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Positive Performance

5.1.1 Collect Information on Situation

* Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LSRD) [Intelligence]: LSRD's very proficiently conduct their basic patrolling skills and survive for extended periods with limited resupply; LSRD's also react well to short notice FRAGOs.

5.2 Process Information

* Initial IPB Process [Intelligence]: Initial IPB products, including MCOO, doctrinal templates and order of battle files are generally very good.

Technique: the high quality of these initial products reflects sufficient time spent with Home Station preparation. Units should deploy with all their IPB products and then appropriately apply them.

Needs Emphasis

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance [Brigade Maneuver/C2]:


1. Staffs do not use all available assets (aviation/logistical) to gain a clear picture of the battlefield.

2. A perceived lack of planning time hinders reconnaissance efforts.

3. Collection planning is weak because units do not focus on NAIs, usually because of an excessive amount of them and because of unclear taskings to subordinate elements.


l. Use all available assets to refine templates.

2. Execute the collection plan, and then track and analyze the followup reporting.

3. Closely monitor the R&S execution, and adjust as necessary.

4. Produce a FRAGO to revise the collection plan each time the intelligence picture is updated.

* Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Planning [Intelligence]:


l. S2s are not issuing specific start/stop times and specific SIRs to collectors as part of an R&S Matrix and/or overlay. RESULT: wasted time.

2. S2s are not considering all available collection assets; too often available assets are untasked.

Technique: Refer to FM 342 and FM 3421 for specific R&S planning techniques and procedures.

* R&S Execution [Intelligence]:


l. R&S tasks are not included in paragraph 3, tasks to subordinate units, of the operations order.

2. Units do not brief R&S taskings during backbriefs or at rehearsals.

RESULT: too many subordinate units fail to execute R&S plans.

Technique: see FMs 78,710,720,792, and 3421 for doctrinal guidance about R&S.

* MI Company Asset Integration and Utilization [Intelligence]: MI Company commanders generally continue to fall short in asset integration and utilization.


l. Lack of detailed collection plans.

2. Poor, or incomplete R&S plans.

3. Lack of taskings listing PIRs, IRS, SIRS, NAIs and the time period to observe.

4. Failure to use available assets.

5. Poor tracking of the R&S plan.


l. Collection assets lack focus, direction or guidance.

2. Independent, uncoordinated collection efforts which fail to answer PIR.

3. Poor tracking makes units reactive rather than proactive.


l. The MI Company commander and the brigade S2 must work as a team to ensure maximum coverage,and to employ all available assets.

2. Establish specific guidelines for mission planning and then subsequent analysis.

3. Specify command relationships and IEW support.

4. Refer to FMs 3410,3480 and 341.

5.2 Process Information

* Information Analysis [Intelligence]:


l. S2s are not analyzing information prior to dissemination; they disseminate every bit of "raw" information they receive.

2. OCs rarely see division level SITEMPS at brigade and battalion level.

3. S2s are not refining SITEMPS they do receive from higher.

4. S2s fail to analyze information for patterns emerging from enemy activities.

RESULT: subordinate units are too often overwhelmed with too much information that is not relevant to their particular mission.


l. S2s must learn how to "step back" from the information and message traffic in order to put the information into perspective. This will assist in recognizing any developing patterns.

2. Refer to FMs 343 and 347 for doctrinal analytical techniques and procedures.

* Scout and Patrol Debriefing: S2s are not routinely debriefing scouts and patrols. Most units have debriefing formats in the unit SOP, but they are not using them. Refer to FM 792 for a doctrinal scout debriefing format.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Intelligence Support to the Military Decision Making Process [Intelligence]:


l. S2s do not clearly understand their role in the MDMP.

2. While S2s produce adequate Intelligence Estimates, the estimate is disseminated in bits

and pieces to the other staff sections long before they start their respective staff estimates.

3. Too often, commanders and the staff never get a complete and coherent intelligence estimate brief.

4. During mission analysis, S2s too often fail to identify the enemy's center of gravity.

5. During mission analysis, S2s also fail to advise the commander whether the restated mission will produce the desired effects on the enemy.

6. S2s do not recommend deception objectives/targets.

7. S2s too often come to wargaming sessions without an event template or a High Value Target List.

8. Generally S2s fail to present a stubborn and uncooperative enemy during wargaming.

9. Too often S2s do not assist S3s in preparing the Decision Support Template.

Technique: Refer to FM 1015, and FM 34130 for doctrinal guidance about the S2s responsibilities during each portion of the MDMP. See also CALL Newsletter 9512, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning for additional techniques and procedures.

* S2 Crosstalk [Intelligence]: S2s do not talk to adjacent unit S2s because, in part, they do not seem to understand their own communications architecture. They fail, for example, to use all available assets, ie. MSE, FM, TACFIRE, LNOs, etc., to communicate with higher, adjacent and subordinate elements. While battalion S2s talk to the brigade S2, battalion S2s do not talk to each other.

RESULT: this failure to crosstalk means that maneuver battalion S2s miss a wealth of information and intelligence available from the FSB, artillery, aviation and other maneuver S2s.


l. S2s should train at Home Station to become familiar with all available communication systems, and proficient in their employment.

2. Refer to FMs 341 and 343 for specific dissemination techniques.

* Integrated Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield [Air Defense]:

PROBLEM: Units develop two separate IPB products. The brigade S2 develops a "ground" IPB, while the air defense officer develops the air IPB. Developed in isolation, the products are disseminated with no integration or synchronization.

Technique: Develop only one set of IPB products with an integrated ground/air focus. This will provide the brigade commander and staff a total picture and will highlight how the enemy will synchronize his air and ground scheme of maneuver. Refer to FM 44100, US. Army Air Defense Operations, Chapter 2, Appendix A.

* Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) IPB [Chemical]:


1. Chemical staffs do little NBC IPB; they apparently do not understand the process, the resultant products, and the potential impact on the scheme of maneuver.

2. Chemical staffs too often fail to coordinate with S2s or other staff sections impacting NBC operations.

3. Chemical staffs too often are not acquainted with area studies, enemy order of battle, or intelligence handbooks for the area of operations.

RESULT: without effective NBC IPB, chemical staffs cannot effectively integrate into the Tactical Decision Making Process.


1. Make an IPB checklist, and use it in performing required actions.

2. Learn what information can be obtained through the S2, S3, air defense officer, fire support officer and from higher headquarters.

3. Use appropriate information for terrain and weather analysis, as well as threat and vulnerability analysis.

4. Devise the chemical support plan based on the IPB results.

5. Doctrinal references:

FM 3101, Chemical Staffs and Units, Appendix D, E

TC 34, Chemical Battle Staff Handbook, Chapter 8

FM 34130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

5.3.1 Prepare Reports on Target Development

* Intelligence Support to Targeting [Intelligence]:


l. S2s do not demonstrate an understanding of targeting methodology.

2. During unit targeting meetings, S2s do not provide High Value Targets, and they do not assist in selecting High Payoff Targets from the High Value Target List.

3. S2s do not develop collection plans to support target damage assessment, when the

brigade intelligence system should be the primary means of assessing the target effect of delivery systems.

Procedure: S2s should become familiar with the targeting methodology in FM 62010, Targeting Techniques and Procedures.

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