TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
126.96.36.199 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communication
* Aviation staffs: Staffs are sufficiently knowledgeable in the installation, operation and maintenance of their communication systems. This allows them to maintain multiple redundant secure means of communications to higher and subordinate units. The use of SINCGARS in the frequency hopping secure mode and TACSAT has been outstanding.
* Signal support operations - early arrival of C2 platforms: Commanders recognize the extended communications range that vehicular mounted radios provide and ensure that this equipment arrives with the first maneuver elements. Vehicle crews bring OE-254 antennas to increase range of vehicle radio systems.
Techniques: Teams install OE-254 antennas using field expedient techniques (erect without mast) using RG-58 coax cable. Teams establish their retrans site then move to concealed positions that still allow them to observe their equipment.
4.2 Assess Situation
* Targeting meetings: Units continue to make great strides in the use of targeting meetings to focus efforts, particularly during the search and attack phase. After the initial 48 hours, staffs realize the benefits of well formatted and focused targeting meetings and produce quality products that help focus combat power during future operations.
Technique: for further improvements
Consistently integrate the BALO, SALTO, ADAO, and Task Force engineer to enhance identification of detection and destruction assets.
4.3 Determine Actions
* Fire planning: Task Force Fire Support Officers (FSO) are positioned in the TOC to facilitate the requirement to coordinate with the S2, the S3 and the TACP. FSOs participate in the planning function and produce fire plans to support the scheme of maneuver.
* Commander/FSO integration: The habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of determining when fires are critical, where fires must be placed, and understanding the restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance
* Commander's planning guidance: Unit commanders continue to provided Battle Staffs with clear planning guidance for course of action development and a simple stated intent that allows the staff to plan with a clear purpose and little restraint. This decisive guidance allows staffs to remain focused during the planning process without being driven off course for substantial periods of time.
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates
* Battlefield circulation: Commanders, accompanied by select staff officers, are increasing the frequency of battlefield circulation. Daily visits to units throughout the brigade area of operations significantly increase command group situational awareness and allows for the personal interaction between brigade commanders and their subordinates. Movement through the brigade sector gives the command group a better feeling of how operations are progressing on the ground. Command Sergeants Major that accompany their brigade commanders add significantly to the command group's presence in front of soldiers.
* NCO Use: The utilization and integration of TOC NCOs into TOC operations is continuing to improve. Although some units do not maximize the NCOs potential in managing information, the NCOs initiative, drive and involvement are an integral part of successful TOC operations. Units that send their TOC NCOs to the Battle Staff Course and then let them apply the techniques they learn get very positive results.
4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders
- Strong company commanders often overcome task force level planning shortcomings with successful planning, preparation and execution at their level.
- Assault and attack company commanders have linked up and conducted a coordinated rehearsal themselves, when task force planned no rehearsal.
188.8.131.52 Coordinate Support
* Drop Zone terrain management (CSS): Units are improving drop zone terrain management through the use of operations and CSS overlays. When drop zones are on brigade graphics there are fewer incidents of no drops due to friendly maneuver forces inadvertently occupying the designated drop zone during CDS operations.
4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline
* Soldier motivation and aggressiveness: Soldiers are physically fit, motivated and disciplined. They maintain their spirits under harsh weather conditions and punishing enemy contact. Their aggressiveness is the key to many successful engagements against the enemy.
184.108.40.206 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information
- Leaders do not enforce the use of standard reporting from soldiers or subordinate leaders.
- Spot report information is either incomplete or inaccurate.
- Radio transmissions become lengthy as commanders try to pull information from observers to clarify information.
RESULT: Commanders habitually have to request clarification of reports.
- Use the standard SALUTE (Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment) format when sending in all spot reports to higher headquarters.
- Modify the report using the SALT (Size, Activity, Location, Time) format to save radio transmission times.
- Use pre-formatted report forms in ensuring that observers provide all required information.
- Leaders must ruthlessly enforce reporting formats.
- Practice and enforce sending reports in the proper format during all training exercises.
- Doctrinal reference: STP 21-2 SMCT, task 071-331-0803.
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status
- Aviation TOCs too often do not accurately and systematically battle track their assets or brigade assets.
- Infrequent updating of friendly locations makes air to ground integration difficult.
- Failure to update TOC battle tracking charts.
- Poor logs; ie. no method to track ongoing, critical or incomplete entries.
- Failure to update graphics with the latest changes.
- Battle tracking charts are useless to commanders for decision making.
- Task force commanders often have to go directly to subordinate commanders for information.
- Graphics in the aviation unit often differ from brigade causing command and control problems.
- Focus on preparing good SPOs.
- Use TOC NCOs to enforce standards for log entries.
- Too many signal units do not maintain the status of communications.
- Failure to routinely report status to higher headquarters.
- Too many signal leaders do not track the status of expendable supplies (batteries) or class IX repair parts.
RESULTS: Battalion signal sections too often do not know the locations of their supporting signal assets to include RAUs and retrans teams.
- Consolidate and submit reports daily.
- Track, disseminate, and update locations of supporting signal assets.
- Develop a standard battle tracking report that includes all equipment and expendables.
- Units do not consistently track elements down to platoon level.
- Infrequent posting of unit locations to platoon level on the operations map board.
- Only random posting of the unit scheme of maneuver on the operations map; no timely, systematic updating.
- Inaccurate reporting from subordinate elements.
- Battle staffs too often fail to follow-up on reports; ie. to check accuracy, etc.
- Inefficient information flow.
- Failure of the Battle Staff to cross-check between staff elements.
RESULTS: Units are unable to consistently maintain accurate overall situational awareness of the battlefield.
- Establish and enforce minimum battle tracking requirements for battle staffs.
- Update information frequently.
- Display information in a logical and useful manner.
- Include all staff sections.
information should include:
- tracking and posting units down to platoon level
- also track smaller elements such as Stinger teams, engineer elements, and MI teams.
- tracking obstacles
- chemical contamination
- enemy activities critical to battlefield circulation
- casualty evacuation
- rapid decision making.
The operations map must be the focal point for the entire Battle Staff and all Battle Staff sections should update their information from it.
- TOCs organize too slowly - impeding command and control and Battle Staff integration.
- TOC personnel do not understand their specific duties and responsibilities as outlined in FM 7-20 and in unit SOPs.
- Non-standard map boards, maps, and overlays.
- Too many unit's TOC charts are ineffective as tools to manage and display critical information.
- Develop and enforce specific duties and responsibilities for all TOC personnel, including "slice" personnel.
- Specify in the TACSOP the echelon/displacement and composition, by vehicle and personnel, that compose the TOC and TAC.
- Prior to any deployment, ensure map placement on map boards and overlays are standardized for all Battle Staff sections and slice elements operating in the TOC.
- Fully integrate slice elements into the TOC by providing a workspace and standardized maps.
- Ensure charts are routinely updated.
- Inconsistent tracking of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and critical events.
- Poor battle tracking and lack of use of Requests for Information (RFIs), particularly in the combat support and combat service support functional areas,
- Staff sections also fail to notify the rest of the staff when a critical event has happened in their area.
- Brigade commander's ability to read the battlefield is impeded.
- Too much information is either lost or not tracked.
locations differ from:
- the actual unit ground location
- the location plotted on the Battle Captain's map board and/or operations map
- the locations posted on TOC tracking charts
- Maintain a set battle rhythm for the staff.
- Conduct staff updates/staff huddles.
- Conduct commander's conference calls with staff in attendance.
- Standardize staff journals.
a tracking system for managing incoming message traffic:
- combat power
- planning guidance
- significant activities
- Analyze all information received from subordinate and higher units for completeness.
- Track follow-up RFIs to complete outstanding actions.
- Enforce existing unit tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs).
4.2 Assess Situation
- The brigade targeting process often lacks focus and fails to orient collection efforts and supporting fires.
- Participants come to targeting meetings unprepared.
- Outcome is uncertain.
- Intelligence, operations, and fire support personnel do not focus on all elements (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) of the targeting process.
- Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPTs).
frequently do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus
- collection plans
- tasking specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest
- tasking and synchronizing delivery and assess assets.
- Read and review FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process, with emphasis on chapters 2 and 5, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process.
necessary personnel attend and come prepared to the targeting meeting.
S2 should present:
- a current analysis of the enemy situation
- current high value targets.
- an analysis of enemy courses of action for the time period discussed at the targeting meeting (24-36 hours out)
- the high value targets for this time period.
- discuss updated guidance from the commander
- highlight changes to the commander's intent.
- present the current friendly situation.
- describe future operations.
brigade FSO should:
- facilitate the meeting,
- present and enforce the agenda,
- provide a list of resources available (for detection, delivery, and assessment)
- present a recommended list of HPTs and a target synchronization matrix.
- The S2 should present:
- At the conclusion of the meeting, the S3 should cut a FRAGO and the S2 should update the R & S plan.
- The FSO/Targeting Officer should work closely with the S2 to develop HPTs and should continually coordinate with all brigade elements to obtain the most accurate data for proposed targets.
- Failure to conduct detailed terrain analysis
- The system is not integrated into the brigade R&S plan.
- The command and control functions of FAAD C2I are rarely employed to verify positioning of Stinger and Avenger teams.
- Lack of technical knowledge on the procedures for establishing the data link with their simplified hand-held terminal unit (SHTU) .
- Inability to determine optimum positioning of the radar to receive effective early warning.
- Plan does not compliment other brigade intelligence gathering assets.
- Inability to relay data to remote teams.
- Poor communication with the FAAD C2I control shelter
Technique: Units must routinely train these operational procedures at Home Station to utilize all the capabilities of FAAD C2I.
4.2.2 Project Future Requirements
- Units tend to gravitate into a "you call, we haul" mentality as the operations tempo increases.
- Inability to conduct current operations and plan future operations simultaneously.
- Passing missions to subordinate commanders before completing mission analysis.
Techniques: for Home Station training
- Empower the battle captain to make decisions while the rest of the battle staff plans future operations.
- Train battle captains and TOC NCOs to execute current operations and maintain situational awareness, while the remainder of the staff focuses at least 24 hours out.
4.2.3 Decide on Need for Action or Change
- Failure to establish routine daily events.
- Inability to assimilate all new available information.
- Lack of focus on future operations.
- Hindered battle synchronization.
- Unfocused subordinate units.
- Conduct scheduled briefings such as Battle Staff huddles, battlefield updates, and targeting meetings.
an agenda that:
- updates estimates
- provides visibility to significant acts
- integrates the Battle Staff and TOC shift
- Conduct Home Station training exercises CPXs to refine C2 procedures and to train TOC personnel.
PROBLEM: Confirmation and/or denial of templated obstacles and reseeded minefields is too slow influence the scheme of maneuver.
RESULT: Units too often unnecessarily impeded by templated obstacles and/or minefields; conversely, units often avoid maneuver areas where obstacles/minefields are templated, but never emplaced.
4.3 Determine Actions
- Survey support tends to diminishes after the firing batteries and radar are complete.
- Units too often fail to consider survey requirements for all assets in the task force; i.e., 81 mm mortars, OH-58D, COLTS, targets, routes, and obstacles.
- Ensure that the survey annex in the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) considers all assets in the task force that may require survey.
- Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station focusing on the importance of effective survey.
- Doctrinal reference: FM 6-2, especially chapter 14-2, 14-7 15, and figure 15-1 (FSCOORD checklist).
- The staffs do not understand the steps or importance of the process.
- Staffs typically have difficulty in attempting to execute an abbreviated planning process because of an insufficient understanding of the deliberate decision making process.
- Failure to continuously update products.
- Wasted time.
- Plans not coordinated or synchronized either internally or externally.
- Lack of clear guidance to subordinate commanders
- Rehearsals omitted.
- Inordinate amount of time and effort spent fixing numerous minor details which negatively impact on the overall operation.
- Use executive officers as a chief of staff to coordinate the battle staff and oversee the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
- Use every available Home Station training opportunity to develop and refine the task force and brigade level battle staff proficiency in employing TDMP.
- Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.
- References: See CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning, and CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center for additional details about techniques and procedures on how to successfully employ the decision making process.
- Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis, with resultant products, including a timeline.
- Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
- Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).
- Poor time management
- Inadequate preparation to conduct TDMP planning in a field environment.
- Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-12, Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning.
pre-printed, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in
- mission analysis worksheet
- COA sketch sheets
- blank timeline
- warning order format
- FRAGO format
commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini-staff with each responsible
for completing a portion of the mission analysis
- developing a COA
- wargaming the COA
- writing an annex to the FRAGO.
- Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process .
Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.
- Too many units fail to adhere to the process.
- Staffs sections operate in isolation, failing to consolidate their estimate products.
- Consistent failure to use the complete battle staff for mission analysis, COA development, wargaming, COA decision-making and OPORD development.
- Incomplete or insufficiently detailed staff estimates.
- Train Battle Staffs at Home Station in the how to of TDMP.
- Train deliberate decision making first, to standard. Then train combat and quick decision making next. The condition, time available, should be the controlled variable in the task, condition, standard formula when applied to training TDMP.
- Use the battalion/task force XO to coordinate the battle staff training at Home Station, and to coordinate the battle staff efforts during deployments.
do not understand their role in the targeting process.
- decide, detect, deliver, assess doctrine set forth in FM 6-20-10
- application of the IPB process
- products or information they must provide at the targeting meeting.
- Battle staffs do not understand targeting and lack collective experience using the targeting process.
- Doctrinal reference: FM 6-20-10, chapters 1-4, 7, and 8.
- S2s should develop HVTs as product resulting from the IPB process.
- Battle staffs refine the list of HVTs to produce HPTs as a product of the decide phase.
- Use the S2 developed R&S plan to determine where HPTs are most likely to appear on the battlefield.
- Use the S2 and R&S assets to support the assess portion of the targeting process.
- S2s should update PIR, HVTL, R&S plan, SITEMP, and event template prior to the targeting meeting.
* Security zone operations (aviation): During brigade defensive operations, the aviation task force is often required to serve as the security zone command and control headquarters. Task organized with mechanized elements, and dismounts to man observation posts, the aviation task force is likely missioned to screen the entire brigade front.
- Failure to properly conduct the required IPB.
- Too often the task force fails to employ all available assets.
- Consistently inadequate planning for the rearward passage of lines for the attached/OPCON ground elements.
RESULT: Unsuccessful execution of this portion of the operation.
Technique: Refer to FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, for the techniques and procedures applicable to executing this mission successfully.
PROBLEM: Diversion of the aviation element to support an infantry element that is in contact.
RESULT: Close air support mission requirements preclude completion of zone reconnaissance.
- Ensure that mission priorities reflects the commander's intent.
- Minimize mission execution distractors.
4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance
commander's guidance for fire support is frequently vague.
- does not focus fire support assets
- unsupportable with available fire support assets available.
- Commanders are using non-standard terminology.
- Improper use of standard terminology
RESULT: Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.
- FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, pg. 3-5
- FM 6-20-10
- verify the commander's interpretations of fire support terminology
- confirm the availability of sufficient assets to achieve the commander's attack guidance.
- fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires.
- translate this into clear, concise and understandable terms.
4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action
- Incomplete course of action concept sketches/statements.
- Poor staff estimate input; efforts of subordinate units are neither integrated nor coordinated.
- Task organization not clearly based on sound mission analysis or supportive of viable courses of action.
- Define decisive points, and focus subordinate units towards those points.
- Task organize to make the best use of available combat power weight the main effort and facilitate the supporting efforts.
4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders
- Fire support planning is too often almost nonexistent.
- When fires support planning is done, it is seldom adjusted based upon the company commander's scheme of maneuver.
- Often not resourced with a FIST.
Technique: The aviation company commander must coordinate directly with the task force fire support officer to integrate fire support planning.
are not enforced.
- units usually do not start their meetings on time
- scheduled events begin late.
- Timelines and milestones are generally established only for the decision making process.
- Because of a lack of timelines following the OPORD, time management is not subsequently and uniformly enforced.
- Failure to track critical supervisory and follow up tasks.
- Units either lack a standard battle rhythm or do not enforce the one published in their TACSOP.
- Extend timelines beyond OPORD issuance.
- The executive officer must establish a system to enforce adherence to timelines and milestones during mission preparation.
- Commanders are not using graphic control measures to communicate their intent down to the lowest level.
- Company/team commanders rarely develop their own graphic control measures for offensive or defensive operations.
- Platoons often try to command and control using battalion/task force level graphics.
- Increased likelihood of fratricide because of a lack of adequate control measures.
- Increased difficulty trying to de-conflict maneuver.
- Use correct graphic control measures to help clarify and support mission accomplishment.
- Do not overuse graphic control measures; find the balance between stifling initiative with overcontrol versus insufficient graphics to assist command and control.
the following in the attack plan:
- passage point
- axis/ route
- assault positions/ probable line of deployment
- support by fire positions
- limit of advance
- consolidation/ reorganization positions.
a concept sketch and ensure all key leaders have a copy.
- use terrain references on the sketch to help control movement.
- use an enlarged map (e.g. 1:25,000) for company graphics
- transfer only essential higher unit graphics to company overlay.
- References: FM 101-5-1.
220.127.116.11 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders
- S2s are unprepared for wargaming sessions and rehearsals.
to bring required products and information to the wargaming sessions and rehearsals:
- updated SITEMP, EVENTEMP and R&S plan.
- assets available to detect and assess and PIR.
- Too many S2s do not roleplay the freethinking, uncooperative enemy commander when opposing the friendly COAs during wargaming.
- Too many S3s and commanders tend to disregard their S2s during the planning phase of operations, particularly during wargaming.
- Structure wargaming sessions and rehearsals in an action, reaction, counteraction format.
- S2s should present an uncooperative, doctrinally correct OPFOR that realistically challenges each friendly COA.
- S2s must arrive at wargaming sessions and rehearsals with at least a SITEMP, EVENTEMP, MCOO, HVTL, and a draft R&S plan.
- Backbriefs and rehearsals are not routinely conducted.
- Too many units simply talk through the concept of operations in lieu of a viable rehearsal.
and S3s do not:
- deliberately plan for rehearsals and therefore do not prepare for rehearsals
- focus on key events
- address branches and sequels
- involve all key leaders and BOS representatives
- use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist
- adequately note changes to the concept resulting from mission preparation
- publish a FRAGO to update subordinate units.
confirmation briefs immediately after the OPORD
- standard format
- the battalion staff must attend
- Do not use brief backs as sole means of rehearsal because backbriefs are inadequate in trying to visualize the entire task force plan
must be properly planned and prepared.
- ensure the entire staff is present
- do not sacrifice rehearsals because of time
- Use a synchronization matrix or execution checklist to guide the rehearsal to insure that all BOS are covered.
- Concentrate on key events.
- References: CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals; FM 7-8, chapter 2; FM 7-10, chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.
When sufficient time is available, there is no substitute for a full-force rehearsal from battalion down to platoon leader level.
- Battle Captains and Battle NCOs are not proficient in orchestrating staff battle drills.
- Staffs rarely train at Home Station on how to execute staff battle drills.
- Unnecessarily large amount of reaction time required for the staff to deal with certain foreseeable situations.
- Too many brigades lose their ability to stay within the enemy's decision cycle.
- Use every possible Home Station training opportunity to develop and refine battlestaff procedures and drills.
- Train the principal staff on the how to of concurrently planning for future operations while still executing current operations.
PROBLEM: Communication rehearsals commonly consist only of equipment function checks.
- Unit signal officers must identify critical tasks to rehearse
- establishment of all nets
- installation of planned antenna systems
- validation of execution check lists
- practice sending required reports
- function checks of all terminal equipment.
- Ensure rehearsals have command emphasis and are part of the unit's predeployment time line.
18.104.22.168 Coordinate Support
- Units do not fully integrate coordinating and special staffs into a Battle Staff capable of operating as a team during the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) and mission execution.
- Units that have not developed and trained as a combined staff often ignore several staff officers (such as civil affairs, psychological operations, S1, S4, EN, ADO, BALO and SALTO) in staff estimates and orders development.
- Battalion SOPs must address all members of the TOC with a clear and separate list of tasks which must be accomplished by each individual.
- SOPs should consider how key personnel in the TOC, including attached special staff, should perform their duties.
- Train the Battle Staff to work together as a team.
- Assign staff personnel to shifts, and then train them together as a shift team.
- The Bn XO and S3 should provide clear guidance and supervision for the accomplishment of duties and responsibilities.
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations
- Insufficient coordination and integration between task organized units.
- Combined arms rock drill rehearsals at brigade and battalion level often exclude key BOS representation. .
- Failure to achieve full scale rehearsals at company team and below.
- Extended amount of time on target.
- Unsynchronized execution.
- Execution shortcomings such as timid and untimely deployment of forces, exposed flanks, no obscuration, and no attempt to secure the far side of unopposed point obstacles are common.
- Use simple, well rehearsed, standard breach drills.
- Apply the doctrinal techniques found in FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations.
PROBLEM : Lack of detailed planning and coordination prior to occupation of positions.
RESULTS: Units consistently underuse assets available to enhance survivability.
- Practice coordinating and integrating beyond the survivability execution matrix.
- Include integration of survivability requirements and link-up instructions with the quartering party in planning unit moves and quartering party.
- Begin executing survivability operations prior to unit occupation.
- Designate a CINC Dozer, usually a CSM or 1SG, to synchronize survivability assets and effort.
PROBLEM: Units do not effectively synchronize all of their assets during combat operations.
RESULT: Subordinate units end up fighting separate fights instead of an integrated brigade fight.
- Conduct targeting meetings.
- Develop synchronization and execution matrices.
- Prepare decision support templates and timelines.
- Conduct war gaming as part of the Tactical Decision Making Process.
- Conduct both technical and combined arms rehearsals
4.5 Employ tactical C3CM
- COMSEC/SOI compromises.
- Lost communications equipment.
- Workarounds do not fully protect EEFI.
- Too many elements are not properly trained on OTAR procedures.
- Interdiction or intrusion by the OPFOR on the unit's C2 nets.
- Loss of SOI materials and signal personnel.
- Request authentication.
- Use encryption tables and ensure that all radio operators are trained on their use.
- Train and execute OTAR procedures for COMSEC and SOI updates both in the field and as part of Home Station training.
- Included OTAR procedures in radio rehearsals as a final validation of the training.
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