COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
TREND 10: Targeting process/targeting meetings.
PROBLEMS:
1. Staff members do not understand their role in the targeting process.
2. Battle staffs lack collective experience using the targeting process.
3. Targeting meetings are random and often unfocused.
RESULT: Most units fail to prioritize and then focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPTs).
Techniques:
1. Conducting the targeting meeting (in sequence):
a. The brigade/battalion XO
--Opens the meeting.
--Details its purpose and the agenda.
--Specifies the time period or event being discussed in the meeting.
b. The S-2 provides an intelligence update.
(1) Briefs the current enemy situation.
(2) Reviews the current collection plan and reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
(3) Provides a battle damage assessment of targets engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy course of action.
(4) Presents an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of actions and locations using the event template and a list of high value targets.
--For the next 24-36 hours for the brigade
--For the next 12-24 hours for battalion
(5) Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the PIR for review by the battle staff.
c. S-3 is next:
(1) Briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to his intent.
(2) Briefs any requirements from higher headquarters since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations.
(3) Finally, he informs the battle staff of the status of assets available for the targeting process.
d. The third briefer is the battalion FSO:
(1) Briefs the status of all delivery assets.
--Reviews the current target synchronization matrix.
--Summarizes results of actions taken.
(2) Provides the new target synchronization matrix and proposed list of HPTs and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement.
e. Changes to the HPTL are made. Locations are updated or refined.
f. XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix:
--Identify a detector.
--Determine an attack means.
--Assign an asset to assess each HPT.
g. After the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the targeting meeting for approval.
h. When the commander approves the results, the following products are updated, prepared, and reproduced for timely distribution:
(1) Target Synchronization Matrix
(2) FRAGO to subordinate units
(3) Updated Target List
(4) Updated R&S plan
(5) Any changes to commander's PIR
2. Reference: Targeting Process video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP Red Book, 1 OCT 96, p. 21.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 11: Utilization and integration. IEW assets are not properly tasked nor is their collection role clearly defined in support of the brigade scheme of maneuver.
PROBLEMS:
1. Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) plans at the battalion level and collection plans from the brigade do not clearly identify tasks (NAIs, reporting criteria, etc.) for most of the MI company's collection assets.
2. IEW teams task organized down to specific units routinely miss out on the mission analysis process, back briefs, and rehearsals which define the unit's scheme of maneuver and the role that IEW plays in the collection process.
3. Intelligence analysts (96Bs) within the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) are poorly utilized; most of their time is spent establishing and maintaining communications and tracking deployed assets.
4. The ACT is not integrated into the brigade TOC set-up and staff battle rhythm which prevents situational awareness.
5. The MI company team commander must sustain aggressive participation in the brigade's decision making process--this is the foundation for successful early integration of IEW assets on the battlefield.
Techniques:
1. Once the initial plan is set, the MI company team commander must constantly check to ensure the plan is described in detail as part of the S-3's task organization and tasks to subordinate units' portion of the brigade OPORD and subsequent FRAGOs.
2. The low density of MI resources and the independent and decentralized nature of IEW operations require that the company leadership exercise centralized planning and C2 for these assets to ensure the brigade commander's intent is met.
3. The MI company team commander must task collection assets in accordance with their capabilities and ensure that guidance published in the brigade collection and battalion R&S plans is carried out and tracked through the ACT.
4. If assets are misutilized by a supported unit, recommended task organization changes must be brought to the brigade S-3 during the target synchronization meeting.
5. The physical location of the ACT and set-up therein are subjects of much debate. Regardless of specifics, one item is certain--the ACT cannot function as a control and analysis hub for IEW operations unless it is fully integrated in the brigade TOC set-up. This clearly means being physically "attached" to the TOC, where on-shift soldiers can participate in TOC huddles, clearance of fire battle drills, targeting meetings, etc.
6. Several soldiers, such as the commo and NBC NCOICs, may be better utilized assisting with company headquarter's functions in the ACT. Any soldier, regardless of MOS, can be trained to properly maintain a journal, receive/send reports, and establish communications. All-source analysis, however, rests firmly on the shoulders of the 96Bs trained to do that job.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
PROBLEM: Brigade level organizations have been ineffective in establishing a battle rhythm that maximizes planning time at the subordinate unit level.
RESULT: Commanders and subordinate leaders at all levels have not had the ideal planning time necessary for planning and execution of orders.
Techniques:
1. Brigades must strive to conduct targeting meetings to direct operations for execution at company level 36 to 48 hours from the time orders and FRAGOs are issued.
2. Brigades must develop a battle rhythm using targeting meetings as the basis to develop the rhythm consistent with the time standards listed above.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 13: Integration of heavy Liaison Officers (LNOs) in the MDMP.
PROBLEM: Brigades have not effectively integrated heavy LNOs into the military decision making process (MDMP). As a result, the capabilities and limitations of heavy assets inherent to the brigade task force are not thoroughly understood.
RESULT: Normally, heavy units deploy to JRTC separate from light organizations and are not present during the initial planning process. Due to this fact, heavy integration becomes an afterthought.
Techniques:
1. Brigade staffs must ensure that heavy LNOs are incorporated into the MDMP and aggressively seek to integrate them into the process.
2. Heavy unit LNOs link up with supported units at the unit's home station and deploy with the brigade staff to JRTC.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
PROBLEM: Heavy units deploy to the JRTC with only one LNO, resulting in a lack of sustained LNO operations in the TOC.
RESULT: This presents a problem when the one LNO is executing a rest plan and/or executing other duties specific to LNO responsibilities.
Technique: Supported units need to emphasize the importance of having more than one LNO to provide 24-hour LNO duties in the TOC.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 15: Task organizing Military Police (MP) units.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.
2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and check points to man that are in close proximity to maneuver units in the same sector.
RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measures are difficult to manage, which has led to problems with fratricide.
Technique: Task organize MP units conducting these types of operations under maneuver battalions. This will alleviate the above mentioned problems.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 16: Casualty evacuation planning.
PROBLEM: Units are not getting the right personnel involved in the CHS planning and are not developing a plan to support sustained operations.
Techniques:
1. To develop a successful combat health support plan, the medical company commander, combat health support officer, brigade S-1, and brigade surgeon must all be involved in developing the plan.
2. During the brigade's course of action development, the combat health support (CHS) plan must be incorporated.
3. Units must use effective CHS rehearsals, matrices, and CHS cartoons on the concept of support.
4. Units can improve their evacuation process by using C-130s for the backhaul of routine and priority patients.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND 17: Company-level estimate of the situation.
PROBLEMS:
1. Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.
2. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
3. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
4. Poor time management.
5. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.
Techniques:
1. Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."
2. Develop pre-printed, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in the field:
- Mission analysis worksheet
- COA sketch sheets
- Blank timeline
- Warning order format
- FRAGO format
3. Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff with each responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis:
- Developing a COA.
- Wargaming the COA.
- Writing an annex to the FRAGO.
4. Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process. Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.
(TA 4.3.1. Issue Planning Guidance)
TREND 18: Guidance for fire support.
PROBLEM: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague and does not focus on fire support assets.
RESULT: The guidance received is not supportable with the fire support assets available.
Techniques:
1. FM G-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOs. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. FM G-20-10 states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct and that we have the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.
(TA 4.3.1. Issue Planning Guidance)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part I
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part III
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