TA.
2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1: Field artillery (FA) battalion S-2's involvement in the brigade targeting
process.
FA
battalion S-2s are becoming increasingly involved in the brigade targeting
process, particularly in analyzing, identifying, and pinpointing opposing forces
(OPFOR) mortar locations and caches. The S-2s are attending brigade targeting
meetings and are becoming an integral member of the brigade targeting effort.
(TA
2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)
TREND
2: Commander/fire support officer (FSO) integration.
The
customary
relationship between commanders and fire support officers is working well.
Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand
the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of
maneuver. Commanders and FSOs are doing an excellent job of determining when
fires are critical and where fires must be placed, and of understanding the
restrictions for fires to ensure non-interference with the scheme of maneuver.
(TA
2.3 Integrate Fire)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1: Use of the Precision Lightweight GPS [Global Positioning System] Receiver
(PLGR).
OBSERVATION:
During
the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase and deliberate attack, most forward
observers (FOs) turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode setting
while moving.
RESULT:
When
the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize
the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.
Techniques:
1.
Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode setting. 2.
Use the PLGR upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a
fire mission using the polar plot call for fire. 3.
Implement the techniques described in "The
PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate
Indirect Fires to the Close Fight,"
Combat
Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin, 4th QTR, FY 96, No. 96-10,
Oct 96. 4.
Reference:
TM
11-5825-29-13.
(TA
2.1 Process Ground Targets)
TREND
2: Q36 operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Field artillery planners often do not have an adequate understanding of the
firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute. 2.
Often the targeting
technician,
the fire finder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations
beyond site selection until after
the battle has begun.
3.
Many times field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect
more from the firefinder radar system than it can actually deliver. RESULTS:
1.
Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to execute
unrealistic plans.
2.
The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future
operations. Techniques:
1.
Conduct extensive Home Station training with the firefinder radar system so
that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities
and limitations. 2.
Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home
Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience. 3.
At Home Station, conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks
to highlight the unique requirements of the firefinder radar system; i.e.,
optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation
and the terrain. 4.
Make the targeting
technician
an
integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting
technician into the planning process early. 5.
Conduct realistic radar training at Home Station; i.e., limited friendly fire
and more hostile fire operations.
(TA 2.1.2.1 Determine System Capabilities)
TREND
3: Call for fire procedures - forward observer (FO).
OBSERVATION:
Many
FOs initiate calls for fire using non-doctrinal, incomplete formats. Example:
calling in a grid location and nothing more.
RESULT:
There
is a critical loss of time as the firing unit must then request target size,
description, and direction.
Techniques:
1.
Fire support NCOs and officers must train FO teams in accordance with (IAW)
FM
6-30, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire,
Chapter
4. 2.
All members of the battalion fire support element (FSE) must know the proper
call
for fire format
and
the six
elements required
to
properly initiate a voice fire mission. 3.
FIST training should include radio rehearsals and the use of the training set
forward observer (TSFO); emphasize proper call for fire formats. 4.
Ensure soldiers understand the necessity of providing the fire direction center
with accurate and proper information the first time to increase mission processing
times and ensure faster rounds on target.
(TA
2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)
TREND
4: Howitzer range cards.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card or only a partially
completed one. 2.
Frequently, howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data
for anti-personnel ammunition (APERS) or the 155-mm Killer Junior. Techniques:
1.
Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during pre-combat checks
and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard. 2.
Reinforce
the value
of
the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements. 3.
Doctrinal reference:
FM
6-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,
Chapter 3, pp. 3-12.
(TA
2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)
TREND
5: Out-of-traverse/6400-mil missions.
Firing
units often experience difficulty executing out-of-traverse missions.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation
(QE) for each octant. 2.
Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position corrections
(TGPCs) for each octant. 3.
Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage
netting, prohibits true 6400-mil capability. 4.
Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly. 5.
Lack of aiming reference points and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths
further inhibits crews from executing out-of-traverse/6400-mil missions. 6.
Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up
displacement. 7.
Units are not using distant aiming points (DAPs) despite their availability.
RESULT:
Slow
fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire.
Techniques:
1.
Doctrinal references:
FM
6-40, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery;
FM 6-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery;
and
the appropriate howitzer -10. 2.
Ensure the executive officer (XO) and fire direction center (FDC) understand
the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions, especially
for setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6400-mil operations. 3.
Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming
reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.
4.
Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure
the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires. 5.
Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6400-mil operations.
(TA
2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)
TREND
6: Observer plans and use of triggers.
Company
fire support officers (FSOs) are not developing observer plans and trigger
points during defensive operations.
OBSERVATION:
Too
many observers are unable to see the target area and do not establish or rehearse
a trigger point.
RESULT:
Planned
fires normally impact after the target has passed through the target area,
allowing an enemy element to successfully pass through the defensive sector.
Techniques:
1.
Company FSOs must position observers to support the defense: - In
restrictive terrain, place the FO well forward of the company/team (CO/TM)
defensive position.
- Establish
an identifiable
trigger
point, based on a projected rate of enemy movement through the sector.
- Rehearse
the optimal position of the FO relative to the trigger once the enemy enters
the target area.
2.
Read FM
6-30, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire,
page 5-25, on the establishment and use of triggers. (TA
2.2 Engage Ground Targets)
TREND
7: Mortar employment in close contact. Few
units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their forward observers
and FSOs to fight with artillery fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy, rather
than using the more responsive mortars under their direct control. 2.
Company FSOs and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm
and 81- mm mortars along the unit's route. Techniques:
1.
FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template
enemy positions and likely ambush sites. 2.
As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish
the next target. Use
the minimum safe distance of the weapon system
designated
to signal the shift to a new target. 3.
When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority
target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the
enemy. 4.
See "Fast,
Accurate Fires in the Close Fight"
in
the Combat
Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Qtr, FY 96, No. 96-4,
Mar
96.
(TA
2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)
TREND
8: Accuracy of mortars.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Fire support officers (FSOs) are not providing timely meteorological (MET)
data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's
organic mortars. 2.
Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations
as a means to improve their accuracy. Techniques:
1.
The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get meteorological
(MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer)
and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the field artillery
(FA) battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the
main effort task force). 2.
The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units should
register the mortars and then ensure this tasking is included in the operations
order.
(TA
2.2.1.1
Conduct Surface Attack)
TREND
9: Indirect fires during small unit contacts.
Infantry
platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during
small unit contacts.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the
enemy is often only 200-300 meters away. 2.
Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation.
They are not well trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted
and dismounted enemy. 3.
Decentralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the
search and attack phase of operations. RESULTS:
1.
Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy. 2.
Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve
the desired effects on the target. Techniques:
1.
Plan for and use
artillery
and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.
2.
Use priority targets for both mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick
fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.
3.
Establish battle drills that immediately "get a round on the ground" upon contact.
Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold,
accurate shift and fire for effect. 4.
Always give accurate target descriptions, and make sure that the attack guidance
is fully understood. 5.
FIST training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the
observer is moving. 6.
Train forward observers (FO) on rapidly determining a target location and initiating
a complete call for fire while on the move and
under attack.
7.
Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly
determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "The
PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate,
Indirect Fires to the Close Fight,"
Combat
Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Qtr,
No.
96-10,
Oct
96.
(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
10: Light Tactical Fire Direction System (LTACFIRE) operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they
rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/initial fire support automation
system (IFSAS). 2.
Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning,
and conduct tactical fire direction. RESULTS:
1.
The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient
use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria. 2.
Inexperienced operators, along with failure of the chain of command to force
the use of the LTACFIRE system, are the primary reasons. Although units often
have excellent LTACFIRE SOPs, they are rarely used. 3.
Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management,
fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.
Techniques:
1.
To exploit the LTACFIRE system, both
operators
and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of the system. Effective
LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational
scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill the necessary confidence
to use the system. 2.
Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training
events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.
(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)
TREND
11: Survey operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets. 2.
Initial field artillery support plans have done a good job in directing survey
support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control. Unfortunately,
the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar
are complete. RESULT:
Units
exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force; i.e., 81-mm
mortars, OH-58D, combat observation and laser team (COLT) targets, routes,
and obstacles.
Techniques:
1.
Ensure planning in the survey annex of the field artillery support plan encompasses
all assets in the task force that require survey. 2.
Review FM
6-2, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey,
specifically Chapters 14-2, 14-7, 15, and figure 15-1 (Fire Support Coordination
[FSCOORD] Checklist). 3.
Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station,
focusing on the importance of effective survey.
(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
TA.3
Air Defense BOS
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