Military

PROBLEM 3-6: Task force commanders dominate task force nets during the fight. There is a lack of cross talk among subordinates and specialty platoon leaders on the command net. Too often in the OPORD, paragraph 5 fails to establish who has priority on the net during certain events or phases of the battle.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 3-7: (Repeat of Problem 3-6) Units at all levels fail to "cross talk" adequately during battles.

1. Units do not keep adjacent elements informed of their tactical situation during missions.
2. Little or no mention of "cross talking" in manuals.

Increased probability of fratricide, maneuvering into enemy fire sacks, and overestimation of battle damage assessments (BDA).
Commanders do not receive clear picture of battle until after-action review (AAR).

PROBLEM 3-8: Task force Battalion Signal Officers (BSOs) are not generally integrated into the task force tactical decision making process (TDMP).

1. BSO's relationship with task force battle staff tends to be better when BSO is a captain (CPT) rather than a lieutenant (LT); LTs may be intimidated or fear rejection.
2. There is insufficient integration to consider communications adequately or timely.
3. While there are attempts to consider communications under paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the OPORD, there is rarely a communications annex written.

Lieutenants do not offer communications advice or recommendations as well in task force staff work as captains.
No clear picture of communications support is available to task force members.
Communications support is not integrated into the task force plan.

PROBLEM 3-9: Retransmit (RETRANS) teams are too often looking for the high ground, with no sense of where the enemy is and no clear mission.

1. Brigade Signal Officers (BSO) tend to give RETRANS teams a brief warning with no route and little guidance.
2. RETRANS teams deploy with a lesson statement, but seldom a detailed OPORD.
3. RETRANS teams have no familiarization with the task force plan.

TA.4 Negative Trend 4: Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP)

1QFY95
PROBLEM 4-2: Too many engineer battalion staffs do not begin their planning until after the brigade issues its OPORD. Task force engineers miss a window of opportunity to impact the maneuver task force planning process. By not having critical information, such as enemy and friendly engineer capabilities and terrain analysis, available before the task force commander issues his guidance and course of action development begins, the task force engineer is often too late in the tactical decision making process (TDMP) to influence task organization, scheme of maneuver and the planning of combined arms rehearsals.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 4-3: Too many task force commanders go through the tactical decision making process (TDMP) and then into battle without knowing what fire support assets are available to support their missions. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) do not identify critical information, usually provided by brigade, such as specified and implied tasks, as well as assets available.

PROBLEM 4-4: CSS units seldom use the tactical decision making process (TDMP) during the formulation of their OPORDs. Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) rarely conduct a full and complete orders process during the development of their OPORDs because of both time constrains and an apparent unfamiliarity with the doctrinal orders process.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 4-5: (Repeat of Problem 4-2) Engineer battalion staffs are not prepared to conduct a structured parallel planning process.

1. The battalion staff's wealth of knowledge and experience is not integrated into the Assistant Brigade Engineer's (ABE) participation in the brigade planning process.
2. Lack of integration precludes commander's guidance and decisions being received by the ABE.
3. Battalion staffs lack understanding that their planning cannot begin after the brigade issues its order.
4. Task force engineers are unable to integrate enemy and friendly engineer capabilities and terrain analysis prior to the task force commander's guidance and course of action (COA) development.

The ABE's input to brigade planning process may not be in line with commander's guidance.
Brigade planning process has no depth.
Battalion OPORD is not produced in a timely manner.
Subordinate units do not receive their staff/commander analysis and guidance early enough to integrate, early on, in the task force planning process.
Task force engineers miss the window of opportunity to best effect task organization, scheme of maneuver and combined arms rehearsals.

PROBLEM 4-6: Battle staffs lack the training required to conduct the tactical decision making process (TDMP) to standard.

1. Task force commanders too often begin to dominate the staff planning process so it becomes the commander's process instead of a staff process.
2. Task force commanders too often spend most of their time at the Main CP supervising the staff.
3. Task force commanders are unable to supervise the critical events that ensure their intent is understood through subordinate unit OPORDS and rehearsals.
4. Task force commanders cannot assess the task force preparation first-hand.

PROBLEM 4-7: The brigade staff conduct of the tactical decision making process (TDMP) does not generally follow the guidance outlined in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123.

1. The brigade targeting team does not synchronize between the battlefield operating systems, and fails to develop:
   - a meaningful high payoff target list
   - a wargame-derived scheme of fires
   - a target list that support the scheme of maneuver

   The reconnaissance and surveillance plan does not focus on generating targetable information for engagement by lethal and non-lethal means.

The various staff elements develop their plans in relative isolation.
There is no plan to link lookers with shooters to synchronize fires with maneuver.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 4-8: (Repeat of Problems 4-2 and 4-5) Engineer battalion staffs do not regularly plan in parallel with brigade staffs.

1. Engineer battalion staffs do not use their proximity to the brigade staff:
   - to expedite their own planning
   - to influence the brigade staff through immediate input to the Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE)

   Engineer staffs do not seek out information/OPORDs received by brigade.

   Reduced engineer input to brigade tactical decision making process (TDMP):

   - terrain analysis

   - enemy abilities templating

   - friendly capabilities input

   - minimal resourcing and timelining of assets

   Engineer OPORD does not give staff information to task force engineers to allow use in task force TDMP:

   - parallel planning with task force

   - engineer company OPORD not synchronized with task force plan

Unsynchronized plans and/or delayed engineer battalion OPORDs.
Engineer battalions are delayed I beginning their own missions analysis process.
Once behind the brigade staff, engineer battalion staffs become non-players in the TDMP.
The ABE becomes the only engineer in brigade TDMP.
The engineer battalion OPORD is incomplete, delayed, not synchronized with brigade plan, and needs FRAGOs to correct.
The task force engineers' OPORD is not synchronized with task force plan.

TA.4 Negative Trend 5: Battle tracking and predictive analysis

The S-2 has an unclear picture of the overall situation and therefore is unable to do any significant predictive analysis based on critical enemy events. Poor reporting also makes it difficult to do accurate battle tracking.
Section operating procedures during combat operations must be developed "on the fly."

2QFY95
PROBLEM 5-2: Task force staffs/command posts fail to effectively battle track during the planning, preparation and execution phases of missions. Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) usually maintain two battle tracking boards/maps - the S-2's and the S-3's. Both boards usually have an assortment of information posted, but fail in tracking all enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations (AO).

PROBLEM 5-3: (Repeat of Problem 5-1) Poor battle tracking in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) interferes with the S-2's ability to conduct event analysis and predictive analysis. Information received in the TOC during battle is not integrated and then routinely disseminated. S-2s too often fail to develop adequate section SOPs spelling out section members' responsibilities and specifying operating procedures during combat operations.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 5-4: Most command posts fight the battle in an inadequate Tactical Operation Center (TOC) configuration, with each staff section fighting the battle from inside its own M577. There is no adequate plan to share information with other staff elements.

The TOC does not share situational awareness, provide predictive analysis to the commander, or aid him in synchronizing all the BOS elements on the battlefield.
The normal TOC configuration does not aid staff integration without a proactive executive officer (XO) and staff.

PROBLEM 5-5: The Main command post (CP) is not able to analyze information that they receive to provide the commander with a picture of what the enemy will do, and make recommendations of actions that we should take.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 5-6: (Repeat of Problem 5-5) The Main command post (CP) often appears more concerned with reporting to higher headquarters than with tracking the battle and predictive analysis for the commander. The Main CP does not consistently analyze information received, provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next, or recommend future friendly actions.

PROBLEM 5-7: The Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel are not cross-trained to duties such as battle tracking, map posting, combat strength analysis and situation updates.

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 3
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 5