The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW

Military

SECTION II

TA. 5 INTELLIGENCE BOS


Positive Performance

5.1 Collect Information

* Enemy air defense weapons systems: Aviation task force S2s have improved greatly in their ability to provide intelligence on enemy air defense weapons systems. Their knowledge of system capabilities as well as their consistent attempts to template these systems must be sustained.

5.2.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information

* Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO): Units are developing adequate terrain analysis products and preparing MCOOs for initial combat operations planning. Terrain analysis is significantly enhanced with satellite imagery products from the division terrain analysis detachment.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Initial development of IPB: Air defense battery commanders generally prepare a detailed IPB in conjunction with the brigade S2s. Thorough analysis identifies air avenues of approach, suspected landing zones for resupply, enemy air order of battle and probable courses of action.

* Initial IPB: Unit S2s continue to conduct thorough IPB prior to the JRTC rotation. S2s are working very hard at Home Station to prepare the IPB products they perceive as necessary to support their commanders. Unit S2s now develop new and innovative IPB products prior to deployment.

Needs Emphasis

5.1 Collect Information

* Reconnaissance and Surveillance planning and execution: S3s and S2s continue to produce adequate initial R&S plans, they generally continue to struggle with subsequent execution.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Commanders generally do not monitor R&S plan execution.
  2. S2s are not producing graphic R&S overlays to compliment the plan.
  3. S2s generally produce only an R&S matrix, while disseminating the information over FM voice.

RESULTS:

  1. OPORDS and schemes of maneuver, etc., are not appropriately modified, based on results of R&S plan execution.
  2. Too many commanders lose sight of where their collection assets are and what they are doing.

Techniques:

  1. Produce R&S overlays to accompany the matrix.
  2. Develop only as many NAIs as their collection asset can realistically cover.
  3. Modify and update the plan as changes in the situation occur.
  4. Monitor the R&S plan closely and strictly enforce accurate reporting from collectors.
  5. Disseminate R&S plans and graphics in hard-copy.
  6. Brief the collector face-to-face during orders, rehearsals, etc.
  7. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-2-1 defines the standards for R&S planning.

* Reconnaissance: Staffs are not using all available assets to gain a clear picture of the battlefield.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Perceived lack of planning time at both brigade and Bn/TF levels.
  2. Bn/TF level collection planning is generally weak.
  3. Bn/TF level element fail to focus reconnaissance efforts on brigade designated named areas of interest (NAIs).
  4. Too often brigades designate an excessive number of NAIs.
  5. Too often brigades fail to provide clear taskings to Bn/TFs.
  6. Brigades generally ineffectively use available aviation assets as reconnaissance platforms.

Techniques:

  1. Brigade level: know what assets are available and their capabilities; then plan to incorporate them in R&S collection in order to situationally template.
  2. Execute the collection as planned.
  3. Track collection and then analyze critical follow up reporting.
  4. Produce a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) to update the collection plan, based on what has already been reported and analyzed.

5.2.4 Integrate Intelligence Information

* Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) refinement: Continuous refinement of IPB products

PROBLEMS:

  1. Inability to assess enemy's intentions.
  2. Failure to establish a pattern in the enemy's employment of air assets.
  3. Inability to predict enemy actions and confirm or deny templated enemy positions.
  4. Early warning tracks of aircraft are not immediately analyzed.

RESULT: lack of early warning tracks analysis fails to trigger a timely response from available brigade weapon systems to engage resupply aircraft while they are still on the landing zone.

Techniques:

  1. Immediately analyze early warning tracks to determine the enemy's current intentions or to determine if those intentions are changing.
  2. Use previously used early warning tracks as a predictive analysis tool.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Aviation S2s are generally not familiar with all the steps of the IPB process, and the importance of IPB products to the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) and subsequent mission execution. S2s produce the initial products required by defining the battlefield environment and describing the battlefield effects, but do not integrate these products with the rest of the staff during the decision making process.

PROBLEMS:

  1. S2s too often fail to integrate initial IPB products (MCOO etc.) into the TDMP.
  2. S2 normally produces only one situational template based on the enemy's most probable course of action
  3. After the unit begins executing a mission, the S2 does not continuously and appropriately update IPB products; instead they tend to focus solely on the situation map.

RESULTS:

  1. Too often the enemy's most dangerous course of action is ignored.
  2. The Battle Staff lacks the necessary enemy COAs to viably conduct wargaming.
  3. Battlefield information is not sufficiently analyzed and products that should result from such analysis either are not produced, or if produced not distributed in time to subordinate element commanders.
  4. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130 and ST 101-5.

Techniques: for aviation S2s

  1. S2 must become familiar with IPB process and its integration into TDMP.
  2. Home Station Training: use the battalion XO to conduct TDMP training with the Battle Staff. Emphasize the IPB process and integrate IPB products into the entire process.

* Predictive intelligence.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Too often intelligence collection plans fail to focus on the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), including information to confirm or deny an enemy COA.
  2. Sporadic air crew reporting during collection plan execution hinders timely S2 analysis.
  3. S2s too often fail to debrief returning air crews.

RESULTS:

  1. Lack of timely intelligence, prior to and during mission execution.
  2. Inability to adjust schemes of maneuver based on intelligence.

Techniques:

  1. Enforce timely reporting during Home Station training.
  2. Train to focus collection planning on PIR.
  3. Practice developing valid PIR based on a variety of situations.

Table of Contents
Section II, TA.4 Command and Control BOS
Section II, TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC)



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list


One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias