TA.
1 MANEUVER BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1: Move tactically. Units
consistently demonstrate the ability to move tactically during daylight conditions.
Soldiers use proper individual movement techniques under direct fire. Squads,
platoons, and companies are adept at using proper movement techniques and formations
based upon terrain and likelihood of enemy contact.
(TA
1.1 Move)
TREND
2: Pick-up zone/landing zone (PZ/LZ) operations.
Units that are successful in PZ/LZ operations have one PZ/LZ control NCO and
three separate PZ/LZs. One PZ/LZ is used for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC),
one for incoming logistical resupply (for A Company), and one to sling-load
forward to the combat trains. Each PZ/LZ is marked separately with its own
day and night markings (i.e., VS-17 panels, IR chemlites). The PZ/LZ control
NCO has communications with the aircraft with either a man-pack or vehicle-mounted
radio. All aircraft contact PZ/LZ control on an established frequency and facilitate
the execution of the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) in and around
the brigade support area (BSA).
(TA
1.1.1.4 Close into Tactical Position)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1: Forward area rearming/refueling point (FARP) operations.
OBSERVATION:
In
the FARP there is an organization problem caused by the direction of landing
and departing aircraft. The FARP should be positioned so that aircraft can
land into the wind.
Technique:
A
marking system, such as an inverted Y, should be established to inform the
aircraft of the approach pattern. This technique will prevent confusion of
the aircraft positioning.
(TA 1.1.1.3 Move Through Air)
TREND
2: Reliance on aircraft systems/technology.
OBSERVATION:
Many
of the units training at the JRTC are flying OH-58D Kiowa Warriors or AH-64
Apaches. The pilots tend to rely heavily on both the navigation systems and
the target acquisition systems of the aircraft.
RESULT:
The
pilot basic skills of navigation with the 1:50,000 map and search techniques
using standard 20/20 vision are not used.
Techniques:
1.
Commanders and instructor pilots should ensure aircrews remain proficient in
the basic skills of navigation with a map, especially at nap of the earth altitudes.
They should also reinforce training procedures involving search techniques.
2.
Aviators should be capable of performing accurate target acquisition. Reference
the aircraft specific aircrew training manual.
(TA 1.1.1.3 Move Through Air)
TREND
3: Company occupation plan.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Companies rotating through the JRTC are having a tough time occupying company
areas, especially at night. 2.
The companies either do not have standing operating procedures (SOP) that cover
occupation, or have an SOP but do not follow it. RESULT:
The
company area becomes very congested and task-saturated with support missions,
and priority of work becomes unsynchronized.
Techniques:
1.
The company must establish a solid SOP on occupation and follow it. 2.
The focal point of the entire occupation process is the advanced cadre/echelon/quartering
party officer in charge (OIC) or non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC).
They have to know the minimum- and maximum-size terrain needed to successfully
accommodate the company occupying a new site. 3.
The OIC or NCOIC must be the commander's representative to make terrain decisions
in conjunction with the battalion S-3's occupation plan.
(TA
1.1.1.4 Close in Tactical Position)
TREND
4: Platoon leader actions on contact.
OBSERVATIONS:
Many
platoon leaders fail to send an initial contact report or a more detailed follow-up
report to their company commander. Quite often the platoon leader performs
little or no assessment and executes a "knee-jerk reaction" in the form of
a hasty attack. He has no "tactical patience" to develop the situation as necessary.
RESULTS:
1.
Failure to send a contact report causes numerous command and control problems,
hampers unity of effort, and often prevents a unit from responding quickly
to a given situation. 2.
It also limits the company commander's options, as he has one platoon decisively
engaged almost immediately. 3.
This initial radio report relays as much information as is known (usually only
that the unit has contact and from which direction). The platoon leader should
assess the following before rushing into a course of action: -
Size of the enemy force.
-
Location of enemy.
-
Intent of the enemy (stay and fight, maneuver, withdraw).
-
Type of enemy (infantry, armored, motorized).
-
Terrain (hasty analysis; i.e., routes, dominant/key terrain, obstacles).
4.
This FO reaction is an important point because too often leaders get so involved
in the "infantry on infantry" fights that they neglect to use all available
assets (in this case, indirect fires). This is a bad habit, further reinforced
by the difficulty in replicating effects of indirect fires during training.
Techniques:
1.
When a platoon makes contact, the radio telephone operator (RTO) should immediately
send a quick message to the company commander's RTO while the platoon leader
is assessing the situation. This is rarely done. 2.
The forward observer (FO) must automatically be generating a call for fire.
3.
During WWII General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, taught
his subordinates to automatically call for enough indirect fire to suppress
the enemy before beginning to maneuver (and often before beginning suppression
with direct fires). 4.
As soon as the platoon leader has assessed the situation, he must send a more
detailed report in SALUTE-A format (the "A" being the action that he is taking
and any help he requires from the company). 5.
Platoon leaders must develop tactical patience and still be decisive and aggressive.
They can control and adjust as necessary the "tempo" of the operation, finding
the appropriate mix of mass (firepower) and speed required to keep pressure
on the enemy and destroy him.
(TA 1.2 Engage Enemy)
TREND
5: Direct fire planning and fire control.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Many tactical leaders do not understand the basic principles of direct fire
control (focus, distribute, and shift) and do not plan properly to achieve
maximum effects with their weapons systems. 2.
Many squad leaders (especially weapons squad leaders) fail to distribute fires
throughout the width and depth of their assigned target area. 3.
Very few team and squad leaders use fire commands. RESULT:
These
leaders do not control the rates of fire of their support element and run out
of ammunition at a crucial point in the battle.
Techniques:
1.
Units must conduct laser spot tracker (LST) on the direct fire control, conduct
leader machine gun training, and review the principles of direct fire control
discussed in the
Soldiers
Handbook 7-45, Fire
Planning Handbook,
Jun
93. 2.
Leaders must specify direct fire control measures/responsibilities for each
target area in the operations order (OPORD). 3.
Leaders must establish and practice methods of shifting and re-focusing fires
during a fight (such as proper use of fire commands, tracers, laser pointers,
and M203 spotter rounds). They
(particularly platoon leaders and company commanders) can assist the support
by fire element leader with ammunition management by giving him an estimated
time that it will take to maneuver into a position to assault the enemy. This
allows the support by fire (SBF) element leader to calculate rates of fire
for his weapons systems during that timeframe. This should result in maintaining
direct fires for the duration of the maneuver. 4.
If a unit is already low on ammunition, the assault element leader can give
instructions to the SBF element leader to save the last 100 rounds per machine
gun. These last 100 rounds will be fired at the assault element leader's command
when enemy suppression is needed most (usually during the breach or just prior
to the initial assault.). 5.
The recommended basic load for the M240 series machine gun is 1200 rounds of
7.62-mm ammunition.
(TA 1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)
TREND
6: Scheme of maneuver for search and attack.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Although most company commanders can provide a correct doctrinal definition
of mutual support, units are unable to execute the find, fix, and finish methodology
against a quick hitting and elusive enemy. 2.
The density of the vegetation at the JRTC is such that if squads and platoons
are more than 200-300 meters apart, it often takes too long to maneuver to
support an element in contact when the contact often lasts seconds/minutes.
RESULTS:
1.
A few company commanders are unable to translate mutual support into the appropriate
time/distance relationship between elements on the ground. Mutual support is
defined as "that support which units render each other against an enemy because
of their assigned tasks, their positions relative to each other and to the
enemy, and their inherent capabilities." (FM
101-5-1, Operational
Terms and Graphics,
p. 1-107) 2.
Platoons continually make contact with the nearest supporting element a kilometer
or more away. Most commanders employ either a linear scheme of maneuver with
two or three platoons abreast or a decentralized independent platoon/squad
search technique. Once contact is made, both of these techniques rely on rapid
movement of supporting elements to converge on and fix the enemy. Units find
it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome the mobility factor: the enemy
moves faster or as fast as you do. Techniques:
1.
The decisive point technique (outlined in CALL
Newsletter No. 97-8, Search
and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,
pp II-9 to II-10) executed at the company level applies the "hammer and anvil
technique" approach. One platoon forms the fix (anvil) element by establishing
ambushes along likely lines of drift into and out of the search zone. The remaining
platoons (hammer) search the zone, forcing the enemy toward the ambushes. 2.
Other references include: FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company,
pp. 4-14 to 4-19; FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
pp. 3-18 to 3-23.
(TA 1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)
TREND
7: Integrate direct fire with maneuver.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Many units fail to effectively manage limited planning time. 2.
In these units there is a tendency to spend too much time on communication
(commo) checks, formation/line-up, and forward area re-arming point (FARP)
operations. RESULTS:
1.
These same units spend very little time on the actual scheme of maneuver and,
more specifically, actions on contact or engagement area operations, whichever
is appropriate for the mission. 2.
Too often there is a failure to plan for action if the aircraft take fire enroute
to their screen line or in occupying their attack-by-fire position. Techniques:
1.
Commanders/air mission commanders should focus more of their individual planning
efforts to putting bullets on targets or on the execution of detailed reconnaissance.
2.
Commanders should allow other "planning cells" or flight members to plan details
such as weather, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) break-up, and FARP
operations. This will allow the commander time to focus on the tactical employment
of his organization. 3.
Specific movement techniques and engagement area operations are found in
FM
17-95, Cavalry
Operations,
and FM
1-112, Attack
Helicopter Operations.
(TA 1.4 Integrate Direct-fire with Maneuver)
TA.5
Intelligence BOS
TA.2
Fire Support BOS
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