SMOKE
Smoke is a far more significant battlefield factor than I used to believe. It simply must be a major planning consideration in terms of both friendly employment and reaction to enemy use. An antitank position that seems very attractive in the middle of a sunny afternoon may not be very desirable when the attack comes in dense smoke early the next morning. If that weapon has not rehearsed movement to prepared alternate positions, it will likely be irrelevant to the outcome of the battle.
The effectiveness of smoke varies markedly with weather. During the periods of temperature inversion which often follow BMNT, it is possible to rapidly cover a very large area with dense smoke. Conversely, smoke rises so fast in the middle of a hot summer day that even the use of a great deal of generating capacity will have only a marginal impact. Also, a wind blowing generally in the direction of the enemy can be a great assist.
There is an obvious similarity in the impact of smoke and fog on the battlefield, and intensive training is required to deal with both.
Offensive operations in smoke require tighter formations, slower speeds, and easily recognized routes.
Defensive operations in smoke require prepared and rehearsed alternate positions and OPs that are generally much closer to the high speed avenues of approach, increased patrolling along obstacles to preclude breaching, and use of attack helicopters to find and exploit windows in the smoke. Although smoke does provide protection, it can turn on an attacker. If it blows away or when an open area is encountered, the attacker is suddenly exposed. A massed formation silhouetted against smoke is a great target. The attacker's need for closed formations, slower speeds, and routes which facilitate navigation makes IBP easier and results in vulnerability to counterattacks. Surveillance which tracks enemy movement and rehearsed counterattack plans are vital.
Jeep transported smoke is vulnerable, but not to a degree that it cannot be successfully employed. Use of wadis and other defilade, movement, and screening with smoke pots prior to start up all reduce vulnerability. Generators can run for an hour before refueling. Hence, it is not necessary for operators to remain in the area.
Smoke at night causes great confusion. Employment on the enemy as he is moving to attack positions in darkness can be very disruptive.
Smoke is a useful deception measure; it almost always draws attention and reaction.
Effective employment of the smoke generating capability of tanks requires a considerable amount of control and judgement. It is important to avoid premature use which gives away positions that otherwise would not have been seen and to be sure that the smoke ends up between the enemy and the vehicle. Smoke behind vehicles only makes them better targets.
The timing and placement of smoke to produce the desired result requires knowledge and experience. It is more of an art form than a mechanical process. A plan which integrates artillery and mortar delivered smoke, smoke pots, and smoke generators must be developed with a knowledge of the peculiarities of each. Smoke is fickle -- pots 100 meters apart can send smoke in different directions. The initial plan will often require adjustment due to unexpected effects of wind, inversion, and slope. We must have personnel with the requisite skills, and they must begin smoke operations early enough to achieve sufficient buildup and make adjustments.
Table
of Contents
Fire
Support
Defensive
Chemical Measures
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