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Intelligence (Commanders Comments):

"With the intelligence system, vehicle identification, knowledge of threat tactics, and timely knowledge of threat dispositions and actions, (Spot Reports) are vital to successful combat operations."

"Own the night: Require fully integrated surveillance and patrol plans. In (the) defense, units must have (a) counter-surveillance plan. In (the) offense, patrol well forward to gain control of terrain early for success."

"Integrate: (Use) all collection assets. Query higher (and adjacent) headquarters for missing information. Aggressively seek answers and indicators. Sort through information and pass to (the) commander for use on the battlefield."

"Spot Reports: Use SALUTE. If not, time is lost and transmissions increase. Demand it!"

"The Threat: (The) S2 should portray threat formations and techniques (to include reconnaissance effort). Prepare (a) unit for the battle as (the) S2 sees it developing. Update as information is available. Use IPB and templating techniques. Make team commanders use the information."

"Sound planning and an aggressive intelligence gathering effort in the form of a well-coordinated task force R& plan is a must. Lack of GSR asset control, poor radio communications, misunderstood missions, (and) inept patrolling/reporting skills will cause the task force to go into battle blind to OPFOR dispositions."

"Scouts must be given missions early in order to position during daylight and maintain contact with the OPFOR."

"The absence of a designated Battalion Operations and Intelligence (O&I) frequency presented a significant problem. With no designated O& net, the Battalion S2 was forced to choose from several frequencies . . . to pool his collection assets on one frequency. The result was the use of the Scout platoon, GSR platoon, AT section, and even a company command net for the Battalion O& net during different missions. Besides saving valuable planning time and causing less confusion, the designation of a specific O& net for the battalion would help in keeping the frequencies of subordinate elements clear and expediting the flow of critical information. . . ."

NTC Lessons Learned Analysis:

Some task forces have successfully utilized a non-doctrinal operation and intelligence (O& net to pass information. Successful use of a task force O& net is predicated on:

• effective home station training

• the preparation of detailed unit

• a well-trained and aggressive S2 who facilitates rather than stops the passage of vital information (see NTC Lessons Learned Newsletter #2, dated 1 May 86, pg 3-5, for details on establishing a task force O& net).

Give the S2 time to brief enemy courses of action to all concerned.

Reconnaissance must be continuous in both the offense and defense and conducted throughout the depth of the battle area.

In the offense, just knowing that the enemy is on a particular hill is not sufficient . . . the commander must know how the enemy has prepared the ground--e.g., obstacles and fire sacks. Successful attacks start with a 3:1 advantage and then through aggressive reconnaissance they build a 10:1 advantage at the point of attack. Every enemy anti-tank weapon must be found to achieve this. The detailed intelligence needed at task force level comes from scouts and infantrymen.

Deny the enemy the knowledge of your concept of operation in the defense. Security must begin before initial occupation and continue throughout the depth of the defense. See Newsletter #2, dated 1 May 86, pg 1-3, for more details on destroying the enemy's mounted reconnaissance.)

Table of Contents

Introduction

Fire Support