ROLE OF INFANTRY
The longer I serve, the more impressed I become with both the importance and the difficulty of basic infantry tasks; e.g., conduct attacks at night in rugged terrain; kill armor at close range; secure, construct, and breach obstacles; defend dismounted avenues of approach; conduct reconnaissance and surveillance; defeat enemy reconnaissance; and provide close-in protection for critical assets. Time and time again, a few skilled infantrymen are the difference between winning and losing a battalion/brigade level battle. They provide the detailed intelligence which permits accurate targeting and greatly enhances the odds of successful maneuver; they breach the pivotal obstacle and destroy the key weapon which unhinges the enemy's defense; they conduct the night attack which causes enemy armor to reposition, thereby facilitating its destruction by friendly tank and AT fire at first light.
Mounted infantry provides a responsive force which fights best dismounted. In the vicinity of the enemy, the AT risk in lightly armored vehicles frequently exceeds the risk of direct and indirect antipersonnel fires on the ground.
Attaining and sustaining the requisite dismounted infantry skills is a difficult training challenge in a heavy division -- a challenge which goes far beyond that of just individual soldier tasks. It encompasses leader understanding of the role of infantry in heavy force operations. Almost without exception, there are many more infantry missions to be performed than there are infantrymen available -- particularly in a modernized task force. While priorities will vary as a function of METT-T, there is seldom sufficient infantry to provide close-in protection for TOCs, trains, ADA, and tanks. Except in the most extreme situations, all of those elements must provide their own security employing camouflage, light and noise discipline, movement, deception, dismounted crewmen, illumination, and VT artillery, as appropriate.
Experience shows only a limited capability for infantry to block dismounted avenues of approach. There is typically a very wide sector, a requirement to deploy forces in depth, and a large number of potential enemy routes. Most avenues should be observed until the enemy is acquired and then blocked by fire and the maneuver of weapons. This is not to say that infantry cannot be used to deny an approach, but only that this capability is often limited in comparison to the total area to be defended.
Infantry can be highly effective against armor in both the offense and defense. Positioning TOWs and DRAGONS to the flanks and rear of enemy approaches/positions in terrain that cannot be traversed by tracked vehicles frequently achieves surprise and causes an unprepared reaction. In the offense, it takes away the defender's "keyhole" AT positions. In the defense, it dissipates his suppressive fires and forces time consuming clearance of rugged terrain. Given an effective man portable AT weapon, correctly positioned dismounted infantry does not need to close with the enemy to be a major factor on the modern battlefield.
Patrolling is both as difficult and as critically important in the environments where we are likely to employ armored forces as it is in close terrain.
Successful dismounted night attacks against an armored enemy are typified by secure movement and a high volume of armor killing fire. Effective movement requires exceptional navigational skills, avoidance of obvious avenues of approach, and traveling with the minimum force required to get the job done. The mission obviously does not get accomplished if you never find the objective, stumbling across ridge lines in moonlight invites indirect fire, and not much is achieved if you get to where you want to be and have no capacity to kill the enemy.
The conduct of air assaults to facilitate the passage of mounted formations through restrictive terrain is an effective yet frequently unexploited technique.
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Reconnaissance
and Counterreconnaissance
Fire
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