TA.
5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are
not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1: Crater analysis.
Commanders
at all levels are more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis
after the receipt of opposing force (OPFOR) indirect fires. The information
provided in the shell report is passed to the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar
analysis of the enemy situation. This information has led to the successful
capture of several OPFOR mortars during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase.
(TA
5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1: Use of scouts.
Scouts
must be involved in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning. According
to FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion,
"Scouts should concentrate on the most important information requirements -
they should not be overtasked."
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Units have difficulty with the employment of scouts in the execution of R&S
plans. 2.
R&S planning is often conducted independent of the daily targeting meeting
and seems to be an afterthought to the course of action development process
rather than the driver for situation development and confirmation. RESULT:
Poor
use of the scouts produces real time intelligence lacking necessary situational
development and not confirming intelligence already gathered by other means.
Techniques:
1.
Immediately following mission analysis, the planning staff identifies a dedicated
R&S planning group (i.e., S-3 air, battle information coordination center [BICC],
fire support NCO [FSNCO], medical platoon leader) to develop priority intelligence
requirements (PIR) for continued planning and an R&S plan to confirm the enemy
situation template. 2.
Reference: FM
7-92, The
Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad.
Chapter
1 discusses the relationship between the battalion staff and the scout platoon
during planning, while chapter 2 focuses on the battalion's role in command
and control (C2) of the reconnaissance platoon.
(TA 5.2 Collect Information)
TREND
2: Collection tasks not linked to the scheme of maneuver.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Collection managers are absent from the wargaming process. 2.
More often than not, the collection plan is written once the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP) is complete. RESULTS:
Collection
tasks are written to fit the scheme of maneuver rather than operations being
driven by intelligence. This is especially prevalent during the movement-to-contact
phase of operations at the JRTC and presents a key challenge for the brigade
intelligence team.
Techniques:
1.
Review FM
101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations. The
wargame begins the process of "finalizing the reconnaissance and surveillance
plan and graphics form the basis for the collection plan. 2.
The basic TTP for solving most of the collection management challenges is to
incorporate the development of the initial plan into the wargaming process.
3.
Since subject matter experts for each BOS attend the wargame, any conflicts
concerning collection capabilities and/or limitations can be worked out prior
to the draft collection plan being finalized.
(TA 5.2 Collect Information)
TREND
3: Overuse of the military intelligence (MI) company.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
During the defense, the MI company is assigned multiple tasks which it usually
cannot accomplish to the level of detail required by the brigade S-2. 2.
Example: The direction-finding accuracy of ground-based signals intelligence
(SIGINT) assets are usually overestimated. The focus of SIGINT should be on
one or perhaps two primary targets to maximize the positioning limitations
of the collectors. 3.
Ground surveillance teams employing the remotely monitored battlefield sensor
system (REMBASS) are given too many areas to cover in too little time. RESULT:
Collection
managers do not consider the limitations of REMBASS: it can only be emplaced
as quickly as the operators can navigate to the monitoring site (a lengthy
combat operation) and it cannot distinguish friendly from enemy moving target
indicators.
Technique:
The
collection manager, either the senior assistant S-2 or the MI company commander,
should bring a list to the wargaming process of all collection assets available
within the brigade combat team as well as those which can be requested through
division (i.e., QUICKFIX). As named areas of interest (NAI) are assigned during
the course of the wargame, the collection manager ensures that the scheme of
maneuver is linked to the required start/stop
and
latest
time intelligence is of value (LTIOV)
per
collection task.
(TA 5.2.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information)
TREND
4: Terrain products. Divisions
are now deploying elements of their organic terrain analysis detachments to
support maneuver commanders and intelligence officers.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Commanders and their staffs are not familiar with the capabilities and limitations
of terrain teams. 2.
Commanders do not routinely request a package of standard terrain analysis
products to support operations. 3.
These products, once delivered, are not generally "pushed" to the rotational
unit because of the lack of habitual training relationships. RESULT:
Units
do not use the tools available to determine the impact of terrain on operations.
Notable examples include the impact of terrain on:
-
Mobility.
-
Direct fire engagement for long-range weapons.
-
Line-of-sight communications.
-
Locations of suitable water sources.
-
The rain and its effect on the strength of local soils.
Techniques:
1.
Review FM
34-130,
Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
2.
Request standard terrain analysis from the division terrain team and train
extensively on its use. 3.
Integrate slice element requirements, such as civil affairs and psychological
operations, into terrain analysis requests in accordance with
FM
34-36, Special
Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
(TA
5.2.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information)
TREND
5: Under use of non-standard collectionassets.
OBSERVATION:
Infantry
battalions are still receiving the bulk of assigned named areas of interest
(NAI).
RESULT:
Highly
capable intelligence gathering units such as aviation, military police (MP),
and the forward support battalion (FSB) receive little to no collection focus,
due in part to the collection manager's lack of familiarity with the capabilities
and limitations of these units.
Technique:
The
basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for solving most of the collection
management challenges are incorporated in the wargaming process. The collection
manager, either the senior assistant S-2 or the military intelligence (MI)
company commander, should bring a list to the wargaming process of all the
collection assets available within the brigade combat team as well as those
which can be requested through division (i.e., QUICKFIX). As NAIs are assigned
during the course of the wargame, the collection manager ensures that the scheme
of maneuver is linked to the required start/stop
and
latest
time intelligence is of value (LTIOV)
per
collection task. Since the subject matter experts for each BOS attend the wargame,
any conflicts concerning collection capabilities and/or limitations can be
worked out prior to the draft collection plan being finalized.
(TA
5.2.1.3 Collect Information on Social/Political/Economic Environment)
TREND
6: The targeting process.
The
targeting and synchronization meeting is an important tool used by maneuver
brigades and battalions during rotations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade to ensure the
effective servicing of targets as well as the integration and synchronization
of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems. 2.
Many commanders use the targeting and synchronization process to drive their
operations. One of the products from the meeting is a fragmentary order (FRAGO).
RESULTS:
1.
The nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) officer is not effectively involved
in the targeting process, nor are the assets he oversees. 2.
The chemical officer must be involved in the targeting process if he is going
to have any timely influence on the battle from an NBC standpoint.
Techniques:
1.
The chemical officer must be involved in the targeting process. 2.
Reference FM
6-30-10, The
Targeting Process.
(TA
5.2.2 Collect Target Information)
TREND
7: Using intelligence indicators for targeting. The
targeting meeting is essential in working out the targeting priorities and
details.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
S-2s and their supporting management of information control officer (MICO)
still do not provide detailed future projections of enemy courses of action
to commanders and staffs during the targeting process. 2.
The S-2s are not prepared for the targeting meetings. 3.
S-2s lack the methodology for turning enemy intelligence into friendly action.
RESULTS:
1.
S-2s arrive at the targeting meeting not prepared to discuss recent battle
damage assessment (BDA), R&S results, or collection asset availability. 2.
The S-2s do not have situation and event templates of probable enemy activities
for the targeting period. Techniques:
1.
It is essential to make the items listed above--BDA, R&S results, collection
asset availability, and template of future activities--a part of the section's
internal updates. 2.
If each of these items is updated several times a day, recent products will
always be available for use in either a targeting process or to support any
future planning. No lengthy preparation for a targeting session would be required.
3.
Review CALL
Newsletter No. 97-8, Feb
97,
Search
and Attack!,
Appendix A. 4.
Review the JRTC video, "How to Conduct Targeting Meetings."
(TA
5.2.2 Collect Target Information)
TREND
8: Collection management by the S-2.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Task force S-2s at brigade and battalion level do not manage their collection
assets well. 2.
S-2s are often not well practiced in the basic techniques of collection management
as discussed in FM
34-2, Collection
Management.
3.
S-2s are often unaware of the capabilities and limitations of the systems at
their disposal. RESULTS:
1.
S-2s do not consider all systems on the battlefield as collectors. 2.
Certain collection systems are being underemployed or are expected to perform
tasks well beyond their capabilities. Techniques:
1.
S-2s should review and practice staff training exercises using the techniques
discussed in FM
34-2, Collection
Management.
2.
S-2s need to familiarize themselves and their soldiers with the basic capabilities
and limitations of each system. The management of information control officer
(MICO) commander and his soldiers is the best place to look for this expertise.
3.
The S-2 section's field SOP and the tools used during collection management
should prompt the S-2 to consider assets not often tasked, such as the foward
support battalion (FSB) and other support units.
(TA
5.3 Process Information)
TREND
9: Poor management of the collection plan.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Brigade S-2s generally treat the collection plan as a "fire and forget" weapon.
2.
During the movement-to-contact phase at the JRTC, brigade S-2s continue to
assign named areas of interest (NAI) to each individual enemy icon displayed
on the situation template. RESULTS:
1.
Once forwarded down to the battalions, little to no visibility is maintained
on NAI coverage, identifying collection gaps, and deconflicting redundant coverage.
2.
NAIs often do not relate to priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or to
commanders' decisions. Techniques:
1.
The basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for solving most of the
collection management challenges is to incorporate the development of the initial
plan into the wargaming process. 2.
The collection manager, either the senior assistant S-2 or the MI company commander,
should bring a list to the wargaming process of all the collection assets available
within the brigade combat team as well as those which can be requested through
division (ie. QUICKFIX). 3.
As NAIs are assigned during wargaming, the collection manager ensures that
the scheme of maneuver is linked to the required start/stop
and
latest
time intelligence is of value (LTIOV)
per
collection task. 4.
BOS subject matter experts should attend the wargame and resolve any conflicts
concerning collection capabilities and/or limitations prior to the draft collection
plan being finalized.
(TA
5.3 Process Information)
TREND
10: Template the chemical threat.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Chemical personnel at both brigade and battalion often fail to produce a template
based on their analysis; they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents
on the battlefield. 2.
A sound template will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort.
The chemical officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy fights;
this can be found in the enemy order of battle. RESULT:
Once
the chemical officer understands the enemy order of battle, he need only conduct
reverse analysis to ascertain where he thinks the enemy will employ agents
and then depict these locations on his template.
Techniques:
1.
The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance plan
that covers the depth and width of his battle space. 2.
The chemical officer must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure that they are presenting
the same picture for their respective commanders. (TA
5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports)
TREND
11: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
Commanders
lack sufficient detail on the terrain and enemy to plan for and synchronize
operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Analysis of terrain and weather by battalion and brigade intelligence officers
does not pass the "so what" test. Although forecasts and light tables are usually
covered in detail, the impact of these conditions on specific operations is
rarely mentioned. 2.
Too many S-2s do not understand the definitions of key
and
decisive
terrain,
nor do they accurately brief these to the commander. 3.
There is still a common lack of understanding for what commanders need to know
about the enemy to shape friendly operations. It is not enough to tell the
commander "where" the enemy is. Battalion and brigade intelligence officers
need to study the fundamentals in FM
34-130, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield.
RESULTS:
1.
Commanders often lose visibility of weather and light factors throughout the
course of mission planning. 2.
The commander's decision on where to defend or attack is usually made hastily,
often prior to the first S-2 slide being briefed. 3.
A similar lack of detail is apparent in S-2 situational templating. Doctrinally
correct, set piece situational templates of the enemy using the most up-to-date
symbology is a positive trend.
Techniques:
1. Intelligence officers can win back this apparent lack of confidence by briefing
their commanders in terms that they understand. Displaying a doctrinally correct
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) is not enough. The terrain should
be broken down into elements which will impact the enemy as well as friendly
operations. Begin with the bottom line up front: where the commander can best
defend or attack and why. For example: "Sir, I'll begin my briefing on terrain
within the area of operations by highlighting Hill 109 as the decisive terrain
for the brigade defense. We must defend this ground to be successful against
the enemy's 6th motorized attack. Both mechanized avenues of approach 1 and
2 converge on Hill 109, making it key to the enemy's success. Given the recent
rain and soil composition, we should have no problem digging individual fighting
positions without extensive engineer support. Further, the forward slope of
Hill 109 provides 500 to 1500 meter clear fields of fire, making it the best
place available to maximize use of our TOW weapon systems." 2.
S-2s can increase understanding on weather by including a graphic segment of
light/lunar data as well as the 72-hour forecast on the decision support template
(DST). Additionally, intelligence officers should update commanders on light
and weather during combined arms rehearsals. Again, S-2s need to brief the
bottom line up front: how to use light and weather to the best advantage (and
the enemy's disadvantage) during the execution of operations. For example:
"Sir, given the enemy's limited night vision capabilities, I suggest we LD
no earlier than moon set or 2350 local time. This will offset the 87 percent
illumination on the evening of the attack. Heavy early morning fog between
0400 and 0545 should allow adequate concealment for Alpha and Bravo Companies
to move into their attack and support-by-fire positions. Beginning mean nautical
time (BMNT) is at 0550. A good window for conducting a concealed breech of
the enemy's perimeter would be between 0530 and 0545." 3.
Brigade and battalion S-2s must be prepared to provide the commander with the
same level of detail on the enemy as is briefed by the S-3 on friendly operations.
4.
A recommended TTP is to use the method
of developing courses of action
format
found in FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion.
5.
Know and brief the following on the enemy: -
Determine the decisive point: where the enemy commander plans to maximize his
combat power against a perceived vulnerability; sometimes linked to decisive
terrain
or
a mission depending on a piece of ground which must be seized for the enemy
to accomplish his mission.
-
Determine supporting efforts: other factors employed by the enemy commander
to ensure the main effort's success. For example: rear area combat operations,
air strikes, and deception.
-
Determine task and purpose: essential tasks of the enemy's subordinate units
and what the enemy is attempting to achieve.
-
Identify types of forces required to accomplish the mission: enemy order of
battle.
-
Display suspected enemy control measures: enemy boundaries (down to the lowest
level).
(TA
5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)
TREND
12: Determining decision points.
OBSERVATION:
The
S-2s are not developing courses of action which allow the commander to be a
decisionmaker.
Technique:
Like
the S-3, battalion and brigade S-2s should prepare an enemy most probable and
most dangerous course of action (COA) sketch. This enhances the clarity of
the enemy's scheme of maneuver. This sketch should illustrate the maneuver
aspects of the COA to include boundaries, threat objectives, task/purpose (by
subordinate unit), and task organization. The goal for this sketch and the
associated statement on enemy COA is to tell the commander what tasks the enemy
is attempting to execute against friendly forces, when enemy action is expected
to begin or end, where objectives the enemy is attempting to seize/defend or
zone of operations assigned are, how the enemy will execute his scheme of maneuver
and the associated purposes of his elements, and why or the desired intent
of the enemy's operations.
(TA
5.4.4 Prepare Reports On Enemy Situation)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS
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