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Military

SECTION II

N - NEEDS EMPHASIS


TA.1 MANEUVER

TA.1 Negative Trend 1: Movement formations and techniques

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
11321

4QFY94
PROBLEM 1-1: Units have problems massing combat power during movement to contact. Units fight "piecemeal" and are unable to mass on the opposing force. Once making contact with the lead OPFOR unit, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. The major contributor to this problem is the march formation. Most units are spread out 7 to 10 kms in length from advance guard company to trail unit. This results in a lack of mutual support, which provides the OPFOR the opportunity to mass on individual BLUFOR companies.
RESULT: Ultimately leads to task force destruction.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 1-2: Units are failing to situationally adjust both their movement formation and movement technique. EXAMPLE: Many units make contact while using the traveling technique.

RESULT: Making contact while using the traveling technique unnecessarily increases the vulnerability of the unit, and makes actions on contact more difficult to effectively execute.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 1-3: Aviation units too often use formation flying techniques instead of movement techniques to occupy battle positions (BP) and attack by fire positions. Formation flying is appropriate for flying a properly planned route up to the release point (RP). From the RP into the BP or attack by fire position, units must use movement techniques to increase survivability. Formation flying from the RP to the BP increases the likelihood of the unit being spotted or being unable to deal with an unplanned situation in the BP.

PROBLEM 1-4: Mechanized smoke platoons do not execute movement formation and techniques based on METT-T. In most cases the smoke platoon conducts little or no maneuver training with the mechanized units at Home Station.

RESULT: The smoke platoon is not trained to maneuver at the pace or using the techniques of the mech infantry.

PROBLEM 1-5: (Repeat of Problem 1-1) Units fight piecemeal, unable to mass on the OPFOR. On contact with the lead OPFOR element, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. A major contributor to this task force problem is the task force's inability to control the march formation. Most units spread out from the assembly area into columns 7 to 10 kms from the advance guard company to the trail element. This lack of mutual support allows the OPFOR to mass individual BLUFOR companies resulting in eventual task force destruction. A lack of detailed rehearsal of actions on contact contributes to this lack of mass.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 1-6: Task forces and company/teams do not use movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use while they are moving.

RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

PROBLEM 1-7: (Repeat of Problem 1-4) Mechanized smoke platoons do not generally execute movement formations and techniques based on METT-T. Smoke platoons lack the necessary training and rehearsal with the maneuver element they support.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 1-8: (Repeat of Problem 1-6) Task forces and company/teams do not use movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use while they are moving.

RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

TA.1 Negative Trend 2: Use of dismounted infantry

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
2122

1QFY95
PROBLEM 2-1: Mech/Armor task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.
  1. Dismounted infantry is not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
  2. Dismounted infantry is not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
  3. Units are not specifying a clear task and purpose for dismounts; when they dismount they are unprepared to accomplish the mission.
  4. Routinely dismounted infantry leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons) behind because they are not sure of the tactical situation and unsure of their mission.
  5. Most mechanized infantry employed as dismounts are unfamiliar with dismounted drills from FM 7-7.
RESULTS:
  1. Mech/Armor task force employment of mechanized infantry is dismounts contributes little to mission success.
  2. Dismounts too often do not use appropriate movement formations or techniques.
  3. Dismounted operations are not conducted as a BFV-dismount team, which hinders mission success.

PROBLEM 2-2: Scout sections are not conducting dismounted observation posts (OPs) to standard.

  1. The selection of OP sites are not well thought out; generally placed on top of significant terrain features.
  2. No consideration is given to OP sites which have good fields of observation and make use of terrain.
  3. Routes from vehicle locations and the OP often provide no cover or concealment.
  4. Discipline of the scouts occupying the OP is poor.
  5. The observers often do not have the proper equipment, situational briefing, or graphics on their maps.
  6. The scouts usually do not identify or conduct a reconnaissance of their alternate OP sites.
RESULTS:
  1. OP sites often compromised, and targeted.
  2. Lack of equipment hinders mission success.
  3. Without a situational brief or graphics, it is difficult for scouts to understand what they are looking for and what they may see.
  4. If the original OP is compromised, the mission is jeopardized if no alternate is immediately available.

2QFY95
PROBLEM 2-3: The lack of employment of dismounted infantry during offensive operations is a continuing long-term trend.

  1. Dismounted infantry actions are seldom planned at task force or company/team level.
  2. Mounted-dismounted coordination is not planned or rehearsed.
  3. Dismounted squads rarely conduct anything more than very generalized rehearsals.
  4. When called upon to dismount, dismount leaders and soldiers are generally unprepared.
  5. Soldiers dismount with minimal orientation or guidance about the tactical situation.
  6. Dismounts are often unequipped to accomplish their mission; they dismount without radios, maps, AT weapons, and other mission essential equipment.
  7. Mounted-dismounted coordination during mission execution is ineffective; dismounted squads therefore operate independent of the mounted force.
RESULT: The dismounted element is either committed without support against superior enemy forces and destroyed, or becomes largely irrelevant and unable to influence the fight.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 2-4: (Repeat of Problem 2-1)

  1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.
  2. I soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
  3. Because of a lack of clear task and purpose, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
  4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:
    - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons)
    - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
    - they are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish
  5. Most infantry squads are untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 2-5: Company/teams are not planning for the use of dismounted infantry in the attack. Because of improper enemy analysis, commanders do not anticipate the enemy use of dug-in infantry in MRC positions.

RESULTS:
  1. Positions for vehicles providing fire support to the infantry are not planned.
  2. Dismount and pick-up points for the infantry are not planned.
  3. No rehearsal is conducted.
  4. If the infantry dismount, it becomes an uncoordinated reaction with a higher possibility of fratricide.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 2-6: (Repeat of Problems 2-1 and 2-4)

  1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.
  2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
  3. Because of a lack of clear task and purpose, too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
  4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:
    - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons)
    - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
    - they are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish
  5. Most infantry squads are untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 2-7: Units do not plan for dismounted operations on the objective. Dismounts typically ride in the back of vehicles and contribute to the operation by exercising the casualty evacuation plan.

TA.1 Negative Trend 3: Actions on contact

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
1111

4QFY94
PROBLEM 3-1: Units generally fail to plan for all forms of enemy contact and reactions to the contact. Task force battle drills either do not exist or are not understood well enough to be executable by subordinate elements. This is also true at company/team level, where battle drills are poorly understood, practiced or rehearsed. Company/teams continue to drive into enemy engagement areas unable to achieve or maintain tactical formations. This results in their inability to mass firepower.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 3-2: Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact. Reaction to enemy contact too often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

RESULT: Units are quickly rendered combat ineffective.

3-4QFY95
PROBLEM 3-3: Platoons and companies need improvement in planning and executing actions on contact. During the planning process, specific actions on contact are neglected. Subsequently these actions are not discussed during mission briefs or rehearsed.

RESULT: Units fail to take proper actions on contact and suffer avoidable casualties and jeopardize mission success.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 3-4: (Repeat of Problem 3-2) Units do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact before crossing the LD. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.

RESULTS:
  1. Units end up driving into enemy kill sacks.
  2. Units are often destroyed in platoon or company "sets".

TA.1 Negative Trend 4: Direct fire planning and execution

Observation frequency:4QFY941QFY952QFY953-4QFY951-2QFY96
112

4QFY94
PROBLEM 4-1: Company/teams exhibit an inability to do direct fire planning for both offensive and defensive operations. Task Forces are unable to mass two-thirds or more of company/team firepower in any engagement area or objective without target overkill. Fire distribution, and the shifting of fires is rarely explained or rehearsed. Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans (if they exist) are not linked. This hinders the ability of commanders to focus, shift or mass fires with sufficient control.

1QFY95
PROBLEM 4-2: Crew gunnery skills determine the outcome of most NTC live-fire battles, rather than unit fire plans. Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans are not linked.

RESULT: Commanders cannot focus, shift, or mass company fires with sufficient control.

1-2QFY96
PROBLEM 4-3: Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

RESULTS:
  1. Company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to find, fix, mass and distribute fires to kill the enemy.
  2. There is often insufficient graphic control measure to allow the company/team to mass their fires from their SBF/ABF or to cover the depth of the zone to allow for flexibility and contingency planning.
  3. Engagements are normally individual vehicle versus platoon or company/teams.

PROBLEM 4-4: Battalions routinely fail to achieve lethality in direct fires from the support by fire position, during the breach and during the assault of the objective.

  1. Units lack understanding of procedures governing
    - distribution
    - mass focus
    - shifting of fires
  2. There is seldom an effective plan or SOP, understood at the crew level, by which leaders control fires.
  3. Leaders fail to adequately address actions on the objective in their orders and rehearsals.

Table of Contents
Section II: PT - Positive Performance Techniques
Section II: N - Needs Emphasis, Part 2



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