TA.
4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
TREND
20: Brigade aviation Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
During
the brigade MDMP, aviation battalions are not being given information from
brigade liaison officers (LNOs) and are not conducting parallel planning. Initial
planning efforts should focus on fighter management, maintenance, classes of
supply, and possible pick-up zones (PZs)/landing zones (LZs).
OBSERVATION:
A
common occurrence is for units at brigade and battalion level to miss a window
of opportunity to coordinate critical events and establish PZs/LZs.
RESULT:
A
critical event that needs to occur is the LZ reconnaissance. Often is does
not, and the result is unsuitable PZs/LZs at mission execution time.
Technique:
Once
the brigade course of action (COA) is approved, the attack assets should conduct
landing zone (LZ) reconnaissance to feed information needed to finalize the
brigade order.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
21: Wargaming.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Units continue to experience problems during execution that can be traced back
to flawed wargaming. Most staffs execute the wargaming procedure, but do not
fully understand why the action-reaction-counteraction methodology is used
and what result/product is required before proceeding to the next critical
event. 2.
Usually, the S-2 and S-3 fight it out at the map board while the remainder
of the staff observes in silence. Following the wargaming session, the battle
operating system representatives (BOS reps) scramble to create their own plans
to support what the battalion wants to do. RESULT:
Mission
execution consistently breaks down as enemy actions and friction reveal the
lack of coordination and flexibility in the plan. Wargaming is the methodology
all units employ in an attempt to synchronize the effects of the BOS integrated
into the plan.
Techniques:
1.
Synchronization occurs when battlefield activities and their effects are reduced
to specific time factors, and then successfully planned, scheduled, and coordinated
so that these activities occur at the desired time and place. 2.
The staff must specifically identify all critical battlefield activities across
the BOS, estimate the time and distance factors for execution, and understand
the mutually supporting relationships among them. 3.
To effectively and efficiently execute these processes, each staff officer
must be an expert in his branch/operating system and come to the wargaming
session understanding his BOS capabilities and limitations and with the proper
tools to determine and calculate task planning factors. 4.
The planning staff should again wargame each of their training missions during
staff training immediately following completion of the event. Capitalize on
hindsight to prompt identification of critical battlefield activities across
the BOS and train (or teach) the individual staff responsibility for determination/calculation
of task planning factors. Experiment with methods (avenue, belt, box) and recording
techniques (narrative, worksheet, synch matrix). 5.
The executive officer must facilitate the wargame and also enforce the standard
for staff participation/input. 6.
References: FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
pp.
2-18 to 2-20; and FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
pp.
5-16 to 5-24.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
22: Operational control (OPCON) relationship.
At
times, aviation task forces are told to "OPCON" attack or cavalry assets to
Infantry battalions for specific phases of a mission for several days to facilitate
search and attack operations. In either case, commanders and S-3s have not
given the necessary liaison officer (LNO) to the supported unit to properly
integrate the "OPCON" assets into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
to support the commander's intent.
OBSERVATION:
The
teams of aircraft will "check-in" with the supported unit on their command
net and ask what the mission is. This obviously will not and has not worked
for the supported unit.
RESULT:
It
is not reasonable to expect both the supported unit and the aircrews to execute
with any level of understanding or synchronization to meet the commander's
intent, much less meeting the success criteria for mission success.
Technique:
A
recommendation is that when told to "OPCON" attack or cavalry assets to a supported
unit, the unit provides an LNO who is doctrinally sound (platoon leader or
senior warrant officer), properly outfitted (use an LNO checklist), and has
sufficient time to get integrated in the supported unit's MDMP to make a difference.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
23: Battle rhythm.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
The lack of a clear battle rhythm at battalion and brigade levels regularly
results in a series of haphazard fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) published at unpredictable
times. 2.
Battalion staffs plan no more than a few hours into the future; consequently,
companies have little or no time between receipt of mission and the required
execution time. 3.
Tactical operations centers (TOCs) are struggling with establishing and maintaining
a worthwhile battle rhythm for the staff to effectively work and not fall behind
various timelines. RESULTS:
1.
FRAGOS that direct subordinate units to conduct missions in a hurry. 2.
The effect of short-term planning is magnified at the platoon level, where
a platoon order with more than a vague concept of the company operation is
rare. 3.
The battle staff is left not knowing or understanding all of the daily events
(i.e., reports, updates, orders, shift changes) that should occur within the
TOC. Techniques:
1.
To be effective, battalion staffs must be looking at least 24 hours into the
future, not planning this afternoon's activities. 2.
Primary staff need to thoroughly read and understand the tactical standing
operating procedures (TACSOP) or fire support SOP and coordinate through the
battalion executive officer to establish a meaningful and functional battle
rhythm (nothing more than a daily schedule of events). 3.
A battle rhythm should consider when the S-3 plans on briefing the fragmentary
order (FRAGO) for the next day's mission to the subordinate companies. This
process should include a planning cycle that includes sufficient time for all
subordinate elements to plan, prepare, and execute. (TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
24: Air defense unit Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Most batteries experience significant difficulties due to a lack of understanding
of the MDMP. 2.
Air defense officers are unable to integrate the air defense plan with the
brigade's scheme of maneuver. The aerial portion of the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB) lacks detail and continuous refinement. RESULTS:
1.
This results in task organizations that are ineffective against the enemy air
threat and creates reactive versus proactive positioning. 2.
It also accounts for improper positioning of teams to gain early engagement,
ineffective early warning planning, and command and control. 3.
The enemy is able to conduct reconnaissance and resupply missions successfully.
Technique:
Air
defense leaders must become familiar with the MDMP as outlined in
FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations.
Effective use of products during MDMP will facilitate production of warning
orders, platoon orders, and necessary fragmentary orders.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
25: Heavy team integration during low-intensity conflict operations.
OBSERVATION:
During
low-intensity combat operations in restrictive terrain, heavy teams are assigned
a task/purpose, task organization, and command relationship that fails to maximize
their capabilities of mobility, protection, and firepower, or provide adequate
support to the brigade's movement-to-contact and search-and-attack operations.
Techniques:
1.
Effective armor operations in restrictive terrain require combined arms task
organization. Attach light infantry or operational control (OPCON) of aviation
assets to heavy teams for operations in restrictive terrain. 2.
Task and purpose for armor units should maximize use of available countermine
equipment (mine plows and rollers, mechanized engineer platoon).
FM
71-1, Tank
and Mechanized Infantry Company Team,
lists
the following doctrinal missions or operations for heavy teams. -
Open and secure routes.
-
Conduct convoy escort.
-
Establish checkpoints.
-
Deliberate and in-stride breach.
3.
Task-organize Bradley or cavalry fighting vehicle platoons or sections to light
infantry companies for use as a fixing or finishing force during search-and-attack
operations to maximize the potential of the 25-mm chain gun as a light infantry
support weapon. 4.
Refer to CALL
Newsletter No. 98-10, Fighting
Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain,
for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) related to these operations.
(TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
26: Light cavalry troop integration.
OBSERVATION:
Brigade
commanders and staffs are assigning missions to light cavalry troops which
are outside the doctrinal mission profile of a light cavalry troop. A ground
cavalry troop is a specialized unit with a unique organization, capabilities,
and doctrine specifically designed to perform reconnaissance and to provide
security in close operations.
RESULT:
Light
cavalry troops are assigned only limited reconnaissance and security tasks
which primarily consist of guarding the perimeter of critical assets. Tasks
assigned are not maximizing the unit's reconnaissance and security capability.
Techniques:
1.
In movement-to-contact operations, use the light cavalry troop as a brigade
detect asset in the targeting/synchronization process. 2.
Assign tasks through fragmentary orders or the reconnaissance and surveillance
matrix to focus cavalry troop reconnaissance on priority intelligence requirements
(PIR) in support of anticipated battalion maneuver 48 to 72 hours out. 3.
To protect the brigade's critical assets, assign the light cavalry troop an
area security mission, with appropriate terrain, in accordance with FM
17-95, Cavalry
Operations.
Area security allows the light cavalry platoon or troop to patrol, defend,
reconnaissance, or attack in order to protect a critical asset. (TA
4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
27: Template development.
Development
of the decision support template (DST) forms the basis for deciding which named
areas of interest (NAI) to assign among the multiple "red icons" displayed
on the situation template. The focus for DST development is to identify those
critical decisions which the commander may need to make during the battle.
Such events, as outlined in FM
101-5,
Staff
Organization and Operations,
may
influence, but are not limited to, such critical decisions as: location and
commitment of the reserve, location of the commander and his headquarters (HQs),
and launching of a counterattack. During movement-to-contact operations, critical
decisions may relate to shifting of the main effort, repositioning of the Q36
firefinder radar, and reprioritizing high-payoff targets (HPTs).
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
At the brigade and battalion level, NAIs which relate to enemy courses of action
(COA) must directly reflect these types of key decisions which are brought
out during the wargaming/DST development phase. 2.
The wargaming process highlights the development of HPTs. HPTs are those targets
whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA
(FM 34-130). Once the HPTs are developed by the staff, the decision is made
as to where these targets can best be interdicted. RESULTS:
1.
Often NAIs are not related to enemy COAs. 2.
These NAIs are labeled as targeted areas of interest (TAIs) or may even be
identified as objectives for certain operations. Techniques:
1.
This process highlights the linkage between priority intelligence requirements
(PIR), named areas of interest (NAI), and HPT: they all must be synchronized
to ensure that the commander makes key decisions at the right time and place
on the battlefield. 2.
NAIs must, therefore, be linked to a decision and/or priority target. This
is further reinforced in FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
which states, "The commander and his subordinates rely on intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB), a sound reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan
and accurate reports to quickly
understand enemy intentions."
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
28: Staff synchronization and battle rhythm.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Brigade battle rhythm is not structured to facilitate decisions by the commander.
2.
The staff is not synchronized with the commander, and the commander's guidance
is not included as part of the targeting process or staff huddles. RESULTS:
1.
The commander is not updated in a timely manner on the results of these meetings,
which prevents him from seeing the battlefield. 2.
As a result of this failure to establish a rhythm, the efforts of the staff
are flawed and do not accurately reflect the commander's guidance. Technique:
Train
to and follow the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and refer to CALL
Newsletter No. 95-12, Military
Decision Making, May
97.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TREND
29: Integration of battalion task force engineers.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Supported battalion staffs continue to exhibit an inability to integrate attached
engineer platoon leaders into the battalion tactical operations center (TOC)
and staff planning process. 2.
The inexperience of most engineer second lieutenants who also serve as platoon
leaders contributes to the difficulty of integration and synchronization. RESULTS:
1.
Battalion staff officers do not assist the engineer in performing his duties
as a staff member. 2.
The engineer is either not consulted at all during planning or is "confined"
to the TOC and not allowed to supervise and synchronize execution of missions
assigned to his platoon. 3.
The end result is poor synchronization of mobility and survivability operations
at battalion. Techniques:
1.
Task force commanders and staffs must understand that the supporting task force
engineer cannot be present in the TOC at all times. 2.
The task force executive officer must ensure that the supporting task force
engineer is integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and
targeting process. 3.
The task force engineer must support task force planning and aggressively supervise
his platoon during execution.
(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 3
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 5
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