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TREND 1: Leader cross-talk and communications. Regular and timely communications between company commanders and members of the battalion staff are critical to the successful synchronization of operations. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on the fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2: Commander's role in staff planning. Military Intelligence (MI) company team commanders are extremely proactive participants in the staff planning process. Considerable effort is made to integrate IEW assets early into the brigade plan.

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 3: Communications. Over the last several rotations, aviation task forces have improved significantly in their ability to communicate. This improvement is due to increased proficiency by the operators as well as the outstanding maintenance performed and supervised by the commo sections.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 4: Use and understanding of MSE (mobile subscriber equipment). Brigades have been successful in using mobile subscriber equipment during their operations here at the training center. MSE has been established early on and has been maintained throughout rotations. The use of MSE has provided brigade with redundant means of communications and has freed up command nets to control current operations.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 5: FM retrans capabilities. Brigades have employed FM retrans systems effectively. As a result, commanders and staffs have been able to C2 operations over extended distances. Keys to success in the use of FM retrans usage have been the integration of the brigade signal officer (BSO) during the MDMP, effective terrain analysis, and reconnaissance of retrans locations. Additionally, brigades have employed FM retrans assets forward early to validate divisions made during planning.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 6: Flexibility to configure communication assets for varying missions. Brigade signal elements have been successful in utilizing numerous communications to support operations here at the training center. Brigades have the flexibility to incorporate several different assets into their operations to facilitate C2. Assets used during operations include single channel tactical satellites (TAC-SAT), single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), MSE, and digital nets.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 7: Mission analysis. Overall, brigade level organizations have executed mission analysis to standard. Integral to their success has been products and tools used to capture and communicate the results of the analysis. Additionally, staffs have been successful in utilizing assistant staff officers to gather general information; i.e., assets available, combat power, etc., while primary staff officers were attending division level operations orders.

(TA 4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)

TREND 8: Firing battery movement order. The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed IAW with the XO's Handbook, addressing specific and implied tasks. Battery leaders brief movement routes utilizing start points, check points, and release points. When higher HQs do not issue start points, check points, and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 9: Clearance of fires battle drill. Brigades have been effective in utilizing clearance of fires battle drills. Keys to success have been a thorough understanding of battle drills specified in tactical command post standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) and tactical operations center (TOCSOPS) and the integration of all BOS elements into the drill. Additionally, subordinate units at all levels have demonstrated proficiency in executing the drill to quickly clear fires.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 10: Time management. Time management has been a strength among brigade level units. Specifically, time schedules have been established early on and brigades have assigned a custodian, historically the XO, to strictly manage timelines inherent to planning processes. Additionally, timelines and schedules have been modified as necessary to adapt to changes IAW the given situation.

(TA 4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 11: Integration of smoke platoon assets. Brigades have integrated smoke platoon operations well into maneuver planning. Smoke platoon assets have contributed greatly to the success of both defensive and offensive operations. Specifically, the brigades have utilized smoke assets to supplement deception operations and during the employment of volcano mine systems.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 12: Survivability. Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 13: Heavy unit task organization. Brigades have successfully task organized heavy units to achieve combined arms integration. Specifically, heavy units are allocated combat multipliers; i.e., ADA and engineer assets, to achieve success.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 14: Heavy unit utilization during defensive operations. Brigades have been successful in integrating heavy assets into defensive operations. Heavy forces have proven to be very effective during counter-reconnaissance operations and covering force operations. Additionally, when combined with attack aviation, success has been achieved in the destruction of enemy forces both forward in sector and in engagement areas.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN) capabilities.

PROBLEM: Brigades have experienced difficulty in using tactical local area network during operations at JRTC.

RESULT: Laptop computers have not had the required software and device drivers to access TACLAN.

Technique: Brigades need to acquire the appropriate software and supporting equipment in order to effectively utilize this system.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 2: Staff coordination.

PROBLEMS:

1. Staffs also fail to recognize the importance of marking the facility as a hospital element through the use of the Red Cross symbol, which can be seen from all avenues of approach to the facility.

2. This is required for them to be afforded protection under the Geneva Convention. Units often place a Red Cross on top of the facility, which only identifies them as a medical facility to aircraft.

RESULT: Visual recognition from the ground is also mandatory and can be accomplished through display of the Red Cross on ambulances or on the sides of tentage.

Technique:

Commanders need to force integration of all staff and task force elements prior to deployment so as to have a task force focus upon arrival.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communication Information)

TREND 3: Coordination between the brigade FSO and BSO and BN FSO.

PROBLEM: Brigade fire support elements need to ensure that they are integrated into signal specific issues within the TOC. Specifically, FSEs at brigade level do not receive updates referencing frequency changes, TEK changeover, and SOI changes implemented by the BSO.

RESULT: The FSE experiences difficulty in executing their assigned mission.

Technique: The BSO must assume ownership of the FSE and ensure the FSE is aware of any changes inherent to signal operations in the brigade.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communication Information)

TREND 4: Knowledge of ground maneuver unit task organization and equipment.

PROBLEM: Air Mission Commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions and thus not aware of the assets available.

Technique: Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At home station, units should attempt to conduct cross training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5: Information management - Battalion Command Posts (Bn Cps).

PROBLEM: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.

RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

Techniques:

1. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).

2. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (Main CP, Combat Trains CP, and Field Trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6: Battle tracking and situational awareness. Air Defense units continue to suffer substantial casualties which are primarily caused by a lack of battle tracking and situational awareness.

PROBLEMS:

1. Inaccurate information concerning air defense team locations.

2. Actual team locations differ from those posted on the ADO's maps despite clearance of fire battle drills conducted at brigade and battalion level.

3. Current minefield tracking charts, usually available at brigade and battalion TOCs, are not considered when planning Stinger and Avenger moves.

RESULTS:

1. Fratricides caused by friendly indirect fire systems.

2. Stinger and Avenger teams suffer an inordinate amount of casualties from known friendly and enemy minefields.

Techniques:

1. ADOs at brigade and battalion level must ensure that their battle tracking is current and accurate.

2. Use communications procedures, status charts, and tracking tools effectively to keep the ADO situationally aware of the entire battlefield.

3. CALL Newsletter 95-7 (Tactical Operations Center) provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.

4. TF TOCs should establish a central node, similar to the one used during the fight, and track the preparation for combat and re-prioritize efforts (Battle Command-Seeing Ourselves).

5. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked.

6. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions during home station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 7: Air Defense coordination. Brigade air defense has not been effectively coordinated.

PROBLEM:

1. ADA assets have not been positioned well, and coordination between brigade and battalion level assets has not facilitated integration.

2. ADA assets must be mutually supporting to ensure that early warning assets are positioned to acquire targets, communication systems are in place to receive information, and Avenger and Stinger systems are emplaced properly to interdict enemy aircraft.

Techniques: During the planning process, the ADAO must consider the above mentioned areas and develop plans for the employment of ADA assets to achieve success.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 8: Develop occupation plan. The Forward Support Battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

PROBLEMS:

1. The military decision making process (MDMP) is usually not used.

2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.

3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.

4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:

• Personnel not familiar with the SOP do not follow the SOP
• Never executed the procedure to verify whether it works or not.

5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.

• OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.
• Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.

6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.

2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.

3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

Techniques:

1. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

2. Rely on the MDMP to:

• Develop the plan.
• Publish a good operations order.
• Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.
• Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.

3. Doctrinal references:

• FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion
• MTP 63-216, Forward Support Battalion
• CGSC ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes

(TA 4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

TREND 9: Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) - Aviation. Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision making process.

PROBLEMS:

1. The staffs do not have a clear understanding of the process and the linkage between the steps.

2. The few senior officers who understand the process generally focus on other issues.

3. Often the executive officer focuses on logistical issues, not ST 101-5 staff "leadership" requirements, while the S-3 is fighting the current fight. Units should train as a staff at home station to become proficient in all areas of the decision making process prior to their training rotation.

Techniques::

1. Use the executive officer as a chief of staff to coordinate the battle staff and oversee the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

2. Use every available home station training opportunity to train as a staff in order to enhance proficiency in all areas of the decision making process.

3. Reference: ST 101-5.

4. Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.

5. References: See ST 101-5, CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning, and CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center, for additional details about techniques and procedures on how to successfully employ the decision making process.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS Narrative

TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part II