TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
7.0 Combat Service Support
* ALOCs: ALOCs are quick and accurate in their requisition of destroyed equipment and casualties. They have been accurate at tracking all assets and supplies available and requisitioning as required to fill shortages.
7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment
* Maintenance: Units continue to maintain operational readiness rates in excess of eighty percent. This is a direct result of thorough maintenance planning and the technical competency demonstrated by maintenance personnel.
7.5.2 Supply the Force
Technique: Conduct Home Station training emphasizing rigging, loading, and load inspection. Such pre-deployment training, conducted with supported units, results in the timely resupply of critical items to the entire brigade.
220.127.116.11 Evacuate Casualties
- ELTs provide the personnel and communications equipment necessary to establish proper control and liaison for the Forward Support MEDEVAC Team (FSMT).
- Use the ELT to coordinate all ground and non-standard air evacuation (CASEVAC) for the brigade.
- Use the ELT as a dedicated casualty evacuation control communications net.
RESULT: Using the ELT as described virtually eliminates the command and control problems normally associated with FSMT mission execution.
Techniques: Home Station training
- Train and sustain the basic lifesaving steps.
- Maximize the use of combat lifesavers to sustain casualties until medics arrive or until the casualties are evacuated.
- Train to use poleless litters and skidcos to aid in evacuation to the company casualty collect point (CCP).
- Train how best to organize and secure the CCP.
* Water production operations (CSS): Units are focusing on the integration of preventive medicine, security, and maintenance for their ROWPU operations, thus providing the task force with continuous water support.
7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment
PROBLEM: Too many aviation maintenance units do not have an updated Standing Operating Procedure.
Procedures: to develop at Home Station
- Designate a specific maintenance unit to be responsible to the Task Force commander for reporting status and managing the task force maintenance flow during contingency operation.
- The designated maintenance element should write, publish and distribute to other maintenance slice elements the SOP for task force level maintenance.
SOP must address:
- slice reporting of aircraft status
- oil sample procedures
- Align the SOP for maintenance between all maintenance elements potentially in support of the task force aircraft.
- Doctrinal reference: FM 1-500 contains examples of tactical SOPs.
- AVIM slices sent to support battalion-level operations are generally too small. EXAMPLE: Usually units deploy 11 to 15 mechanics and one or two shops to support 40 airframes.
- AVIMs too frequently are improperly equipped to repair the components for all aircraft assigned to the Task Force. EXAMPLE: Many AVIMs arrive without the capability to perform many simple tasks such as pressing bearings or making hydraulic lines.
Techniques: for Home Station pre-deployment training
- Train and equip AVIM units based on the size and type of element the AVIM will be tasked to support during a deployment.
- Leaders must plan AVIM support more thoroughly.
- Units arrive with no BDAR kits, manuals, or trained personnel.
- Units combine SAR and DARRT operations.
- Units do not designate an aircraft specifically for DARRT
RESULT: Units waste time preparing a different aircraft every time DARRT is required.
Techniques: Unit leaders should be familiar with FM 1-513, FM 1-500, and FM 20-30.
18.104.22.168 Provide public affairs services
PROBLEM: Brigade and Battalion staffs are not proactively planning, preparing or developing SOPs and guidance to deal with possible media coverage of events occurring in their area of operations.
- Staff at all levels should have plans and SOPs to deal with all types of media situations: scheduled vs. unscheduled ; credentialed vs. uncredentialed.
- Tailor plans to fit each type of deployment: Combat, Peacekeeping and Operations Other Than War.
elements within each plan should include:
- Location and proper use of Public Affairs assets, if available
- Actions upon notification (scheduled vs. unscheduled)
- Battletracking events with possible media interest and development of guidance for wargamed questions with applied command message answers
- Actions/Agenda to take when media arrives
- Guidance on information that can be shown and talked about and what items cannot be shown or discussed (OPSEC at the Source --- explanation of why something can't be shown or discussed)
- Logistical, transportation and safety requirements.
- Remember, time is mission to the Army; time is money to the media. Proper planning will help the command to quickly deal with the media, get back to the mission, and facilitate an accurate story with appropriate messages being told to the public.
PROBLEM: Task force commanders do not deploy with PA assets or designate PA/Media representatives at brigade, battalion or company levels.
- Units should deploy with the PA assets necessary to assist with PA operations and appropriately advise the commander.
- Appoint and train media representatives at all levels of command to interact with the news media and the media escort. EXAMPLE: During unscheduled/unescorted media contact, the media representative functions as the media escort or media point of contact at the unit level.
PROBLEMS: If deployed, PA assets are not located or used appropriately to support and conduct PA operations.
- Locate the PA officer and/or NCO and other PA assets in the BSA during deployments. The BSA contains the logistical assets required to support the media's needs and facilitate the PA requirement to do their mission.
- Locating PA assets with rear command posts facilitates tracking key events which helps to anticipate those events likely to attract media attention.
- Provide PA assets access to communications and provide them movement support within the area of operations. This facilitates liaison with both the media and with forward commanders and their staffs.
PROBLEM: Too many units refuse to speak to media during unscheduled visits.
RESULT: This allows the media to formulate a story without any input from U.S. Army participants. That increases the possibility that the point of view reflected in the resultant story may be incorrect.
- Plan for both scheduled and unscheduled media visits.
- Allow units to speak with the media during unscheduled visits if time is available and it will not interfere with the mission.
- Do not use the mission as an excuse not to talk.
PROBLEM: Units often refuse to speak to uncredentialed media. Today, great numbers of the media from all countries and affiliations deploy to areas of operations. In addition, many hundreds of host nation media may be present. Only willing media are credentialed.
- Do not make credentialing a requirement to speak with US forces.
- Allow units to speak to uncredentialed media if time is available and it will not interfere with the mission.
- If you recognize a news reporter, allow him/her a few minutes of your time.
- If you do not recognize them, politely refer them back to higher headquarters PAO for credentialing.
PROBLEMS: During media visits, leaders and soldiers give conflicting information about their unit activities or subjects the news media are covering.
- Ensure public affairs guidance, plans, and important information gets briefed to the lowest level.
- Emphasize the importance of speaking with one voice. Train personnel to stay in their lane regarding what they talk about; ie. talk about your unit and your job.
PROBLEMS: Units handle or treat media according to the origin and affiliation.
- Treat all media the same regardless of affiliation or nationality.
- Telling your unit story truthfully and accurately to all affiliations and nationalities is important.
- Remember to protect OPSEC.
- Make sure that the individual assigned as the unit media rep is trained on how to deal with the media.
- Avoid building a hostile atmosphere and a relationship of mistrust. Use sound judgement when checking credentials. It's O.K. to check for IDs and credentials, but there is a difference between honest checks and an act of interrogation.
PROBLEMS: Units do not fully train or prepare for media contact during operations or deployment.
Techniques: what to train for
- Familiarize brigade, battalion and company level commanders with interview techniques on how to express proper command messages.
- Planning for dealing with the media.
- How to recognize events or missions likely to generate media interest.
- How to prepare guidance; ie. preparing for question and answer sessions.
- How to best tell your unit's story.
- How to maintain OPSEC and still be open with the media.
- How to facilitate media visits and still accomplish your unit mission.
- Train these skills to the lowest feasible level. Remember that reporters love to talk to privates.
22.214.171.124 Evacuate Casualties
- Consistent inability to evacuate casualties from company casualty collection points (CCP).
- Battalion-level CASEVAC planning is usually not well coordinated and poorly executed.
RESULT: Unacceptably high DOW rate.
- Synchronize the battalion medical evacuation plan with the maneuver plan; it must not be planned in isolation.
- Treat medical evacuation as a combat operation.
- Rehearse the plan at the battalion-level. Suggested attendees: Bn XO, CSM, S1, PA, Medical Officer, Medical Platoon Leader and PSG, Company XO, 1SG and Senior Medics.
- Units should strive to train and maintain at least one combat lifesaver per squad and vehicle.
- Units are not planning the ammunition in volleys. They fail to calculate the number of volleys required and then allocate ammunition by that number.
- Ammunition tracking is deficient. Ammunition counts at the battery, battalion TOC, and battalion ALOC often widely differ.
- Ammunition resupply is often pre-packaged prior to D-Day with little thought given to follow-on missions.
- Planning for resupply is being done by only one means, and if weather or threat eliminate that means, units are slow to develop an alternate means of delivery.
- Units have insufficient ammunition to meet the commander's guidance for fire support.
- Infantry companies are initiating attacks with little or no mortar ammunition, or with insufficient artillery "killer" ammunition available to meet the desired attack criteria.
- identifies ammunition requirements for the brigade and battalion fights
- allocates volleys to meet the commander's desired effects on enemy forces
- estimates requirements for future operations.
field artillery battalion S3:
- refines the FSO's requirements
- identifies the amount of ammunition for gunnery needs (registration and calibration) and counterfire efforts
- tracks and controls the expenditure of the ammunition.
field artillery battalion XO:
- identifies ammunition resources
- plans and coordinates resupply operations (considering and using multiple means)
- monitors consumption
- anticipates future requirements.
- monitors the process
- identifies shortfalls to the Brigade Commander.
- the battalion FSOs must work closely with the infantry battalion commander and S3 in assigning priorities for mortar fires.
- FSOs must also work closely with the infantry battalion XO and S4 to ensure that both the battalion and company mortars are resupplied with sufficient ammunition to accomplish the commander's intent.
- Units are storing large quantities of high explosives and projectile ammunition close to high traffic areas within the BSA.
- Quantity/Distance requirements are not being considered by units when selecting ATP sites.
- ATP Layout plans should be developed IAW FM 9-13, and FM 9-6, chapter 2.
- Doctrinal reference: TM 9-1300-206 for quantity and distance requirements for field site ammunition storage.
Procedure: include a generic ATP plan in the unit TACSOP.
7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area
- Too often units allow civilians free access to the position area.
- Subordinate elements frequently call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Battalions usually take an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with the civilians.
- Disruption of unit activities.
- Friendly or neutral civilians are too often unnecessarily angered by procedures and the treatment they receive as a result of units trying to figure out the proper disposition.
- Too free an access however, allows nuetral or anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2 nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities etc.).
- Frequently terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.
- Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians.
- Develop clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian, as well as those civilians who do not appear on any list.
- Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians. Train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with civilians on the battlefield at Home Station.
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