TA.
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
TREND
30: Combined arms obstacle integration.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the fundamental relationship
between fires and obstacles as outlined in FM
90-7, Combined
Arms Obstacle Integration.
2.
Infantry leaders are not proficient in siting tactical obstacle groups to influence
enemy maneuver. 3.
Soldiers are not proficient in emplacing protective obstacles. 4.
Obstacle emplacement is not tracked at battalion level, so the commander does
not adjust his plan based on actual battlefield conditions. RESULTS:
1.
This results in poor execution of defensive operations. 2.
Direct and indirect fires are not integrated with the obstacles. 3.
Obstacle construction is unnecessarily delayed because infantry units are slow
to occupy sectors or battle positions, directed obstacles are not used to support
battalion/brigade decisive points, and engineers are routinely tasked to operate
battalion Class IV/V points. 4.
This lack of adjustment results in minimal delay of assaulting enemy forces.
Techniques:
1.
Review FM
90-7, Combined
Arms Obstacle Integration.
2.
Conduct reconnaissance as early as possible during the defense. Site critical,
directed obstacles so that engineer effort is not wasted while the staff completes
the operations order. 3.
Establish procedures that require the task force S-4 and support platoon leader
to operate and supervise the Class IV/V supply point. 4.
Task maneuver companies with the responsibility for obstacle group construction
to ensure that engineers receive assistance with mine dump operations and protective
wire emplacement. 5.
Comply with obstacle reporting requirements outlined in FM
20-32,
Mine/Countermine
Operations.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
31: Combat service support (CSS) integration.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Combat service support (CSS) is consistently an afterthought rather than a
vital integrating system. 2.
CSS integration must begin at receipt of the mission and must continue throughout
the operation. RESULTS:
1.
A poorly synchronized CSS plan routinely disrupts the engagement systems. 2.
The CSS planner must participate and clearly understand the maneuver plan to
provide continous support before, during, and after the operation. Techniques:
1.
The S-1, S-4, and special staff officers must participate in every step of
the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and continuously refine the personnel
and logistics estimates. 2.
The executive officer (XO), as the battalion and brigade chief of staff, must
rigorously synchronize the CSS BOS and fully integrate CSS in the decision-making
process. 3.
The commander must carefully assess the effects and risks of CSS on his engaging
systems. 4.
References include CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making;
FM
100-5, Operations;
and FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
32: The targeting process and targeting meetings.
OBSERVATION:
Most
brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the basic concept of the targeting
process and intermittently conduct targeting meetings with no agenda and focus.
RESULT:
Most
units fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff
targets (HPTs).
Techniques:
1.
Read and review FM
6-20-10, The
Targeting Process
(with
emphasis on Chapter 2 and Chapter 5) and the Targeting Process video script
in the JRTC
FS DIV TTP Red Book,
1
Oct 96, page 21, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process and
meeting. 2.
The battalion executive officer (XO) should open the targeting meeting by detailing
its purpose, the agenda, and specifying the time period or event being discussed.
3.
The S-2 provides an intelligence update, briefs the current enemy situation,
and reviews the current collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance plans.
The S-2 then provides a battle damage assessment (BDA) of targets previously
engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy courses
of action. He follows the BDA with an analysis of the enemy's most probable
courses of action and locations for the next 12 to 24 hours using the event
template and a list of high-value targets. Finally, the S-2 briefs changes
to the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for review by the battle staff.
4.
The next briefer is the S-3. He briefs any particular guidance from the commander
and changes to the commander's intent. He briefs any requirements from higher
headquarters since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations.
Finally, he informs the battle staff on the status of assets available for
the targeting process. 5.
The final briefer is the fire support officer (FSO). He briefs the status of
all delivery assets and reviews the current target synchronization matrix,
providing a summary of results of actions taken. He presents the new target
synchronization matrix with the proposed list of high-payoff targets (HPTs)
and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement. Once any changes
to the HPT have been made and any locations updated or refined, the maneuver
XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the remainder of the matrix
by identifying a detector, determining an attack means, and assigning an asset
to assess each HPT. 6.
Upon completion of the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO brief the
commander on the results for his approval. Once the results are approved, the
following products are updated, written, and reproduced for timely distribution:
-
Target synchronization matrix
-
FRAGO to subordinate units
-
Updated target list
-
Updated reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan
-
Any changes to commander's PIR
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
33: Integration of aviation assets.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
The difficulty of integrating AH-64s and OH-58Ds into the scheme of maneuver,
particularly during the movement-to-contact and attack phases, continues to
frustrate commanders and leads to relatively ineffective employment. 2.
The root cause of this difficulty appears to be the failure on the part of
ground commanders to plan in detail for aviation employment and assign an appropriate
task and purpose. RESULT:
There
seems to be an unwillingness on the part of aviation commanders to place assets
under operational control (OPCON) to ground commanders.
Techniques:
1.
Like infantry companies, AH-64 and OH-58D teams should be assigned a doctrinally
sound task and purpose with specific graphics to support employment. Example:
Support by fire from position 1 in order to suppress suspected enemy platoon
with machine-gun vic grid 123456. Placement of aviation assets OPCON to ground
commanders for specific, pre-designated windows permits development of clear
tasks and purposes such as the example above. 2.
Assignment of an aviation liaison officer (LNO) is the final piece required
for truly integrated employment.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
34: General doctrinal knowledge.
OBSERVATION:
Warrant
officers (WO) in the forward support maintenance teams (FSMT) generally lack
the doctrinal knowledge and terminology required to successfully take charge
of the FSMT.
RESULT:
These
WOs cannot conduct planning in the FSMT when primary leaders are absent or
lost due to illness or combat.
Technique:
The
program of instruction at the Warrant Officers course should reflect greater
emphasis on doctrinal knowledge and terminology.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
35: Troop-leading procedures.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Troop-leading procedures are not effectively executed within batteries and
platoons. 2.
Often teams are ordered to move and occupy new positions without a clearly
stated task and purpose. 3.
Batteries and platoons are unable to synchronize their plans due to the lack
of backbriefs and rehearsals. RESULTS:
1.
Warning orders and operations orders are not used to facilitate planning, coordination,
backbriefs, and rehearsals for subordinate leaders. 2.
Teams have very little information concerning moves other than proposed grid
coordinates and primary target lines. 3.
Timelines detailing critical events are not completed to effectively manage
time. Techniques:
1.
FM
44-44, Avenger
Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations,
Appendix D, contains numerous checklists to assist in conducting troop-leading
procedures and pre-combat checks. 2.
Leaders need to make use of warning orders with timelines to assist subordinates
in parallel planning IAW the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. The use of formatted backbriefs
and rehearsals will facilitate synchronization and integration.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
36: Commander's intent.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Commanders are not formulating useful commander's intents. 2.
The key tasks portion of the intent statement is a restatement of the key highlights
of the concept of the operation. It should state those essential tasks that
the operation depends on as the commander envisions the battle. The key tasks
should also be meaningful two levels down. RESULT:
For
example, stating a key task as "rapidly deploying combat power" during a forced
entry operation does not meet the above criteria. The concept may call for
a battalion to seize the flight landing strip (FLS) with another battalion
expanding the airhead. Rather, the key task might be stated as "seizing the
FLS with at least a rifle company and a mortar section in less than four hours."
This latter version conveys a vision of what the commander sees as those tasks
that somehow must be accomplished, even as the plan begins to unravel.
Technique:
Subordinate
leaders at every level must fully understand the concept of operations and
the commander's intent for the operation planned. These leaders have to translate
this intent into clear, concise, and understandable terms for the soldiers
that must execute this order.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
37: Inadequate unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
OBSERVATION:
Often
units deploy with a TACSOP that marginally addresses NBC matters.
RESULT:
Units
repeatedly discover shortcomings in their TACSOPs, such as patient decontamination
procedures, chemical defense equipment (CDE) equipment reporting, and decontamination
site setup.
Techniques:
1.
Units must review the NBC portion of TACSOP and ensure they address key and
essential activities. 2.
Copies or extracts of these TACSOPs must be at all levels in the command, and
NBC personnel must have access to them. 3.
Brigade and battalion chemical officers must conduct rehearsals with subordinates
to ensure that all required actions are understood. 4.
References: FM
3-5,
NBC Decontamination Operations;
FM
8-33, Control
of Communicable Diseases in Man;
and FM
8-285, Treatment
of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
38: Leader's guidance.
OBSERVATION:
Fighting
positions are substandard and frequently dangerous to the soldiers that occupy
them.
Techniques:
1.
Train signal officers and NCOs to use GTA
7-1-38, Troop-Leading
Procedures,
when
conducting retransmit (RXMT) operations, and require soldiers to complete formatted
backbriefs and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) according to FM
11-43, The
Signal Leader's Guide.
2.
Also reference GTA
7-6-1, Fighting
Position Construction.
(TA
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
39: Integration of mechanized/armor assets by light infantry company commanders.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Many light infantry company commanders do not understand the capabilities of
the M1A1 tanks and BFVs they have attached to them during the light/heavy live-fire
exercise and the deliberate attack-trench live-fire exercise. 2.
Most commanders leave the development of the mechanized/armor unit's direct
fire plan to the platoon leader and fail to even provide adequate guidance.
RESULTS:
1.
The mechanized/armor platoon/sections are often left on their own for much
of the rehearsal day and usually ignored during the commander's PCIs. 2.
Also, many commanders fail to understand the impact of heavy forces upon the
maneuver plan and the potential fratricide risk (such as danger zone of the
discarded sabot from the M1A1 tank). Techniques:
1.
The first thing that a company commander must do when he receives a mechanized/armor
attachment is to meet with the element leader and discuss the following (at
a minimum): -
Manning/task organization
-
Weapons systems available and their capabilities
-
Logistical requirements: ammo, fuel, maintenance, vehicle recovery
-
Communications capabilities
-
Training status/level of proficiency (applicable tasks for the mission)
-
Unique capabilities
2.
Commanders must also ensure that the mechanized/armor element leader is included
in the planning/wargaming process. The commander must specify what he expects
the mechanized/armor unit to accomplish (this may mean precisely targeting
specific bunkers, buildings, and sectors of fire). 3.
It is crucial that the mechanized/armor unit fully participate in all rehearsals.
4.
The commander must conduct pre-combat inspections (PCIs) of the mechanized/armor
attachment just as he would for any of his organic rifle platoons. 5.
Light infantry leaders can use a tactical pointer to designate targets at night.
6.
Soldiers can also use BFVs/tanks as cover if they must advance through an open
area.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 4
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 6
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
