CTC Trends, 2QFY98 & 3QFY98

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

TREND 10: Battle-tracking significant legal actions during deployment.

OBSERVATION: During any deployment, events will occur that will require investigation, be it by commander's inquiry or an informal AR 15-6 investigation. Often the brigade operational law team (BOLT) records these events and all other related matters on DA Form 1597 (daily log). Some matters, such as AR 15-6 investigations, are time sensitive or have command interest. These actions must be closely monitored to ensure suspense dates are being met.

RESULTS:

1. Daily logs get cumbersome quickly, and information retrieval becomes a time-consuming, often frustrating, event.

2. Additionally, since the action being tracked is buried in the log, it is out of sight and, therefore, typically forgotten.

Technique: Use a simple chart, posted in open view at the tactical operations center, to track significant legal actions. Suggested headings across the top of the page are as follows:

DTG and
Incident

CDR's INQ.
Appointed

Inv. Officer

Date
Suspense

Date
Reviewed

Forwarded

Be careful of the data entered in this chart as some investigations may be sensitive.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 11: Situational awareness of military police (MP) platoons.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. Many MP platoons experience difficulty with situational awareness because they do not have a system in place to battle-track and manage information.

2. Battle-tracking in platoon command posts inadequately provides squad leaders with visibility of enemy locations, friendly unit dispositions, and the current status of combat operations throughout the battlefield.

RESULTS:

1. Squad leaders rarely provide route or area reconnaissance overlays and do not report sufficient information to platoon leaders.

2. Soldiers lack mission-essential information and do not always know where they are in relation to the threat.

3. During operations, the platoons do not always use adequate control measures (i.e., phase lines, checkpoints, or rally points) to internally track progress or to report locations to the higher command and control element.

Techniques:

1. The platoons should provide the brigade with the information necessary to have resolution of location, current status, and missions of the military police (MP) units on the battlefield.

2. The military police platoon should be considered during the brigade's clearance of fires drills. In the platoon command post, track the current brigade operation to the resolution necessary to provide squad leaders with information to plan and conduct operations and prevent fratricide.

3. Use control measures and accurate movement information to track progress of subordi-nate units and to give higher units resolution of the progress of MP units on the battlefield.

4. Disseminate and provide feedback on the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and commanders critical information requirements (CCIR). Require squad leaders to submit timely situation reports (SITREPs) and route reconnaissance reports. Teach individual soldiers and leaders how to identify, report, disseminate, and react to the many threats that make up the battlefield while remaining aware of their immediate surroundings.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 12: Mission tracking and situational awareness of medical units.

OBSERVATION: Few medical staffs have any expertise in tracking and analyzing events to discover trends that may indicate pending hostile actions against the unit. Simple analyses may show hostile forces approaching from the same direction or the same general time and allow the unit to take additional protective measures against the threat.

RESULT: Failure to track events causes decreased situational awareness. This hinders the ability to anticipate the locations where significant casualties are likely. Also, the medical unit's own survivability may be unnecessarily jeopardized.

Techniques:

1. Soldiers must learn all common tasks appropriate for their grade. The Army assumes all soldiers understand and can execute common tasks regardless of their military occupational specialities (MOS).

2. Leaders must instill the skills and confidence in subordinates to survive a level one threat. Leaders must also understand the fundamentals of defense and use appropriate measures to protect facilities.

3. Understanding STP 21-1 SMCT, Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks Skill Level 1, would greatly enhance a medical unit's ability to protect itself against a threat.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 13: U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) support element battle-tracking.

OBSERVATION: Reserve component corps support groups and corps support battalions staffs are not, for the most part, familiar with battle-tracking and how this process, in conjunction with asset visibility, can enhance customer support.

RESULT: Most staffs have trouble assimilating and translating intelligence and operational products into valuable information that can assist in anticipating requirements.

Technique: The support operations section, if working properly, will track all assets provided by the companies. The S-2 will provide the latest intelligence on the threat and what impact threat actions will have on the unit and its ability to support. The S-3 will provide the latest update for the next operation. When combined and analyzed, these elements will provide enough information on current requirements, possible future requirements, and assets on-hand to satisfy those requirements. This will enable the unit to anticipate and be proactive versus reactive.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 14: Tracking logistical support.

OBSERVATION: One of the most challenging aspects of logistical support is to track each mission from beginning to completion. Many support operations shops have the basic tools displayed but seldom use them properly for the purpose of mission tracking.

RESULT: After the first few missions, tracking fades into following only those missions that are yet to start point (SP). The support operations section needs to have visibility of all missions. The biggest problem is the mission closeout. The company accomplishing the mission seldom closes the loop with the support operations section. Without closure, the support operations section will not have a good picture of what assets are available to support future missions.

Technique: One possible solution is to have a trip ticket that the support driver can fill in after returning from the company forward position to the support operations section. The support operations section can then update their boards with up-to-date information.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 15: Tracking friendly unit positions.

OBSERVATION: Battalions are consistently unable to keep track of all friendly units operating in their zone. Although the tactical operations center (TOC) generally has a good view of where its organic subordinates are on the battlefield, it often lacks awareness of brigade or division forces deployed within the battalion's boundaries. The often-seen, but usually unsuccessful, technique is for the ADA company commander to keep the avenger under brigade control and position the asset in sector without coordination.

RESULT: This leads to clearance of fires problems and increases the probability of fratricide.

Techniques:

1. Battalion TOCs must be proficient in battle-tracking techniques. Specific techniques are discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center, May 95.

2. Brigades should not assign units missions within battalion sectors without designating a command relationship or issuing specific coordinating instructions. For example, the brigade air defense artillery (ADA) officer wants to employ an Avenger in a battalion sector to cover a likely enemy avenue of approach. A more effective technique would be to task-organize the Avenger to the battalion and give the battalion the specified task of denying the air avenue of approach. This method achieves both the desired tactical effect and forces the appropriate coordination.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 16: Air assault unit planning synchronization. Synchronize planning events that lead up to H-hour. It is essential that the planning timeline for an air assault be thought out in sufficient detail to allow units time to complete assigned tasks.

OBSERVATION: Condensed timelines often hinder the success of an air assault.

RESULT: Mission execution is jeopardized because key pieces of information are left out of the plan. Too often units fail to parallel plan and execute key events specified in the air assault planning.

Technique: Unit commanders and staff need to have an understanding of where they fit into the scheme (air assault planning process).

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: Planning detail. Operations planning by the battle staff often lacks sufficient detail to allow accomplishment of the mission even when there is enough planning time. However, when detail planning time is limited and planning steps are compressed or when some planning is conducted concurrently, the detail needed to accomplish the mission is the same or worse.

OBSERVATION: The dilemma presented to units at the JRTC is how to compress the planning steps without inadvertently leaving out details necessary for mission success.

RESULT: Units end up omitting key details from their plan or giving a cursory glance at requirements. This results in missed H-hours, incomplete loads, refuel problems, unsuitable landing zones (LZs), and missed LZs.

Technique: Units must review their standing operating procedures (SOPs) and update procedures outlined in those documents that can speed up the planning process. Standardized shortcuts, charts, and key information posting are key in updating everyone in the tactical operations center (TOC) on important planning considerations in planning air assault missions.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 18: Reverse planning by air assault units.

OBSERVATION: Too many air assault units do not use the reverse planning process that is integral to successful planning.

RESULT: Unit planning is not coordinated nor efficient.

Techniques:

1. The reverse planning sequence used to plan for an air assault is a proven checklist of requirements that allows all the "blocks to be checked" for a successful mission.

2. The initial plan starts with the ground tactical plan that drives the development of the remaining plans.

3. The other plans, in order, are the landing plan, the air movement plan, the loading plan, and the staging plan. Since all of these plans are interrelated, they should not be planned independently, but sequentially, as outlined in the reverse planning process. A basic understanding of these plans alone will not ensure success.

4. All units involved in the process must know how and when they play a part in the planning.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 19: Time.

OBSERVATIONS: During offensive operations, some air assault units purposely sacrifice planning time to initiate an offensive operation earlier than the enemy anticipates. Time needs to be allocated to plan, prepare, brief written orders, and rehearse.

RESULT:

1. Often air assault battalions use 6 to 10 hours to conduct battalion-level troop-leading procedures, and from 2 to 8 hours for company- and platoon-level preparations.

2. Company orders are unclear on the plan below the battalion level and on platoon orders that offer almost no resolution on how the platoon will accomplish its own mission.

Techniques:

1. The air assault task force commander (AATFC) has the responsibility for ensuring adequate time for the staff planners and, most importantly, the aircrews. The AATFC ensures adequate time for the troops by carefully constructing the timeline to be followed from receipt of the order to H-hour.

2. Although the early initiation of operations offers some benefits to the commander, he must recognize and be willing to accept a significant reduction in planning and preparation at subordinate unit levels.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 2

TA.4 Command and Control BOS, Part 4

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TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)