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TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL (cont)

TA. 4 Negative Trend 10: Troop Leading

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 10-1: Heavy team troop leading procedures continue to lack the level of detail and quality required to execute assigned missions.

1. Typically leaders move from Step 1, Receive the Mission, to Step 7, Issue an Operations Order, without any structured planning or thought.
2. The most notable problem is the lack of detailed planning during Step 3, Make a Tentative Plan.
   - inability to identify critical events and work them into an understandable timeline.

   The problems with the "estimate of the situation" become apparent during the OPORD, which tends to be issued in Execution Matrix format.

   - does not provide subordinates sufficient detail for platoons to conduct their own troop leading procedures.

   Information about the enemy lacks detail and does not get disseminated to the appropriate levels.

   Rehearsals are either not conducted to standard or omitted.

PROBLEM 10-2: Air defense pre-combat inspections are ineffective .

1. Unit SOPs seldom include dismounted Stinger checklists.
2. Inspections, if done, are not function-oriented.
3. Leaders do not check to ensure critical equipment, such as Stingers, man-pack SINCGARS and night vision goggles are operational with the required number of batteries, etc. on hand.
4. The air defense battery rarely establishes standards for platoons
   - teams in platoons with the same mission may be equipped differently.

PROBLEM 10-3: Troop leading procedures are not followed by the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) team at all levels.

1. Team leaders often do not receive specific guidance from their platoon leaders/section OICs.
2. Team leaders do not conduct detailed mission planning.
3. Individuals deploy with minimal guidance
   - no purpose or intent from leaders.

   Leaders do not follow the standard five paragraph OPORD format.

   OPORDS are not issued in a timely manner

   - inadequate planning time for subordinate elements.

   Platoon leaders do not rehearse, nor do they require team leaders to rehearse.

RESULTS:

1. Inadequate mission preparation
2. Poor mission execution
   - degrades intelligence support to the task force.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 10-4:

1. Lack of command and control at the company and platoon level.
2. Inadequate overall collective skills.
3. Poor task execution.

EXAMPLES:

1. MICO team does not coordinate and synchronize well within the unit itself.
2. Collective tasks such as direction finding (DF) operations are a major problem for SIGINT operations.
3. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams:
   - continue to show implanting weakness by failing to implant sensors tactically.
   - fail to verify radio line of site
   - fail to coordinate what frequency to use for repeaters.
   - sensor string configurations and distances do not allow the teams to determine direction or length of columns.

   HUMINT teams

   - continue to display weak interrogation approach techniques

   - are not prepared to conduct CI screening with developed plans.

   - do not relate to their respective roles.

   - fail to have a clear picture of the battlefield

   - lack focus

1. Train on mission essential task list (METL) tasks at Home Station.
2. Identify battle tasks and individual tasks that support the METL.
   - train the tasks to standard.
   - improves mission execution and
   - enhances unit command and control.

   Doctrinal References:

   - ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes. For training and executing the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

   - CALL Newsletter 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Staff.

   - FM 25-101. For planning and resourcing battle focused training.

Standardize equipment and checklists so teams deploy with similar and necessary equipment.

TA.4 Negative Trend 11: Time Management

4QFY94

PROBLEM 11-1: Units develop time schedules upon receipt of missions, but:

1. Rarely include critical events
2. Do not update the schedules as changes occur
3. Task force XOs and S-3s do not enforce the time schedule
4. Task force XOs and S-3s rarely maintain focus on time management.
5. Battle staffs give seldom consider time/distance factors and their relationship to movement, preparation and mission execution during mission planning.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 11-2: Units generally establish notional time standards for planning, preparation and execution of combat operations. They fail to refine and complete the timelines during the decision-making process.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 11-3: Units develop time schedules during mission analysis. But they are not always enforced

1. Units usually do not start meetings and other scheduled events on time.
2. Timelines generally focus on the decision making process and end with issuance of the operations order (OPORD).
   - no organized program after issuance of the (OPORD).

   Critical supervisory and follow-up tasks are rarely tracked

   Units either lack a standard battle rhythm or do not enforce the one in their TACSOP.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 11-4: Repeat of Problem 11-3.

1. The battalion XO must establish and enforce the battalion time schedule during the initial mission analysis.
2. Inform leaders at all levels of the time schedule.
3. Adjust the time schedule as required. Ensure essential tasks are completed as scheduled.
4. Use time schedules routinely at home station to support all training events.
5. Use the reverse planning sequence in developing the timeline
6. Do not stop timelines once combat begins.
7. Continuously update the timeline
8. Work the timeline in conjunction with the battle rhythm, which gives the staff an idea of how to better manage their time during continuous combat operations.

Incorporate a format for time schedule development in the battalion TACSOP.

TA.4 Negative Trend 12: Incomplete/Inaccurate Estimates

4QFY94

PROBLEM 12-1: Companies tend to send lengthy, unclear and inaccurate reports to battalion.

RESULT: The reports confuse the staff as they try to paint an accurate picture for the battalion commander.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 12-2: Staffs rarely update the estimates they prepare at Home Station.

RESULTS:

1. Incomplete picture of the capabilities and limitations of each battlefield operating system during the decision making process.
2. Unsound decisions on task organization, missions, and tasks and purposes.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 12-3:

1. Leaders at company level and below make little or no effort to conduct their own analysis of their respective zones or sectors.
2. Leaders do not develop detailed timelines nor multiple courses of action.
3. Failure to wargame COAs against their analysis of the enemy's most probable or dangerous COA.
4. Lack of standardized operation orders
5. Poor time management
6. Inadequate preparation to conduct the detailed planning in a field environment.

PROBLEM 12-4: Repeat of Problem 12-2.

Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.

1. Battle captains should insist on complete and accurate reports from the companies.
   - The shift NCO and radio telephone operators (RTOs) should help by performing quality control checks

   Do not stop timelines once combat begins.

   Despite limited planning time, update staff estimates routinely.

   Develop pre-printed acetate sheets to estimate the situation in the field:

   - mission analysis worksheet

   - COA sketch sheets

   - blank timeline

   - warning order format

   - FRAGO format

   Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff. Each commander is responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis

   - developing a COA

   - wargaming the COA

   - writing an annex to the FRAGO.

   Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process.

   Use limited available planning time to update staff estimates.

   Doctrinal reference:

   - ST 101-5, Section 5, Appendix C, I-5-1.

   - CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning", dated Dec 1995.

Units should use the SALUTE report format to shorten and clarify reporting.

TA.4 Negative Trend 13: Information Management

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 13-1: Brigade staff is not collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating and safeguarding information.

1. Lack of standardized tools to assist the staff in managing the immense amount of information that flows through the brigade command post.
2. The Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are not understood or updated by the battle staff
   - not properly tracked and disseminated to subordinates.

   Staff update briefings take too much time

   - information overload

   - confuse rather than focus the staff.

   Staff huddles are unstructured or are not conducted.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 13-2:

1. Inconsistent tracking Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and critical events.
2. Poor battle tracking and lack of use of Requests for Information (RFIs), particularly in the combat support and combat service support functional areas,
3. Staff sections also fail to notify the rest of the staff when a critical event has happened in their area.

RESULTS:

1. Impedes the brigade commander's "read" of the battlefield. Leads to information being either lost or not tracked.
2. Unit locations routinely differ between the Battle Captain's mapboard, grids posted on tracking charts and actual unit locations on the ground.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 13-3: Repeat of Problem 13-2.

1. Exercise the battle staff at every opportunity at Home Station,.
2. Limit the amount of time the staff members have to brief the commander.
3. Practice conducting staff huddles to facilitate the timely exchange of critical information.
   - improves shift changes and commander updates.

   Develop and use standardized tools to assist the battle staff in information management.

   Ensure all information received from subordinate and higher units is analyzed to determine what information may be missing.

   Track requests for information (RFIs) to completion.

   Develop a tracking system for incoming message traffic.

   Track commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), combat power, planning guidance, and other significant activities.

   Strive to maintain a set battle rhythm.

   Conduct staff updates and huddles.

   Conduct commanders' conference calls with staff in attendance.

   Standardize staff journals.

   Enforce existing tactical standard operating procedures (TSOP).

   Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-7. Tactical Operations Center, May 95

1. Develop a tracking system for managing incoming message traffic.
   - CCIR
   - combat power
   - planning guidance
   - significant activities

   Analyze all information received from subordinate and higher units to determine if important elements are missing.

   Track follow-up RFIs must be tracked to complete outstanding actions.

   Enforce existing unit tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs).

TA.4 Negative Trend 14: Air Liaison Officer Operations

4QFY94

PROBLEM 14-1: Numerous joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) missions are unsuccessful.