanders do not receive back briefs or use other methods to ensure reconnaissance intent is understood.

PROBLEM 1-12: While task force scouts usually succeed in observing tasked Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), there are too many instances where there was no plan to reposition the scouts if the TF scheme of maneuver changes.

TA.5 Negative Trend 2: The IPB process and application

1QFY95
PROBLEM 2-2: Field Artillery (FA) battalion S-2s routinely spend the first several days of a rotation trying to put together IPB templates to support the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) because this type of training and preparation was not done at Home Station prior to deployment.

PROBLEM 2-3: S-2s possess an acceptable conceptual understanding of the IPB process, but there is a breakdown that appears to be rooted in the application of IPB, including what products must be produced, by whom, when, and to what standard. Staff integration of IPB products at task force/squadron level is poor.

PROBLEM 2-4: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) products and analysis, specifically enemy engineer capabilities and terrain analysis, are not integrated with the S-2 products. Task force commanders are not receiving the complete enemy picture.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 2-5: Commanders and staffs fail to conduct a complete IPB. They do not follow processes outlined in FM 34-130. In many cases they do not develop a full understanding of the enemy or weather or terrain. Seldom do intelligence personnel accurately develop the enemy's most likely or most dangerous courses of action.

PROBLEM 2-6: IPB at company/team level is either not done, or not done to the level of detail necessary. Company/team commanders are not templating down to the individual vehicle, or dismounted fighting position. When vehicles are templated, the potential dismounted threat is often ignored.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 2-7:

1. Company/team commanders do not analyze terrain for:
   - intervisibility lines
   - dead space
   - choke points

   Company/team commanders fail to consider the enemy's:

   - use of terrain

   - weapon system emplacements and their effect on friendly maneuver.

Offensive mission: BLUFOR elements consistently maneuver into enemy engagement areas.
Defensive missions: BLUFOR elements establish a defense with too much dead space not covered by observation and indirect fire and/or obstacles to channel to enemy into a friendly engagement area.

PROBLEM 2-8: (Repeat of Problem 2-3)

1. While the Intelligence School and Center teaches Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) concepts well, the specific application of the IPB process, what products must be produced by whom, when, and to what standard are not clearly articulated anywhere except the Combat Training Centers.
2. The staff planning process at task force/squadron level, and specific IPB integration, is generally not understood or articulated to the S-2 by the commander, executive officer (XO) or the S-3.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 2-9:

1. During Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), S-2s continue to omit detail needed to focus course of action (COA) development and their commander's estimate.
2. S-2s experience some difficulty in portraying the enemy throughout the Area of Operations (AO).
3. For light infantry operations, the enemy threat during infiltration and/or airborne/air assault operations is frequently not adequately explained or templated.

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 5
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 7