Military

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force staffs wargaming either gets too detailed and never finished, or is extremely superficial.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 1-3: Units routinely experience significant problems with both COA development and then wargaming of COAs.

1. Brigade staffs seldom use the five step methodology to develop COAs described in FM 101-5, ST 101-5, or CALL Newsletter 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff.
2. Commanders either dictate most COAs, or one or two key staff officers develop them without other staff input.
3. In short-cutting the five step process, most staffs do not examine force ratios by arraying the forces available.
4. Most staffs fail also to develop all parts of the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear).
5. By not using a doctrinal COA development methodology, staffs fail to develop a critical events list because they have not fully developed a scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEM 1-4: Task force staffs are not well trained in wargaming, frequently getting bogged down in small details, or just doing a superficial job. Too often, staffs do not list critical enemy and friendly events. In some cases, units fail to wargame COAs at all and begin OPORD development. Some commanders see no use in decision support templates/matrix products, and rely on their "feel" of the battle to make their tactical decisions.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 1-5: Task force S-3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact or actions on the objective, but never get to the details of what it is they want their company/teams to really accomplish.
3. Task and purpose are rarely assigned to company/teams.

PROBLEM 1-6: Most brigade staffs do not understand course of action development.

1. Courses of action are not fully developed prior to starting wargaming.
2. The five-step methodology for developing COAs described in CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning, and CGSC ST 100-9, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking, are not followed.
3. Most COAs are dictated by the commander or developed by one or two officers without staff input.
4. Staffs often get in such a hurry to begin wargaming that they do not fully formulate each BOSs role in the approved COA.

PROBLEM 1-7: Task force commanders and staffs do not understand how to develop a Course of Action (COA).

1. COAs are not developed based on the commanders's decisive point.
2. COAs do not define in doctrinal terms what the company/teams are to do.
3. COAs are not in enough detail.
4. COAs are frequently not developed with the S-2's SITEMP.
5. COAs are frequently not developed on a map when the terrain can be taken into account.

Lack of optimum synchronization in the scheme of maneuver.
Broad concepts of operation rather than detailed, fully-developed COAs.
Wargaming tends to be COA development rather than an exercise to synchronize the operation.

PROBLEM 1-8: Fire support integration during the wargame is still not to standard.

1. Fire support integration during wargaming of branch plans is usually not done.
2. The S-3 usually focuses strictly on maneuver.
3. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) are expected to participate in the wargame only as observers.
4. Integration of radar zones with the maneuver plan is forgotten.
5. Integration of mortar priority targets and mortar positioning is seldom accomplished.
6. Integration of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan with the fire support plan is never done.
7. Prioritising or focusing fires for different phases of the operation is not done.
8. Integrating CAS targets into the plan is not done.

PROBLEM 1-9: Wargaming is not focused and does not synchronize the task force plan.

1. During the wargame, the task force Executive Officer (XO) does not facilitate the process and the battle staff loses its focus on the critical events that need to be wargamed and the relationship between events and the decisive point.
2. The wargame ends up taking all day or night with only the most aggressive participants providing input and the rest of the staff writing their annex without fully synchronizing their BOS.
3. Task forces routinely conduct wargaming without:
   - refined SITEMP
   - Event Template
   - fully-developed and integrated COA
   - having identified enemy and friendly critical events.

The lack of a refined SITEMP and Event Template makes it hard for the commander and staff to visualize the enemy. Plans are not focused on killing the enemy and protecting the force.
We do not understand the enemy's use of combat multipliers. This prevents us from anticipating their use and developing our actions for the various forms of contact.
The lack of a developed and integrated COA before the wargame results in the wargaming process becoming a COA development session.
Without having identified both the enemy and friendly critical events, we cannot properly scope our wargaming process, make assumptions about events that will not be wargamed, or identify contingencies/branch plans that must be developed.

1-2QFY96

1. PROBLEM 1-10: COA development often fails to produce plans with sufficient detail and precision for successful execution.
2. Most brigades fail to conduct a COA development session as part of their Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
3. While most brigades use an abbreviated form of TDMP in which the commander dictates a course of action, staffs fail to develop the COA fully into a draft plan with sufficient detail to synchronize the BOS. Not until wargaming is the COA developed, thus failing to produce synchronization, precision, and detail needed for successful execution.

Brigades either fail to have a COA development session or wargaming or both.
The plan lacks details and precision necessary for successful execution.

PROBLEM 1-11: (Repeat of Problem 1-9) Wargaming rarely synchronizes the Task Force plan. Task force Executive Officers (XOs) do not facilitate the process. The staff loses focus on critical events and the relationship between events wargamed and decisive point.

The wargame takes too long.
Only the most aggressive participants provide input.
Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

PROBLEM 1-12: (Repeat of Problem 1-5) Most task force S-3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact. They rarely provide details on what they want company/teams to accomplish and rarely assign task(s) and/or purpose to company/teams.

TA.4 Negative Trend 2: Task Force Rehearsals

2QFY95
PROBLEM 2-2: Too often company level "rehearsals" are no more than backbriefs. The rehearsal allows participants to become familiar with the concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver and fires.

PROBLEM 2-3: Task force rehearsals too often do not focus on critical events, i.e., actions on the objective. Units routinely fail to plan offensive missions in sufficient detail, and then rehearsals for those missions also lack detail.

PROBLEM 2-4: Medical personnel are not pinpointing medical asset locations (forward aid stations and main aid stations (FAS/MAS)) by the time the CSS rehearsal begins. The eventual location of the aid stations is not adequately disseminated to brigade elements.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 2-5: Brigade fire support rehearsals are frequently not conducted to standard.

1. They generally consist of verification of brigade consolidated target list and overall discussion of scheme of fires.
2. There is no cooperative effort within the brigade staff:
   - poor or no scheme of fires developed in initial part of planning process
   - scheme of fires not published with brigade order

1. Subordinate units do not know overall scheme of fires until brigade rehearsal:
   - rehearsal becomes explanation of scheme of fires, not a rehearsal
   - rehearsals lack structure and do not include all key players.

   Rehearsals do not:

   - establish responsibilities

   - reinforce synchronization of fires with maneuver actions and triggers

PROBLEM 2-6: Rehearsals of integrated Air Defense (AD) battery plan are not taking place or are not to standard. They are not conducted with all participants present, and they tend to be FM rehearsals rather than sand table rehearsals.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 2-7: MI companies are conducting map rehearsals or ineffective FM rehearsals rather than conducting thorough terrain model rehearsals. Rehearsals using a terrain model is the only way to enable leaders to visualize the battle by seeing how the BLUFOR and OPFOR are expected to maneuver across the battlefield.

PROBLEM 2-8: Task forces and company/teams do not place emphasis on conducting company/team combined arms breach rehearsals.

PROBLEM 2-9: Battalion/task forces rarely rehearse assaults and action on the objective. SOPs usually fail to properly address the actions necessary and/or the units fail to follow their SOPs for these operations.

Units become extremely disorganized on the objective.
The infantry is not prepared to dismount and is unaware of the plan.
Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) are not prepared to provide support.

PROBLEM 2-10: Fire support rehearsals have generally not significantly contributed to a better understanding or synchronization of the fire support plan.

1. Rehearsals usually consist of a target list scrub and a brigade recital or briefing of the fire support plan, and do not address specific observer responsibilities with the executor announcing his trigger, his engagement criteria, his observation post location and his call for fire.
2. The artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC) does not identify the specific units and volumes of fire that will fire.
3. By merely briefing but not rehearsing, the brigade Fire Support Element (FSE) has not ensured each player can execute his part of the fire support plan unprompted and fully understands the desired end state of each event.

PROBLEM 2-11: The integration of CSS into the tactical plan continues to be a problem area. Although brigades routinely conduct lengthy combined arms rehearsals, little or no emphasis is placed on integrating CSS into the process. On those occasions when CSS is addressed it is done at the end of the rehearsal process without any attempts to integrate it into the overall plan by brigade leaders.

Table of Contents
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 2
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 4