4.
Avoid using non-secure means of communication.
(TA
4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
3: Air assault planning and use of timelines.
OBSERVATION:
In
the air assault unit planning process, the timelines sometimes show a lack
of connectivity to key events.
RESULT:
Some
members of the battalion staff do not understand that connectivity of key events
to the timeline is important to the overall success of the plan. These battle
staff officers find themselves behind key events and unable to catch up, resulting
in poor execution of the operations order due to poor synchronization.
Technique:
The
battalion battle staffs need to train in synchronizing key events to a timeline
established for planning. Practice at Home Station will help train staff officers
on the need to stay on task and to maintain the timeline. This training will
also facilitate establishing a battalion and eventually a brigade battle rhythm.
(TA 4.1.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
4: Casualty evacuation control net.
OBSERVATION:
Neither
the forward support medical company (FSMC) command post (CP) or the aviation
task force tactical operations center (TOC) has been able to do a sufficient
job of establishing and maintaining a dedicated casualty evacuation control
net.
Technique:
Units
must utilize the evacuation liaison team (ELT) concept in establishing a dedicated
casualty evacuation control network.
(TA 4.1.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)
TREND
5: Mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT) operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
MSRTs continue to experience significant outages at the JRTC. 2.
Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network planners generally cover the area
occupied by subscribers with wireless radio access unit (RAU) access to the
area common user system (ACUS). MSRT operators are poorly trained to operate/troubleshoot
their equipment. RESULT:
Procedures
such as MSRT/KY-68 over-the-air-rekeying (OTAR), and FAXing (UXC-7A) from an
MSRT to a digital non-secure voice terminal (DNVT) are beyond most owner-operator
capabilities.
Techniques:
1.
Establish operator certification programs and a monthly MSRT communications
exercise (COMMEX) at Home Station. 2.
Use a locally produced, pocket-sized, ready reference (complete with remoting
instructions and a troubleshooting chart) for every MSRT operator. 3.
A successful COMMEX of MSRTs in the intermediate staging base (ISB) (manual
up-load of the frequency plan in support of this COMMEX) is highly encouraged.
4.
Staff planning/coordination by the brigade signal officer and MSE company commander
for support to MSRT subscribers once they enter the maneuver area. 5.
Planning should include the disposition/location of communications and electronics
(C&E) maintenance personnel, priority of each KY-68 and RT-1539 (P)A(C)/G in
the combat team (to include those at the RAU's), and assigning an individual
for tracking MSRT status. 6.
Refer to FM
11-43, The
Signal Leader's Guide,
and FM
11-30, MSE
Communications in the Corps/Division,
for further information. (TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
6: NBC warning and reporting.
OBSERVATION:
Warning
and reporting systems in rotational units is dysfunctional. During chemical
attacks it takes one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report with any
useable information.
RESULT:
Chemical
personnel often delay taking any action until the initial report is received.
Techniques:
1.
The key is, "Don't delay." If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and a strike has occurred
in a templated area, he can then start taking action in response to the attack.
2.
A good tool that assists the tactical operations center (TOCs) and chemical
personnel in dealing with chemical attacks is the "battle drill." This provides
focus for everyone in the TOC and causes a pre-selected number of actions to
be executed. 3.
One condition of the battle drill is the submission of an NBC 1 report to higher
headquarters. The NBC 1 report will provide the chemical officer with the necessary
information to identify the hazard that confronts him. 4.
FM
3-7, NBC
Field Handbook,
and
FM
3-3, Chemical
and Biological Contamination Avoidance,
address the required information for a good NBC 1 report.
(TA
4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
7: Medical unit communications with support elements. The
transmission of information throughout an organization is a significant challenge
to medical units at JRTC.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Typically, echelon above division (EAD) medical units coordinate with the supported
brigade during initial planning and while the unit is in the intermediate staging
base (ISB). However, once deployed into the maneuver area, little communication
takes place between division and corps-level troops. 2.
Hardware incompatibilities between units often hinder communications. Medical
units still operate on 12-series radios, while combat forces use frequency-hopping
equipment. Medical units typically have insufficient communications assets
to monitor the number of frequencies required to maintain good communications
with adjacent and higher headquarters. 3.
Units fail to share information or include supporting elements in the planning
process. Seldom do corps-level units follow-up with the maneuver brigade in
terms of battle-tracking once the brigade departs the ISB. 4.
Because of the non-secure lines of communications (LOCs), operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) of the exercise, and difficulty in obtaining and maintaining clear
communications, units put communications with adjacent and supported units
in the "too hard to do" category and assume the missions are going as planned
in the initial meetings. RESULTS:
1.
This shortfall results in poor planning for support, inefficient use of assets
across the battlefield, and high died-of-wounds rates. 2.
Consequently, requirements change without the knowledge of those that must
support the mission. 3.
Corps units are unaware of threats such as minefields, enemy locations, and
assets that will significantly disrupt the unit's ability to support the maneuver
force. Techniques:
1.
Units must continually and consistently communicate with supported units. Without
battle-tracking and good continuous communication with the supported units,
support cannot be planned or provided efficiently. 2.
If hardware systems are incompatible, some method must be found to consistently
share information between units. If all else fails, the myriad of vehicles
(air and ground) that move throughout the battlefield can provide courier service
between critical nodes.
(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
8: Army airspace command and control (A2C2), integrated combat airspace command
and control (ICAC2).
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Understanding and proper utilization of Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
procedures are lacking. 2.
Aircrews and aviation planners are unfamiliar with airspace control order,
air tasking order information, and applicability. RESULTS:
1.
This situation often leads to a failure to plan missions around existing airspace
constraints or in conjunction with existing airspace control measures. 2.
Airspace command and control affects the entire depth of the battlefield and
often requires early planning emphasis to deconflict and ensure mission success.
3.
Aircrews and aviation planners must understand the implications of airspace
control measures and standard graphics control measures on mission accomplishment.
Techniques:
1.
Units should incorporate airspace control order and air tasking order training
into Home Station training programs and exercises. Mission planning timelines
should include checklists to ensure planners deconflict existing and potential
airspace control measures early to ensure mission success. 2.
Refer to FM
1-113, Cargo
Helicopter Operations,
which includes an initial planning conference checklist that works as a good
template and includes information required for most missions, not just air
assaults. At a minimum, the S-3 shop, brigade liaison officers (LNO), company
commanders, and pilots in command should understand the requirements of airspace
command and control and ensure the implementation of FM
100-103, Army
Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone,
in all phases of mission execution. JCS Pub 3-52 discusses airspace command
and control in a joint combat environment.
(TA
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
9: Battle-tracking and reporting.
OBSERVATION:
Commanders
habitually have difficulty in making sound, timely decisions due to a lack
of available information.
RESULTS:
1.
Subordinate battalion S-2 sections should be trained to report by named area
of interest (NAI). If this does not occur, junior members within the brigade
S-2 section should have adequate visibility on assigned NAI to determine if
incoming information is appropriate and should be posted. 2.
Often a vital piece of information is in possession of the unit, but is not
part of the commander's decision process because it was not reported or was
lost somewhere in the battle-tracking system. 3.
The hesitation to report is compounded by the all-too-frequent disappearance
of information within the TOC or TAC. Techniques:
1.
S-2 sections at brigade and battalion must develop a tracking tool for ensuring
collection plan execution within the TOC or TAC. Quite simply, this could be
a NAI overlay with the associated collection plan attached. 2.
A clear, universal understanding of the commander's critical intelligence requirements
(CCIRs) and effective information management techniques within TOCs/TACs can
greatly reduce the danger of making decisions without the benefit of all critical
information.
(TA
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 1
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 3
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