TA. 6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/ BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)
6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles
Technique: A combination of wire, mines, tank ditches and berms has proven most effective.
6.3 Enhance Survivability
* Use of engineer equipment: Aviation elements obtain engineer assets from the infantry brigade for enhancing force protection; brigade commanders understand the necessity to protect the aviation assets.
Technique: Use SEE and bulldozer support to construct survivability positions protecting aviation assets.
* Priority of work for engineer equipment: Aviation units continue to properly prioritize their engineer support requirements. By identifying the aircraft, the FARP and command and control nodes as enemy high payoff targets, units successfully establish engineer priorities. While digging survivability positions for each aircraft is not feasible, FARPs and TOCs are habitually "dug-in."
* Survivability: Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, class IV planning, and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability for many units.
6.2 Provide Countermobility
* Security zone operations: More frequently, the aviation task force, task organized with ground maneuver forces, is assigned the mission of establishing the security zone during the defense phase. The task force must understand that these obstacles are the first tier in shaping the brigade battlefield.
- Too many aviation task forces do not complete the brigade directed security zone obstacle plan.
- Most aviation task forces do not include an engineer liaison officer.
RESULT: Recurring failures to emplace obstacles within the security zone.
Technique: Aviation task force staffs should seek and use engineer support in planning and executing this effort.
6.3 Enhance Survivability
- Movement of teams, such as repositioning assets to adjust ADA coverage, is not planned as part of a combat operation. EXAMPLE: teams move individually, without prior planning for security and convoy integration.
- Upon arrival at the designated location, team leaders do not conduct a complete and effective reconnaissance of the area to determine enemy ground and air avenues of approach or hide positions for snipers.
- They do not employ their organic firepower (SAW and M3P .50 caliber machine gun) to cover these avenues or coordinate with their supported unit to establish security measures.
RESULTS: Teams are often destroyed enroute to, or shortly after arrival at, the new location.
- Improper movement techniques
- Inadequate preparation of individual fighting positions, ie. use of sector stakes, preparation of range cards, fighting position construction.
- Poor dispersion during halts or in patrol bases.
- Poor noise, light and litter discipline.
- Inadequate use of observation posts.
- Inadequate local security patrolling.
- Failure to understand the rules of engagement.
- Poor passive/active air defense measures.
- Inadequate leader supervision of field hygiene.
RESULT: preventable loss of life and combat power.
Techniques: for Home Station training
- Construct individual fighting positions to standard, with particular emphasis on sector stakes, clearing fields of fire, range cards and sector sketches
- Practice squad and platoon movement techniques consistent with desired speed, security, cover and concealment, fields of fire, dispersion, command and control, and the enemy threat.
- Treat every halt as a hasty defense. Begin preparing hasty fighting positions when halts last more then 15 minutes.
- Practice a disciplined response to hostile air, both fixed and rotary wing.
- Use vignettes to train soldiers on situational application of the rules of engagement. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-2, Peace Operations Training Vignettes.
- Proactive patrolling techniques designed to find the enemy, determine his strength and dispositions and to provide early warning and security.
- Enforce, at all levels, strict adherence to noise, light, and litter discipline.
- Enforce field hygiene; note: in heavily forested and vegetated areas, soldiers are susceptible to poison ivy and poison oak, particularly in the summer and fall.
6.3.1 Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection
- Too many units have no procedures developed specific to handing chemical casualties.
- Bn/TFs are not adequately trained, organized or equipped to perform patient chemical decontamination.
- Company/Teams routinely fail to segregate and decontaminate chemical casualties.
- BSA located medical companies are not equipped to handle mass chemical casualties.
- Bn/TFs fail to use the existing CASEVAC system for chemical casualties; they rely on brigade to develop a separate chemical casualty evacuation plan, which often does not happen.
- Brigade and battalion level chemical staff members do not sufficiently coordinate with their medical counterparts about casualty estimates, logistical considerations based on casualty estimates, evacuation capabilities, treatment facilities, or other management concerns.
RESULT: Unacceptable soldier deaths caused by evacuation delays.
Technique: Use non-standard evacuation methods and ambulance exchange points to transport uncontaminated casualties to the medical support units.
Procedure: develop specific procedures to handle chemical casualties; these procedures will be different than the procedures for normal battle or non-battle casualties.
- Batteries and platoon routinely do a poor job of positioning crew served weapons.
- Too often the crew served positions lack interlocking fires.
- Units fail to clear fields of fire.
- Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.
- Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
- Too many soldiers do not know how the T&E mechanism functions.
- NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew served weapons proficiency.
RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.
- Doctrinal references: FM 6-50 chap. 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG pg. 3-6.
- Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, on positioning crew served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
- Consider identifying crew served weapons positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
- Crew served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader (BC or 1SG) to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.
6.3.4 Provide Security and Readiness
- Inadequate OPSEC. The terrorists develop their own intelligence using civilians on the battlefield or by simply observing the assembly area.
- Inadequate perimeter defense.
- Inadequate measures to prevent terrorists from entering assembly area.
RESULT: Level One terrorist attacks routinely render aviation task forces combat ineffective.
Techniques: Because it is not feasible to totally prevent terrorist entry into assembly areas, plan to severely limit damage once terrorists do enter the area.
- Protect most heavily high payoff targets, such as the aircraft and the FARP.
- Develop and train reaction forces to combat terrorist infiltrators. Develop a set of battle drills during Home Station training for those soldiers potential members of the reaction force.
- Include fratricide prevention into the planning, preparation and execution of reaction force missions.
- Survivability positions should be available for all personnel.
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