ENGINEER
Training (Commander's Comments):
"The DS engineer company must begin training with supported units during company/team training. Engineer platoon leaders must work hand in hand with the task force commander (and his team commanders)."
"The engineer platoon leader had constant communications problems. The engineer platoon worked with the task force only on the TF ARTEP. They were not an integral part of the train up and (this) prevented the building of a well coordinated staff effort."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
Repetitive combined arms training:
- Builds teamwork.
- Allows workable SOPs to be created by identifying the myriad of small problems which hamper execution.
- Generates effective synchronization.
As minimum training:
- Engineer equipment must regularly dig in all fighting vehicles during defensive training. Construction of vehicle fighting positions is so decentralized that repetition of established drills is essential. All fighting vehicle crews/leaders must know explicitly how to construct vehicle fighting positions.
- Breaching procedures must be ruthlessly drilled.
- Engineer platoons must practice emplacing task force and company/team obstacles during all maneuver unit collective training.
Training hones troop leading procedures, coordination and the pushing forward of barrier material.
Command and Control (Commander's Comments):
"Task force commanders and S3s must be aware of the capabilities of combat engineer platoons. Accurate estimates of time/work factors must be provided to the command group by the engineer platoon leader (or representative). Engineers must be deployed forward during offensive operations; priorities of work must be clear; and in defensive operations, company/teams cannot expect all battle position preparations and improvements to be undertaken by the engineers. Likewise, more work and practice must be demanded in the area of assault ant deliberate breaches of obstacles. SOPs must be standardized in as many areas as possible within the division to ensure fluid transition on cross attachment . . . the engineer platoon leader must be able to evaluate obstacles plans and be aggressive enough to comment on the validity and feasibility of suggested obstacle plans."
"When a unit occupied a hasty position, engineer assets waited for detailed planning before digging obstacles. As a result, construction of obstacles did not begin until several hours after the unit had occupied the position. Engineers should immediately begin digging when a defensive position is identified. If detailed countermobility planning has not been developed, engineers should begin survivability operations by digging inTOWs and tanks."
"Task Organize: An engineer squad to each team is a habit, not planning. Engineer resources must be concentrated at the critical place at the critical time . . . Tailor support to mission needs."
"The engineer input is a must in all planning. Especially in defense, his annex is critical to the overall success of the scheme and must be briefed and the hard copy plan given during the OPORD."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
The engineer must be integrated into the IPB and troop leading procedures to ensure early and effective syncronization of engineer assets.
Clearly engineers must be continually employed. Normally there are a few obvious obstacles in the task force sector which support all schemes of maneuver. Engineers should immediately be directed to begin work on these. The obstacles must be physically sited on the ground by both the engineer and maneuver commander to avoid wasted effort by poor positioning. As vehicle positions are finalized, priority of engineer equipment normally goes to survivability while other engineer assets continue work on obstacles.
For more information on task force command and control of engineers, see NTC Lessons Learned Newsletter #1, 31 Jan 86, and #4, 27 Feb 87.
Mobility (Commander's Comments):
"Ensure engineer elements are located well forward in the movement formations of teams in the attack."
"More work and practice must be demanded in the area of assault and deliberate breaching of obstacles."
"Bn TFs do not use engineers well in the offense .... Bn TF's and Co/Tm must develop and practice obstacle breaching as a matter of battle drill."
"The engineer elements were often killed while attempting to breach enemy obstacles . . . (because they were) called forward before the obstacle was secured or covered by smoke. All obstacles should be covered by smoke and be secured prior to requesting engineer support to be sent forward."
"Obstacle Breaching: It is too important to leave to engineers; it's dirty, dangerous, and crucial to success--a perfect infantry mission. Engineers do not have sufficient manpower or firepower to conduct a breaching operation under fire. . . . this is the responsibility of the maneuver commander with engineer assistance."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
Well-drilled breaching SOPs are the key to mobility. Ideally, the scout platoon (with an engineer NCO or squad attached) or follow-on infantry identify obstacles before the attack begins. Stealthy breaching at night can then occur. Guides, colored smoke, or VS 17 panels orient the assault force to the lane(s). Regardless of the method, breaching is so complex that repetitive training is critical. This is a combined maneuver/engineer problem.
Survivability (Commander's Comments):
"Vehicle fighting positions were not prepared properly . . . the dozer was not utilized as well as it should have been . . . due to a lack of proper supervision, the misinterpretation by the dozer operator of what was a good fighting position, and the unawareness of the unit as far as what the capabilities of the dozer were . . . priority of work was not established for time available. (Combined Arms) training is needed . . . with regard to preparation of vehicle fighting positions . . . the tank unit leaders should be trained so they fully understand the capabilities of the dozer. This type of training could best be conducted jointly in a field environment."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
A properly dug in platoon can readily take out a battalion; therefore, maneuver leaders must supervise the construction of fighting vehicle positions. Full turrent defilade or a covered route to full hide/defilade is absolutely required. The position must be sloped and berms must be avoided. For further information, see NTC Lessons Learned Newsletter #2, 1 May 86.
Countermobility (Commander's Comments):
"The engineer platoon leader failed to coordinate effectively with the maneuver elements . . . On one occasion, the engineer failed to (construct and site) obstacles on the terrain as it was portrayed on the operation overlay. Obstacles located in the sector of and covered by the fire of a given team were frequently not fully coordinated with that team .... (units) failed to close the gaps in an obstacle system. . . . The inexperience of the engineer platoon leader led to a degradation of the effectiveness of the engineer assets (and obstacles). A maneuver officer or senior NCO should be assigned to work closely with the TF engineer to assist him in best serving the TF commander's purpose."
"Don't unrealistically plan for obstacles. Analyze the obstacles you need to support the plan, types and amount of material, and man hours required to complete each and (have) a system to check on progress. Use sub-elements to emplace certain obstacles and use soldiers to assist engineers, as necessary, to construct obstacles. All obstacles must be (assigned) to a team for responsibility (of) covering it by fire and securing it at night. Otherwise, obstacles will be breached before dawn."
"Engineer elements were destroyed while attempting to emplace obstacles. TF elements in the vicinity of the obstacles did not cover by fire, and the engineer platoons were not issued enough Class V to protect these areas during obstacle emplacement. . . . the TF element failed to close the gap in the obstacle (so) the OPFOR experienced no difficulty in breaching or bypassing the obstacle. The TF operation order should emphasize unit's responsibility for covering obstacles (by fire) and closing gaps at obstacles."
NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:
All obstacles must be physically sited on the ground by both the engineer and the maneuver commander.
Manpower details to support engineers emplacing obstacles are helpful. A few soldiers with an NCO from each company/team and the trains works well. Infantry squads/platoons tend to be poor choices for details; they have too many other critical tasks such as providing security and digging their own fighting positions. One task force routinely emplaced 15,000 surface laid mines and 2,000 rolls of concertina in 24 hours at the NTC. This required extensive training and employment of the entire task force doing defensive preparation.
For further information on obstacle siting, see NTC Lessons Learned Newsletter #3, dated 1 Sep 86.
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