SECTION
II
N
- NEEDS EMPHASIS, PART 2
TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT
TA.2 Negative Trend 1: Triggers versus target location
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 1-1: Problem Example - While conducting defensive operations, the task force FSNCO was ordered to emplace task force triggers for each target. The task force had no standard for these triggers, so the NCO gathered no materials. The triggers used were hasty, and developed by lazing the area beyond the target and marking azimuth and vertical angle to the target. The triggers were from 2,500 meters to 5,000 meters beyond the target. This distance did not correspond with the artillery battalion's reaction time or the time of flight.
1QFY95
PROBLEM
1-2: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) During defensive operations, task forces emplace
triggers for targets that do not work because the time/distance factors are
incorrect.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
1-3: (Repeat of Problems 1-1 and 1-2) During defensive operations, the primary
observer for each target orders the firing of each target as the enemy crosses
the trigger. However, this distance does not correspond to the enemy's movement
rate plus time of flight.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
1-4: Personnel do not understand the various techniques for establishing triggers,
and the advantages of each.
TA.2 Negative Trend 2: Jump TOC operations
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 |
1QFY95
PROBLEM 2-1: Regardless of whether TACFIRE moves with the Jump TOC or TOC main body, once the shelter or FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or controlling platoon FDC does not have the required information to control and mass fires.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
2-2 (Repeat of Problem 1-1) There is a significant degradation in the field
artillery battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when the battalion
conducts Jump TOC operations during combat operations.
- Once the FDC or the FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or the controlling platoon FDC do not have the required information or precise procedures to control and mass fires.
- The problems controlling and massing fires occurs whether the battalion FDC moves with the Jump TOC or the TOC main body.
- The FDC does not have the personnel or equipment to maintain both a fully digital and manual back-up system.
- Artillery is piecemealed.
- Reduced effects on targets.
- Delays in the delivery of fires.
- Artillery is piecemealed.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM
2-3: Most artillery units do not plan in detail to control fires while the
field artillery (FA) battalion TOC moves.
- Efforts to use the single station IFSAS-equipped vehicle as the jump TOC (J-TOC) hamper efficient fires due to poor information transfer.
- Some units transferring to mutually supporting units (MSU) simply tell the other unit to take over their guns and then relinquish control, without also transferring information.
- Significant degradation in FA battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when battalion performs J-TOC operations during combat operations.
- The transition between MSU is often awkward and causes animosity between the two units.
- Significant degradation in FA battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when battalion performs J-TOC operations during combat operations.
TA.2 Negative Trend 3: Fire Support Element (FSE) organization
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
| 1 | 1 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 3-1: Fire Support Elements (FSEs) are not organized to provide positive control of fires from planning to execution of the fire support plan. Brigade FSEs generally do not have all of the manuals on hand to facilitate complete fire support planning. Personnel responsibilities are not fixed prior to deploying to the field. All graphics are generally not posted on the fire support map. Threat graphics, current targeting intelligence, flight routes, all fire support coordinating measures (current and future), and friendly positions are not routinely updated.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
3-2: (Repeat of Problem 3-1) Fire Support Elements (FSEs) are generally not
organized to provide positive control of fires from planning to execution of
the fire support plan.
- Brigade FSEs generally do not have all the manuals on hand to facilitate complete fire support planning.
- Personnel responsibilities are not fixed prior to deployment.
- All graphics are not posted on the fire support map, i.e., threat graphics, current targeting intelligence, flight routes, fire support coordinating measures (current and future).
- Friendly positions are not routinely updated.
- The fire support charts posted next to the map do not facilitate the control of fires during mission execution
TA.2 Negative Trend 4: Fire Support plan transition from Deep to Close
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
| 1 | 1 |
4QFY94
PROBLEM 4-1: As brigades prepare to transition from deep operations to the close fight, task force observers routinely are not in a position to observe enemy formations; targets are not planned along likely enemy avenues of approach and task force observers are not in communication with the appropriate fire support agencies to attack targets of opportunity. This is primarily due to a lack of brigade staff supervision that would ensure the task force plans are synchronized with the brigade plan.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
4-2: (Repeat of Problem 4-1) Brigades experience difficulty transitioning from
deep operations to support of the close fight.
- Task force observers are routinely not in position to observe enemy formations.
- Targets are not planned along likely enemy avenues of approach.
- Task force observers are not in communication with the appropriate fire support agencies to attack targets of opportunity.
- Fire support rehearsals are not conducted in sufficient detail to identify gaps between brigade and task force fire plans.
TA.3 AIR DEFENSE
TA.3 Negative Trend 1: Early warning dissemination and reaction
| Observation frequency: | 4QFY94 | 1QFY95 | 2QFY95 | 3-4QFY95 | 1-2QFY96 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
1QFY95
PROBLEM 1-1: In too many cases early warning was not pushed through the task force/squadron via the command net. Instead, the O/I net was used.
2QFY95
PROBLEM
1-2: Units incorrectly use the air defense warning system to control the level
of readiness of ADA fire units. Either all ADA fire units are at the highest
level of alert or they are at the lowest. Individual fire units must specify
their own readiness level during those periods when the level is not specified
from higher. Too often the readiness level is too high for the situation.
3-4QFY95
PROBLEM
1-3: While air defense units arrive with a plan to disseminate early warning,
there are too many instances where supported maneuver elements fail to sufficiently
disseminate the warnings. These dissemination problems most often result from
a failure to exercise the procedure during Home Station training; the air defense
early warning plan works for the air defense battalion, but breakdowns occur
within the supported maneuver elements.
1-2QFY96
PROBLEM
1-4: Air defense units give evidence of not understanding local air defense
warnings (LADWs). They base their states of readiness on the air defense warning
(ADW) of the overall area of operations rather than on what it is in their
sector.
- AD teams search and scan for non-existent threats.
- AD fire units get left behind by the protected unit.
- AD protection is not adequate to the threat to the supported unit.
- AD teams search and scan for non-existent threats.
- Confusion at the company/team level to what the actual threat is.
- Overall poor reaction to directed early warning.
- Confusion at the company/team level to what the actual threat is.
Table
of Contents
Section
II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 1
Section
II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 3
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