COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
TREND 19: Course of Action (COA) development.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigades have not thoroughly developed approved courses of action to the level of detail needed to execute wargamming and synchronization.
2. Brigades begin the MDMP already having an OPLAN developed to address their initial entry and mission. While this can serve as an advantage in the interest of time, staffs have not developed courses of action in detail.
RESULTS:
1. Movement tables, convoy density, and ACLs specific to airland and air assault operations are not developed until the actual wargamming and synchronization begin.
2. This confuses the wargamming process and does not allow the staff to totally focus on synchronizing the plan.
Techniques: Brigade staffs must develop approved courses of action prior to initiating the wargamming and synchronization process to maximize synchronization.
(TA 4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)
TREND 20: Maintenance standard operating procedures (SOPs).
PROBLEM: Maintenance units train at the JRTC without an updated maintenance SOP. The AVUM responsible for status reporting and maintenance flow management habitually will not have an SOP covering all the attached assets.
Techniques:
1. This unit should write, publish, and distribute a copy of the SOP outlining the maintenance procedures to be followed by the entire task force.
2. The SOP should contain such information as how attachments will report aircraft status, process oil samples, and conduct maintenance throughout the entire task force.
3. Refer to FM 1-500 for examples of tactical maintenance SOPs.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND 21: Effective utilization of the battalion S-2 NCOIC.
PROBLEM: Battalion S-2s in infantry battalions do not effectively use their NCOICs. By MTOE, these battalions are authorized a CMF 11 series MSG as the S-2 NCOIC.
RESULT: This senior infantry NCO is a maneuver subject matter expert. In most cases, he has almost two decades of experience on how to fight at the team, squad, and platoon level.
Technique: S-2s should tap this experience when portraying how the enemy will fight small units, just as the S-2 taps the FSO's experience and expertise to determine how the enemy will deploy his indirect fire assets.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND 22: Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).
PROBLEM: Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission-essential equipment items required for particular missions.
Technique: Commanders need to ensure that platoon and section leaders routinely participate in home station training with elements of their supported brigade task force to increase awareness of IEW assets and facilitate coordination during combat operations.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND 23: Utilization of the Analysis Control Element (ACE).
PROBLEM: SALUTE reports are being passed to the commander with little or no analysis.
RESULTS: Where analysis is attempted, it is usually of poor quality and lacks the necessary detail to be useful to the commander. In essence, this information is only of general benefit to the commander.
Techniques:
1. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of ASAS.
2. Use this tool to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat data base upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, to name only a few of its capabilities.
3. Incorporate communications and dissemination to the ACE as part of the ACT battle rhythm.
4. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the AO but within the area of interest (AI). The analysts working the ACE are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases.
5. Integrate the ACT into brigade TOC set-up, preferably between the S-3 and S-2.
6. Update the company SOP and clearly outline the tasks of the ACT.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND 24: Transferring Command and Control (C2) from the Tactical Command Post (TAC) to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
PROBLEM:
1. Brigades do not have the procedures incorporated into the tactical standard operating procedures TACSOPs that address the specifics inherent to TOC vs TAC operations.
2. They have failed to develop any criteria that determines when the TAC has control of the battle.
Technique:
1. Brigades must first determine what conditions must exist for this to occur. Examples are: all nets inherent to the TAC are operational and the TAC being in position to monitor and track the battle.
2. During wargamming and synchronization, brigade staffs must determine the necessity to employ a TAC. Considerations and factors include, but are not limited to, the need to place C2 at a specific point to influence the battle, the need to have redundant communications, and the current enemy threat.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
PROBLEMS:
1. Once units depart the Intermediate Staging Base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.
2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.
3. Rehearsal techniques listed in FM 6-20-1 are not being used.
Techniques:
1. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.
3. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the time required to construct it.
4. Review FM 6 -20-1, pages 3-12 through 3-15. This source provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by home station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.
(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans)
TREND 26: Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) - Military Intelligence (MI).
PROBLEMS:
1. The MI company leadership does not rigidly enforce the basic tenets of troop leading procedures (TLPs) during operations.
2. Rehearsals are not stressed by the company leadership, and little planning time is dedicated to contingency planning for C2, reporting criteria, and actions on contact.
RESULT:
1. The result is poorly planned missions which lack integration into the tactical scheme of maneuver.
2. The factors of METT-T are rarely considered, particularly in preparation for ground surveillance (GS) and human intelligence (HUMINT) team missions.
3. Teams often deploy missing basic mission-essential equipment items such as radios, maps, etc.
4. Coordination with attached and/or supported units is poorly executed.
Techniques: Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission-essential equipment items required for particular missions.
(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
TREND 27: Staff coordination. For a CSS unit, support operations drives the train.
PROBLEM:
1. The mission for CSS units is to provide support. However, support operations alone does not comprise the entire spectrum of elements needed to conduct or support combat operations.
2. A common mistake is to run support operations in a vacuum without the proper staff coordination.
RESULT: Missions come and go without the benefit of interrelating with other staff sections. Support operations sections do not coordinate with the S-3 or S-2.
Technique: The S-2 and S-3 can provide relevant information to elements going out on missions in support of customers.
(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)
TREND 28: Air/ground coordination and integration. Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.
PROBLEMS:
1. Frequently aviation units operate over ground commanders' sectors without an understanding of the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.
2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.
3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and do not suggest the best method to utilize their assets.
Techniques:
1. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.
2. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.
3. During home station training, conduct classes on the Air Tasking Order (ATO), Airspace Control Order (ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS), and A2C2 operations IAW FM 100-103.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 29: Combat Health Support (CHS) Planning and Staff Integration.
PROBLEM: As the brigade's subject matter experts for combat health support operations, the forward support medical company commander and the brigade surgeon are not properly integrated into the brigade staff.
RESULT: A CHS plan that lacks proper and timely coordination, synchronization, and dissemination. Overall, the CHS plan becomes reactive instead of proactive.
Techniques:
1. Integrate the medical company commander and brigade surgeon into the brigade staff planning process for CHS operations.
2. Ensure that the Combat Health Support Officer (CHSO), the brigade signal officer, and a representative from the forward MEDEVAC support team become involved the CHS planning process.
3. The brigade S-1 should schedule CHS wargaming, coordination meetings, and rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline.
4. The CHS planner must provide the command with a CHS estimate to be used as a basis for the CHS plan which is developed by the brigade S-1 and the other CHS planners in the brigade.
5. The CHS planners should develop a single CHS graphic (cartoon) showing the position of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes, and planning and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.
6. The brigade should include the CHS graphic with the brigade operations order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the CHS plan.
7. Doctrinal reference: FM 8-55.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 30: Commander's guidance for fire support. Most commanders are using the format of FM G-71 when writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation, and Restriction (PPAR). Recently some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method, and Endstate.
PROBLEMS:
1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.
2. Some FSOs use the terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass incorrectly.
RESULT: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.
Techniques:
1. FM 6-71 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Cornbined Arms Commander, pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOs. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. FM 6-20-10 states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct, and that we have the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 31: Heavy unit employment during MOUT.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade task forces have experienced difficulty in employing heavy teams during MOUT.
2. Heavy units do not understand the complexity of MOUT, and brigade staffs do not understand how to effectively utilize heavy units during MOUT.
3. Fire control measures needed to prevent fratricide have not been planned in detail.
Techniques:
1. Brigade staffs must conduct leader professional development training with heavy team leaders to completely understand how to employ heavy forces during MOUT.
2. Detailed planning to address fire control measures and issues must be incorporated into plans developed for MOUT.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 32: Task organizing Military Police (MP) units.
PROBLEMS:
1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.
2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and check points to man that are in close proximity to maneuver units in the same sector.
RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measure are difficult to manage which has led to problems with fratricide.
Techniques: Task organize MP units conducting these types of operations under maneuver battalions.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND 33: Synchronization of attacks.
PROBLEMS:
1. Synchronization of attacks in built-up areas.
2. Although units typically do well inside buildings, they are much less successful at coordinating the efforts of units outside and between buildings.
3. Units generally disregard the synchronization of direct fires, indirect fires, and obscuration, often in the belief that "MOUT is a squad leaders fight."
4. Units lack a detailed direct fire plan.
5. They fail to weight the main effort through restricting responsibility or adding combat power.
6. The unit's lack of a plan to suppress and obscure enemy positions to allow movement.
7. They exhibit tactical impatience resulting in movement to a new building before the conditions have been set.
RESULTS:
1. The result is a large number of friendly casualties and the loss of tactical momentum.
2. On average, units suffer twice as many casualties moving between buildings as they do in the close fight within buildings.
Techniques:
1. Refer to CALL CTC Bulletin 90-3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).
2. Refer to CALL, Newsletter 93-8, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Chapter II.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part II
Acknowledgements
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