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PROBLEMS:

1. Lack of coordination between the lifted unit and the aviation task force.

2. The initial air mission coordination meeting rarely includes any of the leaders. The primary players are usually the infantry S3 Air and the pilots from the assault helicopter company.

3. The first time the infantry battalion and aviation task force commanders usually get involved is during the Air Mission Briefing.

RESULT: the Air Mission Briefing (AMB) turns into a coordination meeting, and often changes the entire plan at the eleventh hour.

Techniques:

1. Get the infantry and aviation task force commanders and S3s involved early in the planning process.

2. Reconnoiter LZs to ensure suitability early in the planning process (step 5 in troop leading procedures).

3. Provide a knowledgeable LNO to the infantry battalion; the LNO must keep the aviation S3 and commander informed.

4. Conduct the AMB at least 24 hours prior to H-hour.

5. Rehearse all phases of the air assault at least 12 hours prior to H-hour.

6. The aviation FSO must the understand SEAD plan.

7. Reference: FM 90-4.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Synchronization [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Units do not effectively synchronize all of their assets during combat operations. Subordinate units fight separate fights, instead of an integrated brigade fight.

Techniques:

1. Conduct targeting meetings.

2. Use synchronization matrices.

3. Use decision support templates.

4. Develop operational schedules and execution checklists.

5. Doctrinally wargame.

6. Conduct technical and combined arms rehearsals.

* Staff Integration [Battalion Command and Control]: Staffs are not being integrated to produce a synchronized task force effort.

PROBLEMS:

1. LOGPACs driving into minefields previously identified by unit engineers.

2. LOGPACs arriving after companies are scheduled to cross the line of departure.

3. Units conducting civil-military operations without incorporating attached civil affairs representatives into the planning process.

4. Units pushing Class IV for defensive operations with no plan on where to link up and drop the pallets.

5. Scouts consistently being sent on missions with no combat service support plan.

Technique: In order for the unit to ensure synchronization of combat multipliers, they must incorporate the entire staff, to include BOS representatives and attachments, into all aspects of TOC operations. Put specific emphasis on wargaming, staff huddles, shift change-over briefings and targeting meetings.

* Air/Ground Integration [Aviation]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Aviation is seldom integrated into the brigade scheme of maneuver.

2. When aviation is integrated, if is often an afterthought to fill gaps in the brigade plan.

3. This failure to integrate is often identified during the brigade rehearsal. However, by then it is too late to make major changes to the plan.

RESULTS:

1. lack of synchronization during mission execution.

2. inability to mass critical combat power at a decisive point on the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. Involvement by the aviation task force commander or S3 during the brigade planning process ensures the proper use of aviation assets during all phases of the battle.

2. During wargaming, address aviation under each of the following BOS:
- intelligence
- maneuver
- fire support
- logistics
- command and control

3. Conduct lateral coordination with the infantry battalions to ensure complete integration of the total tactical plan. Aviation will be required to operate throughout the brigade sector.

* Air/Ground Coordination for the Hasty Attack [Aviation]: Units continue to have problems with air/ground coordination resulting in mission failure and fratricide.

PROBLEM: many units cite the lack of a standardized friendly recognition method as a significant factor for fratricide and/or mission failure.

Techniques: Coordination must begin at brigade level, but it is imperative that the aviation task force ensures the proper coordination is completed.

1. The aviation task force must have current and accurate graphics, and friendly locations for all units in the brigade. All air crews must have these graphics posted.

2. Teams must have the latest information. This is easily accomplished by a face-to-face briefing between the team leader and the S2 and S3. This may require the team leader to land at the TAC prior to executing the mission.

3. Team leaders may have to contact supported units directly. Be prepared to communicate down to platoon level by having the proper frequencies and call signs available in the cockpit.

* Synchronization During the Deliberate Planning Process [Air Defense]: Air defense personnel are routinely not present during key synchronization events. Air defense mission analysis and OPORD preparation are often conducted in isolation, with the end product submitted to the S3.

RESULT: an air defense plan that is not synchronized with the supported commander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

Techniques:

1. The air defense officer (ADO) must synchronize his planning efforts with the brigade.

2. Proactively discuss air defense efforts with the brigade S3 and commander to ensure the brigade's maneuver operations are not degraded by enemy air operations.

3. Reference: FM 44-100 U.S. Army Air Defense Operations, Chapter 6 and Appendix B.

* Combined Arms Obstacle Integration [Mobility/Survivability]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force commanders and engineers plan individual obstacles rather than obstacle groups.

2. Direct and indirect fires are not well integrated.

3. Units do not template and disseminate the placement or sighting of scatterable mines.

4. When units do attempt to plan direct and indirect fires on obstacle groups, the priorities are not clear on where and when to fire on the enemy.

5. Overwatch of tactical and protective obstacles is limited by poor obstacle sighting and poor line of sight for the overwatching element.

Techniques:

1. SCATMINWARNs must be sent to task force and brigade TOCs to provide units the necessary warning to successfully plan and execute their operations.

2. Conduct reconnaissance and adjust obstacle placement to support the maneuver force's ability to integrate with direct and indirect fires.

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