FIRE SUPPORT
Maneuver commanders must direct fire support in a very personal way and therefore require a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and ground effects of fire support systems. By definition, a commander's concept is both a scheme of maneuver and fires. The concept for fires needs to be expressed in terms every bit as specific as that for maneuver. Target value analysis -- the process of determining what to shoot -- is guided by the commander with advice from the FSO. FSOs must talk to commanders in terms of target effects, not numbers of rounds by type.
The fire support plan is far more than a target list or schedule of fires. It is an articulation of how supporting fires are to be employed with the other elements of combat power to accomplish the mission. The timing of maneuver and fires must be developed and then fully explained. "Priority of artillery fires to Team B; 4.2 mortar to Team C initially. See Target List" simply does not cut it.
Although execution is mostly decentralized, fire support planning needs to be more tightly controlled at task force level than I previously believed. Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver. The fire plan should originate at task force level and then be modified and expanded based upon company input. Given that there is never sufficient artillery to do all things, a centralized approach guards against the risk of firing a few rounds on a few particularly critical targets.
In the defense, priority of fires should be determined by where the enemy goes; i.e., we must keep track of the enemy and adjust to his actions.
The goal is a collection of preplanned targets that satisfies a high percentage of the requirements for indirect fire. Responsiveness is the obvious benefit. That goal notwithstanding, it is important to guard against the tendency to fire preplanned targets when the enemy is somewhere else. Adjustments from planned targets or grid missions must be used if that is what it takes to get the fire on the enemy.
A face to face meeting between brigade and task force FSOs and the DS Battalion S-3 and FDO, where the concepts of operations and intents of the various maneuver commanders are discussed, pays rich dividends.
The fire support execution matrix -- the linkage of targets to systems and the identification of specifically who is to shoot by phase of the battle -- is a very effective tool. Responsibility for each target to include identification on the ground, observation, execution, and adjustment as necessary is given to a specific unit; e.g., company team, attack helicopter company, or scout platoon. Sufficient redundancy is required to guard against obscuration and casualties.
Hitting targets requires a great deal of preparation which should not be underwhelmed. Commo between companies, FSOs, and FDCs needs to be thoroughly checked before the battle to include necessary corrective action. The locations of OPs, obstacles, and reference points require confirmation by resection or PADs to the maximum extent possible. Commanders, subordinate infantry and tank leaders, FOs, and others responsible for specific targets must be able to point them out on the ground. Trigger lines based upon projected enemy routes and movement rates must be clearly identified.
There is a tendency for too much artillery talent to be too close to the guns. The complicated jobs requiring experienced judgement are the ones closest to where the rounds land.
While FSOs and FOs play a big role, the effective integration of fire is a command responsibility and there clearly needs to be a lot of non-artillerymen calling for fire. All leaders must know the frequencies and how to make the system work.
TACFIRE tends to back up during battles and it is difficult to override the queing sequence, in part because the TF FSO forward cannot monitor the fire nets. Non-TACFIRE nets can also become jammed with the stronger stations overriding. In either case, the likely consequence is that fires will not be massed on the highest priority targets. Disciplining fire nets is obviously important. In addition, the establishment of a voice fire coordination net for the task force is recommended. On this net, the TF FSO passes instructions to company FSOs, his FSE, and the mortar FDC, and he receives feedback on what is happening on fire direction nets. Unless the TF FSO has a net to receive information and pass instructions, he becomes just another FO.
Mortars can make a significant contribution, but are difficult to employ in a fast moving mech-armor environment due to their limited range. The mortar platoon leader must keep track of the battle, participate in decisions concerning his positioning, and sell his product. The TF FSO also has obvious responsibilities in those areas. Considering the impact that range has on the capability to both mass fires and support multiple companies, mortar employment should be kept as uncomplicated as possible. Often it helps to assign specific preplanned targets to the mortars. Also, attaching sections to lead companies can work well in offensive operations. Tight company commander control is recommended; e.g., "Stay one terrain feature behind; move when I move; shoot the targets I give you; and use direct lay whenever possible."
Artillery/mortar illumination should be planned for all night operations, even when the primary concept calls for no illumination. Plans need to delineate specific conditions which will trigger the use of illumination and who will make the decision. Even when gunners can acquire targets with night sights, leaders often need illumination to facilitate command and control and fire distribution. It is far more difficult than I realized to achieve effective illumination over the areas covered by modern direct fire weapons. Illumination assumptions upon which the overall concept of operations is based should be very conservative.
The effective integration of CAS and indirect fires requires Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs). The simplest solution -- stopping all indirect fires while aircraft are in the area -- is no solution. Aircraft almost always need the suppressive effects of the artillery in order to survive, and maneuver commanders cannot abide an overall reduction in fires. Prior planning and close coordination between the FSO and FAC are key. Dividing the target area into either east and west or north and south halves is a practical approach. Whatever scheme is decided upon, it needs to be simple, and instructions to the aircraft must reference terrain features, not grids; e.g., stay north of the ridge and east of the road. ACAs can have such a significant impact that their implementation and removal should be approved by the TF commander on a case-by-case basis.
There is a dilemma inherent in having only one ground FAC with a battalion task force. He frequently needs to be in two places at one time -- with the commander and FSO coordinating fire support and maneuver and at a vantage point directing aircraft to their target. Sometimes these two functions can be performed at the same location but often they cannot. Two FACs are needed, and FSOs, company officers, and scouts must know how to give final approach instructions to A-10 pilots.
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