FIRE
SUPPORT
Combined Arms Team (Commander's Comments):
". . . the interface of fire support systems with maneuver (requires additional emphasis). The key is . . . to include those lessons learned in the annual training plan . . . the most obvious lesson learned was that the entire digital system must train with maneuver. TACFIRE and BCS must be up when companies do collective training . . . there must be a training plan to teach maneuver, the capabilities, system improvements and limitations of the entire digital system."
". . . the company commander and his company FSO (must) establish a close working relationship . . . the maneuver company commander does not give fire support the attention it deserves, thus, the company FSO must be trained to promote fire support aggressively, and use it in the same manner."
"The TACFIRE system was designed as a centralized system with control being passed to another TACFIRE set during periods of movement and down time. Real world conditions dictate that when the TACFIRE is down, firing batteries must operate autonomously. If a good SOP does not exist to transition to autonomous operations and back to centralized control, fire support will suffer during periods of transition. Each FTX and CPX should have transition to the autonomous mode and back to centralized operations as a major training objective."
"Need to develop a digital "how-to" SOP for a task force fire plan from FIST to FDC . . . (to) address steps needed for execution of the artillery portion of the fire plan using the digital system."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
The combined arms team is the nucleus around which all tactics and techniques must revolve. At home station, fire support personnel meet, teach, and plan with their supported units frequently and vice versa. The artillery commander and his staff conduct seminars and joint exercises with brigade and battalion counterparts.
A successful combined arms team possesses a living, breathing SOP which is practiced and rehearsed until it has become second nature. People get tired, they forget, and sometimes as a result they make mistakes. Success is built on solid, proven procedures anyone can follow. Successful fire support requires total integration of commanders and staffs of all arms at all levels. "Successful Fire Support Planning," a video tape which epitomizes seven key areas that make a successful fire support plan, will soon be available at your level TASC. It features LTC Glen Skirvin, the former Senior Fire Support Observer Controller at the NTC.
Fire Planning (Commander's Comments):
"After action reviews . . . stress the need for decentralized fire planning . . . (which) is ideal if time is available and the current plan known. (However), at the NTC centralized planning is essential to ensure that a uniform plan is available to support the operation. FISTs are still able to influence the plan by use of priority targets and are still able to submit additions or deletions continuously."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
Fire planning must be a continuous process to be successful. Decentralized (informal) planning, like centralized (formal) planning, is a product of the situation, the time available, and the echelon at which it occurs. Fire planning should be both formal and informal, regardless of the time available, to be executable and successful. A fire plan formulated and disseminated from higher to lower will allow the fire plan to be communicated to support the commander's concept, but feedback from the lower echelons is vital to refine the plan according to conditions that lower units meet. These coordination actions should be established in a unit's SOP and practiced and rehearsed at home station.
Close Air Support (CAS) (Commander's Comments):
"Doctrinally, CAS coordination and control responsibility is assumed by the appropriate FSO/FIST upon loss of theTactical Air Control Party (TACP). The fire support system is unable to continue normal CAS operations after loss of the AF TACP. . . . (Commanders must) attempt to provide hands-on CAS control training for deploying FSO/FIST personnel."
"It is desired that the (ALO) have exclusive use of the battalion ALO M-113 due to his unique role. If the (ALO) has to share a M-113 with other members of the battalion staff, he should share it with the FSO."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
When the ALO shares a vehicle with the FSO, he has the following advantages:
- Has immediate access to fire support information and frequencies
- Probably is located in a key position to overlook the battle
- Is able to coordinate face-to-face with the FSO on fire support matters, especially ACAs.
There are trade-offs with the ALO sharing a vehicle with the FSO:
- The ALO is unable to communicate directly with aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with FM radios or the ALO is equipped with a portable AM/HF radio.
- Vehicle space could be a problem, especially when the FSV is buttoned-up.
Every soldier in fire support should know how many sorties are planned and available in his sector. They should also know the proper frequencies, call signs, and how to guide aircraft in case the Air Force (ALO or FAC) personnel are killed or not in position to control the aircraft. The key is getting the air liaison officer (ALO) involved in all planning operations. This will allow a constant dialogue between the FSO and ALO on fire support matters.
It is imperative that units schedule training with the ALO on a regular basis and have him teach classes on how to direct aircraft. Due to personnel turbulence, once a year is not often enough. Quarterly training is more appropriate. Since aircraft are expensive to use and hard to obtain for training, you may want to try an alternate idea. Obtain a Radio Controlled Miniature Aerial Target (RCMAT) from your Air Defense Artillery unit and fly it around your local training area. Your ALO can teach you classes and critique your execution with this device.
Observed Fire Procedures (Commander's Comments):
"Shift from known point missions proved to be the most accurate and timely methods of attacking targets with artillery fire. Missions fired on recorded targets or known points and shifted from them are processed much more rapidly than are grid missions. Subsequent fires using this method can be delivered quite rapidly. Although grid (method) is the primary method taught to FIST and FOs, this method only should be used as a last resort. Training (should) emphasize the development of target lists using intelligence input and terrain analysis and that shift from these targets as the primary method of delivery of fire."
"FIST personnel must be able to identify all targets in their sector on the ground."
"Mass: (Mass) fires on objectives and columns of vehicles (and other lucrative targets). Piecemeal violence (is) not enough; mass destructive capability to stop mass."
"Illumination: Integrate fully in tactical plan. Adjust as required--failure to train in adjustment . . . results in sight wash out and lost battlefield kills."
"The calls for indirect fires by the platoons were often non-existent. (When called they were neither) timely, nor complete. The majority of the indirect fires . . . were requested by the commander and the XO through the company team forward observer."
". . . classroom training on calls for fire (for maneuver units) should be conducted by fire support personnel . . . followed by extensive work utilizing Training Set Forward Observation (TSFO) and eventually having the junior leaders calling for fire in a controlled live-fire environment."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
Some successful techniques or procedures to optimize destruction (target effect) on the enemy follow:
- Minimize moving target engagements by massing fires in coordination with engagement areas formed by the reinforcing terrain and obstacles.
- Always plan illumination--even for day missions, always plan smoke--even for night missions; the battle may go longer than you planned.
- Observers must develop terrain sketches in the defense.
- Adjust illumination in the daytime.
- Stress coordination between the supported maneuver commander and FIST personnel to obtain locations of patrols/scouts and other units so as not to compromise them with illumination.
- Mass fires whenever possible to ensure maximum effects when attacking targets with a minimum expenditure of ammunition and to reduce the firing unit's vulnerability to enemy target acquisition.
- Establish an IPB decision point to engage their moving target. (See NTC Newsletter #1, dated 31 Jan 86, page 9, for more details on engaging this type of target.)
- Ensure that the fire support plan, (to include the mortars, FDC frequencies and FDC call signs), is briefed at company/platoon OPORDs.
Mortars(Commander's Comments):
"The 4.2 inch mortars were often ineffective due to poor positioning by the FSO/Mortar Platoon Leader and under-utilization by the FIST. Many times, the mortars were out of range of the enemy . . . On several occasions, the 4.2 mortar platoons were . . . not given sufficient fire missions by the FIST. Procedures must be established to integrate mortars with other indirect fire assets (in the fire support plan). The FSO positions the mortars and they move by echelon on his direction. Procedures (must) be established where FIST are dedicated to use the 4.2 inch Mortar Platoon."
"Mortars are the weak link in fire support."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
The TF FSO must get with the maneuver commander and S3 and decide who is going to control the mortars. Many maneuver commanders give this responsibility to their TF FSO. The alternative is to have the mortar platoon leader move based on monitoring the maneuver net. This requires a mortar platoon leader with great initiative. Mortar employment should be kept as uncomplicated as possible. Often it helps to assign specific preplanned targets to the mortars. Also, attaching sections to lead companies can work well in offensive operations; this will alleviate the mortars being out of range. The mortar platoon leader and FSO must keep abreast of the updated intelligence information so:
- They don't let the mortar platoon get overrun in the defense.
- The mortars are far enough forward to support by fire in the offense. Consider using trigger lines IAW FM 7-90.
- Mission the mortars based on their contributions to the battle according to the commander's concept. Tell them when and what force they are to engage.
Table
of Contents
Intelligence
Engineer
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
