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Military

SECTION II

N - NEEDS EMPHASIS, PART 5

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

TA.4 Negative Trend 6: Employ tactical C2W

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
42

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 6-1: Electronic surveillance team/platoon leaders are not conducting thorough Pre-combat checks (PCCs) or Pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Relying on memory rather than using a written checklist.
RESULTS:
  1. EA system inoperable due to missing ground strap.
  2. EW system runs out of fuel.
  3. Two backup EW systems inoperable due to missing parts.
  4. Weapons will not fire due to lack of maintenance.
  5. Backup manpackable EW systems run out of batteries.

PROBLEM 6-2: The traffic analysis cell does not maintain a current data base of historical analytical observations, reconstruct radio nets, plot manual direction finding results, or provide feedback to the collection/jamming teams.

RESULT: The traffic analysis cell was essentially a glorified radio-relay facility.

PROBLEM 6-3: Timely and accurate Jamming Effectiveness Reports (JERs) are not reaching the Platoon Operations Center (POC) during the conduct of an EA mission to have the desired effect.

PROBLEM 6-4: The Platoon Operations Center (POC) is unable to adequately track the tasking of its EW systems and utilize the collection/jamming assets to their fullest potential. The POC relies heavily on the EW teams to coordinate among themselves with little or no guidance from the POC to accomplish the mission. POCs show lack of knowledge on both the capabilities and limitations of its EW systems and how to effectively run either a collection or jamming mission.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 6-5: (Repeat of Problem 6-2) As a whole, the traffic analysis cells did not maintain a current data-base of historical analytical observations, consistently plot manual direction finding results, or provide meaningful feedback to the collection/jamming teams. These problems are the result of lack of time management, apathy or ignorance by traffic cell members, and lack of emphasis or concern by company team leadership.

RESULTS:
  1. Ineffective traffic analysis for leadership and collection teams.
  2. Ineffective platoon operations center (POC).

PROBLEM 6-6: Company commanders and platoon leaders make decisions from their command post with little understanding of the environment in which Electronic Warfare (EW) teams are operating.

TA.4 Negative Trend 7: Battle staff mission analysis

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
1111

4QFY94
PROBLEM 7-1: Battle staffs are not providing the commander a detailed mission analysis briefing and do not focus the wargaming effort on the critical points of the plan. Staffs consistently fail to brief assets available by platoon; amount of special equipment and munitions available; duration of combat multipliers (i.e., minutes of mortar smoke, number of mines, wire available, etc.).
RESULT: Lack of focus during wargaming because of an inadequate understanding of where and when these assets can be used to enhance maneuver elements ability to accomplish their mission.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 7-2: Task force staffs do not give their commanders sufficient information during mission analysis briefs about the task force's current and projected status, particularly information useful in planning.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 7-3: Mission analysis is not conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

  1. The battle staff does not:
    - meet at the Main CP
    - receive an overall brief of upcoming operations by the task force XO or S-3 Air
    - conduct a mission analysis of their proponent BOS while the task force commander, S-3 and Fire Support Officer (FSO) are at brigade receiving the brigade order.
  2. Frequently, the Air Defense Officer (ADO) and logisticians are not informed that the Main CP has received the order, or given the time that the mission analysis is going to be conducted.
RESULT: Without a fully integrated mission analysis, the S-2 and S-3 will not be able to conduct a mission analysis brief to the commander with all specified, implied, mission essential tasks identified.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 7-4: (Repeat of Problem 7-3) Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

  1. The battle staff does not conduct parallel planning:
    - battle staff assembles at task force command post while task force commander, S-3 and Fire Support Officer (FSO) receive brigade order at brigade.
    - battle staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs
  2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.
RESULT: Task force planning does not identify fully specified, implied, and essential tasks for brief to commander.

TA.4 Negative Trend 8: OPORD and FRAGO preparation

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
112

1QFY95
PROBLEM 8-1: Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) are required to produce numerous OPORDs in support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) operations. FSBs rarely conduct a full and complete orders process because of a failure to manage time and a lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process.
RESULT: FSB OPORDs lack sufficient detail, which then leads to rehearsals that lack detail and are not well coordinated. In turn, these deficiencies lead to avoidable mission execution failures.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 8-2: Units lack a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Overall, battle staff training levels are low, and the roles and responsibilities of each staff officer/NCO are not clearly defined. Although task force staffs have a good understanding of the doctrinal planning process, it is evident that these same staffs are not well drilled and therefore cannot produce detailed plans quickly.

RESULT: Plans lack adequate detail, are not well integrated and therefore have little chance of success.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 8-3: The commander's intent is frequently not reflected or embraced in subordinate unit's plans and orders.

  1. Subordinate commanders do not understand the commander's intent. Their own orders, graphics, and intent do not reflect the intent of next two higher levels. Plans differ from what the higher commander envisioned.
  2. There is no system to ensure subordinates build concepts and plans that will accomplish mission in accordance with higher commanders' intent. Staffs rarely check compliance. The higher commander often learns of discrepancies late in the tactical decision making process (TDMP).
RESULTS:
  1. Higher commanders' intent is not accomplished.
  2. Higher commander cannot change subordinates' plans in time to reflect intent.

PROBLEM 8-4: Company/teams do not produce operations orders (OPORDs) in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

  1. Situation Template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the enemy will fight and shape the battlefield.
  2. Commanders are weak in articulating how they envision the battle will flow.
  3. Paragraph II: Poor understanding of task force/brigade scheme of maneuver.
  4. paragraph III: Often scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to KILL the enemy.
  5. Task forces give unclear task and purposes to company/teams which result in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.
  6. Paragraph IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for the company/team.
  7. Paragraph V: No "JUMP" plan or signals discussed.

TA.4 Negative Trend 9: Enemy COA development

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
111

2QFY95
PROBLEM 9-1: Brigade staffs have not been developing and synchronizing viable plans against multiple enemy courses of action (COAs) during the planning process.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 9-2: Most task forces develop and wargame one course of action (COA) to defeat the enemy most likely COA. As part of mission analysis, task force S-2s develop and brief the enemy most-likely and most-dangerous COAs. The commander and staff then develop the task force plan to defeat the enemy most-like COA. During wargaming, the S-2 fights the enemy most-likely COA against the task force plan. Because of limited time, the wargame ends without fighting other possible enemy COAs.

RESULTS:
  1. Task forces are typically unprepared to adjust/react to another enemy COA during the battle:
    - no adequate contingency plans or decision support products to react to other possible enemy COAs.
    - inadequate graphic control measures to maneuver their company/teams
  2. Piecemeal commitment of the task force.
  3. Confusion on the battlefield.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 9-3: S-2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy courses of action (ECOAs).

  1. Units attempt to conduct tactical decision making process (TDMP) rapidly and limit time devoted to mission analysis.
  2. S-2 does not complete realistic, detailed ECOAs until COA analysis/wargaming or even until rehearsal.
RESULTS:
  1. S-2 cannot develop detailed, realistic ECOAs during mission analysis phase; does not influence friendly COA development.
  2. Unit staff is surprised by ECOAs late in TDMP and must rework plan and orders.

TA.4 Negative Trend 10: Timelines and time management

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
111

4QFY94
PROBLEM 10-1: Task force staffs do not understand how to develop a timeline, refine it as necessary, and effectively track and adhere to the established timeline.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 10-2: Task force timelines normally contain basic items and are not effectively disseminated; frequently they are not even posted.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 10-3: Most units do not effectively manage time, and often produce inadequate timelines. Despite unit commanders and staffs acknowledging the importance of time management and adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule, the majority of units fail to properly manage their time.

TA.4 Negative Trend 11: Employment and integration of a reserve

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
111

2QFY95
PROBLEM 11-1: Brigades often do not designate a reserve.
RESULT: At critical points in the close fight, brigade commanders have no options as the battle progresses. In those instances where a reserve is designated, the reserve commander either does not get a copy of the brigade OPORD, or gets it late. Seldom does the reserve element participate in brigade rehearsals, and too often the reserve commander has little or no idea of his specific task, purpose or commitment trigger.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 11-2: Brigades often do not designate a reserve in COAs, and when one is designated, it often has no clear mission or commitment criteria.

  1. Reserve is not designated especially on operations where there is sufficient combat power to do so.
  2. When reserves are designated, they often are given little or no guidance.
  3. Reserve positions and route of probable deployment are not reconned.
  4. Specific criteria tied to a clear trigger and designated in a decision support template (DST) are not formulated.
RESULT: Reserve commanders are often confused as to their task and purpose.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 11-3: Reserve operations need refinement in planning and integration.

  1. There is a lack of positioning guidance and triggers for commitment for reserve during planning.
    - reserve commander does not participate fully in planning.
    - positioning guidance, priority for commitment, and clear communication procedures not given to reserve.
  2. Reserve commander seldom gives brigade commander briefback
    - does not participate in brigade rehearsal
    - must deduce mission
RESULTS:
  1. Independent action by reserve rather than integrated with commander's intent.
    - reserve commander does not understand his role in brigade plan
    - reserve follows designated task force.
  2. Many offensive maneuver opportunities for decision lost.
    - reserve reinforces failure or a dilemma rather than success
    - reserve attached to main effort or task force in contact

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 4
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 6



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