TA.
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
TREND
40: Task and purpose.
OBSERVATION:
Soldiers
want to know and deserve to know why actions are being taken.
RESULT:
Soldiers
who understand both the task and purpose of their mission will execute their
instructions with much more enthusiasm. The "why" of the mission allows leaders
at all levels to better understand how their "piece" fits into the big picture
of the battle. It also increases awareness of the importance of what may at
first seem an insignificant job.
Techniques:
1.
Internal communications must be driven by and through the chain of command.
Only by enforcing this means of communication can leaders be sure everyone
in the unit has the correct information. 2.
Clarity of messages must be ensured through proper feedback. Backbriefs are
excellent tools as long as they do not become "parroting sessions." 3.
Make it a habit to include purpose with task so that soldiers know why actions
are required.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
41: Medical unit pre-combat inspections (PCIs).
OBSERVATION:
Once
established, inspections by leaders of teams and sections that leave the compound
for external missions often are shoddy or nonexistent.
RESULTS:
1.
Ambulances depart without strip maps or briefings on road conditions, minefield
locations, enemy threats, actions in case of ambush, and frequencies of supporting
or supported units (if they have communications capability). 2.
Front-line ambulances (FLA) depart without all necessary medical equipment,
preventing the driver and crew from providing necessary life support for patients
at the scene or en route. Techniques:
1.
Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution.
2.
NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly
prepared for mission execution. 3.
Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established
and carried out. 4.
Standing operating procedures (SOPs) can reflect requirements for PCIs but
must be checked periodically to ensure the right information is contained in
the checklist and changes in equipment or missions is included. For instance,
some endemic diseases in a geographic area may require special equipment or
supplies that can be added to the checklist for deployment.
(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
42: Battle drills and tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs).
OBSERVATION:
Platoons
continue to have difficulty aggressively executing battle drills.
RESULT:
The
soldiers react to the contact slowly and unrehearsed. Reacting to contact should
be instinctive, immediate, and rehearsed.
Technique:
Units
should train on battle drills outlined in ARTEP
19-100-10-DRILL,
and
drills developed for internal tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs).
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
43: Forward logistics element (FLE) operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Forward logistics element (FLE) operations are failing to become combat multipliers
for brigades. 2.
Typical weaknesses include lack of task and purpose, failure to integrate all
battlefield operating systems (BOS) elements into the composition, and lack
of participation and/or attendance by key players at rehearsals. 3.
Other weaknesses include failure to follow an established SOP, lack of clear
command, control, or communications (C3), and failure to ensure the unit is
on the brigade's execution checklist. RESULT:
The
FLE is not treated as a combat operation and is often scheduled so late in
the brigade's planning process that it has little or no effect on actual execution.
Techniques:
1.
The brigade S-4, S-1, and the forward support battalion (FSB) support operations
officer must take the lead to ensure that the FLE is properly resourced and
that it is integrated into the brigade's scheme of maneuver. 2.
Treat the FLE operation as a combat operation and integrate all BOS and tactical
logistics functions into its composition. 3.
Plan for a separate FLE rehearsal. 4.
Refer to FM
63-1, Support
Battalion and Squadrons, Separate Brigades and Armored Cavalry Regiments;
Chapter 1 provides a thorough and useful guideline for this procedure.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
44: Fire support rehearsals.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Once units depart the intermediate staging base, rehearsals are poorly conducted
and seldom provide benefit to the operation. 2.
Units frequently rehearse prior to operations, but often never move beyond
generic or leader-only rehearsals. Surveys over the past two quarters reveal
that at the company level, rehearsals cover all mission-essential tasks to
be performed only 8% of the time, while companies conduct no rehearsals 39%
of the time. At the platoon level, leaders rehearse all mission-essential actions
19% of the time and neglect rehearsals completely 27% of the time. 3.
Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended
in FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
and
most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target
list. RESULT:
Rehearsal
techniques listed in FM
6-20-1, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Cannon Battalion,
are
not being used.
Techniques:
1.
Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal. 2.
Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and fire
support officer (FSO) should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights
with maneuver and fires. 3.
The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger
a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth
the required time to construct it. 4.
Review FM
6-20-1,
pages 3-12 through 3-15. This source provides an excellent overview of key
rehearsal elements. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home Station
training, would greatly improve rehearsals. 5.
The lack of rehearsals specifically tailored to the tasks to be performed often
results in reduced proficiency during the mission. 6.
Reference: CALL
Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals,
Mar
98.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
45: Unified maintenance.
OBSERVATION:
Maintenance
units that are sliced together in a contingency operation assigned to a light
infantry brigade have difficulty unifying the maintenance effort for the aviation
battalion. Each unit assigned to the aviation battalion brings a maintenance
element to support its aircraft.
RESULT:
In
the operations order, one of the maintenance companies is assigned the task
of reporting the status of the assigned aircraft to the battalion commander.
The production control element of the assigned company often has difficulty
getting timely and accurate reports from other maintenance elements.
Technique:
One
way to correct the problem is to attach maintenance personnel, technical inspectors,
and test pilots from other units to the unit responsible for reporting aircraft
status to the battalion commander.
(TA
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)
TREND
46: Chemical asset integration.
OBSERVATION:
Many
brigades are not using NBC assets with the best possible task and purpose.
RESULTS:
1.
Decontamination, smoke, and reconnaissance assets are repeatedly left performing
missions such as convoy escort, reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU)
security, manning of tactical command posts (TCP), and troop transportation
missions. These are viable missions when no NBC threat is present, but as the
situation changes and the threat warrants, NBC assets should be used in enhancing
force protection. 2.
There are many instances where smoke assets could be combat multipliers but
are often omitted. 3.
Additionally, there are instances of units being slow in relinquishing control
of chemical assets (platoon is a part of the forward support battalion (FSB)
perimeter and the commander not wanting to give up the asset) when directed,
therefore hindering the NBC fight. By the time a persistent chemical strike
happens, decontamination response is slow because the decontamination plan
never matured. This is basically a result of the brigade not executing proactive
decontamination site reconnaissance. Techniques:
1.
Chemical officers must stress the proper use of NBC assets during the planning
of operations and then check to ensure that assets are being used as intended.
Situational awareness is paramount, and a thorough understanding of upcoming
operations is the key to integration of NBC assets. 2.
FM
3-100, NBC
Defense, Chemical Warfare and Flame Operations,
gives
a good basis for the doctrinal employment of NBC assets.
(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)
TREND
47: Employment of retransmission teams (RXMT).
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Signal leaders are not familiar with the staff coordination. 2.
Signal soldiers on RXMT teams are not familiar with signal site security. Techniques:
1.
Reference FM
11-43, The
Signal Leader's Guide,
Figure
A-3, and FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
for
staff coordination. 2.
Reference FM
11-43, The
Signal Leader's Guide,
for site selection and RXMT team employment.
(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)
TREND
48: Safety briefings.
OBSERVATION:
Proper
safety/convoy briefing of personnel prior to executing a jump forward area
rearming/refueling point (FARP). It is imperative that all personnel departing
for the jump FARP know grid locations, enemy situation, and scatter plans prior
to departure.
RESULT:
This
prevents confusion in the event of separation during convoy or attacks.
Technique:
Unit
tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) should address safety briefings
for all hazardous activities specific to that type of unit.
(TA 4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)
TREND
49: Pre-deployment/pre-combat inspections (PCIs).
OBSERVATION:
1.
Invariably units arrive at the JRTC missing vital pieces of equipment or parts
necessary to put equipment into operation. 2.
International standard of organization (ISO) shelters and their contents are
often not inspected prior to deployment. 3.
Preventive maintenance check and services (PMCS) are seldom accomplished on
medical equipment until after the unit is established in the field. RESULT:
1.
The absence of items as simple as computer disks, electrical connectors, keys
to oxygen cylinders, or extension cords for key areas can cripple a unit. 2.
Units are surprised to discover missing essential equipment once they begin
to set up. Techniques:
1.
Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution.
NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly
prepared for mission execution. 2.
Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established
and carried out. 3.
SOPs can reflect requirements for pre-combat inspections (PCIs) but must be
checked periodically to ensure the right information is contained in the checklist
and reflects changes in equipment or missions. For instance, some endemic diseases
in a geographic area may require special equipment or supplies that must be
added to the checklist for deployment.
(TA 4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
50: Integration and synchronization with brigade staff.
OBSERVATION:
Most
brigade operational law teams (BOLT) have not been to the field and operated
as a member of the brigade staff in that environment.
RESULT:
1.
Other staff members often do not understand the Judge Advocate (JA) role on
the staff or what issues that should be reported to the JA. 2.
The JA who is new to this environment does not know who has information that
affects his area of responsibility and where or how to find that information.
Technique:
1.
The BOLT should take every opportunity to go to the field with the unit and
train with them as part of the staff. The JA should brief significant legal
information or actions at the commander's update and shift change briefings.
Often the JA is not listed as a briefer or attendee at these sessions in the
brigade tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) or TOCSOP. The JA should
review these documents and submit changes as necessary to legitimize JA presence
at these meetings. 2.
The JA should attend the planning and targeting meetings that are a part of
the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). 3.
The JA should post a significant acts board at his station and review it several
times a day. He should also review other battlefield operating systems (BOS)
areas to see what events have happened that may affect his operations.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
51: Staff integration and synchronization.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
At Home Station, the platoon leader, the company commander, and the division
provost marshal should conduct informal NCOPD/OPD at brigade on military police
(MP) capabilities and employment. They must also ensure that the platoon leadership
understands how the brigade uses the tactical decision-making process to plan
operations. 2.
Platoon leadership must understand where and how they provide input in the
planning process to integrate and synchronize MP support into the operation.
Leaders must be able to take the information given to the brigade and produce
combat orders for the platoon, so that junior leaders can begin their troop-leading
procedures and parallel planning. The platoon leader must ensure that MP assets
are included in the brigade's TACSOP. He must also ensure that his recommendations
on the appropriate doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization
are used by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined
arms operations and working with host nation police will improve operations
as well as information sharing and intelligence collection. 3.
Proper integration and synchronization of MP assets will prevent many of the
911 missions which are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed. RESULTS:
1.
Many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets are the result of 911
missions. At Home Station, the provost marshal, the commander, and the platoon
leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities
and employment. 2.
The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations,
doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support
the brigade mission essential task list (METL). Technique:
The
platoon leader must also ensure that his recommendations on the appropriate
doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization are used
by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined arms
operations and working with the host nation police will improve operations
and information sharing and intelligence collection.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
52: Commander's guidance for fire support.
OBSERVATION:
Most
commanders, using the format in FM
6-71, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,
write their guidance for fire support using Purpose,
Priority, Allocation
and
Restriction
(PPAR).
Recently, some commanders have started using Task,
Purpose, Method
and
Endstate.
RESULTS:
1.
Although fire support officers (FSO) are using the correct formats, many FSOs
are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support. 2.
The terms destroy,
neutralize, suppress,
and
harass
are
not being used properly. The commander's guidance for fire support is usually
vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the
fire support assets available. Techniques:
1.
FM
6-71, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,
pg.
3-5, lists the information commanders should provide to FSOs. FSOs
must
clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2.
FM
6-20-10, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process,
states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or
destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must
ensure the commander's interpretations of this terminology are realistic and
equally understood, and that the commander has the fire support assets available
to achieve his attack guidance. 3.
FSOs
must
fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for
the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise and understandable
terms.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
53: Timelines.
OBSERVATION:
The
key piece to a timeline is the development of the ground tactical plan that
encompasses the organization for combat, fire support, scheme of maneuver,
attack/cavalry (CAV) support, and the commander's intent.
RESULT:
Planning
for the air assault can begin once the air assault task force commander approves
a course of action (COA).
Technique:
Immediate
parallel planning is essential for the successful coordination of all units.
(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 5
Acknowledgements
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