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Chapter Three

Operations (cont)

OPSEC in peace operations poses unique challenges for the peace operations force as it engages in routine actions connected with maintaining the peace between the FWFs. Often we are unaware of the patterns we have established in our day-to-day, mission-to-mission operations, even in peace operations. Discernible patterns of operations give potential adversaries knowledge of our most likely course of action.

OPSEC may contribute to IO by slowing the adversary's decision cycle and providing opportunity for easier and quicker attainment of friendly objectives. OPSEC targets the adversary's ability to collect reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, and, when integrated with other IO capabilities, shapes to the friendly force advantage the adversary's knowledge and beliefs about friendly operations. OPSEC denies the adversary critical information about friendly capabilities and intentions needed for effective and timely decisionmaking, leaving the adversary vulnerable to other offensive IO capabilities.(93)

Army OPSEC policy and operations doctrine state that the division OPSEC program is managed by the G3 who analyzes the commander's concept of operation to determine the essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) which must be protected from exploitation by enemy intelligence. The G3 develops appropriate OPSEC measures based on the G2's assessment of enemy intelligence collection capabilities and on the friendly indicators that may cause a compromise of the EEFI.(94)Achieving seamless OPSEC in peace operations also requires coordination with supporting agencies and departments from outside of the DoD.(95)OPSEC is a threat-oriented process consisting of five distinct actions: 1) Identification of critical information; 2) Analysis of threats; 3) Analysis of vulnerabilities; 4) Assessment of risk, and; 5) Application of appropriate OPSEC measures.(96)Although often described as occurring in five steps, the OPSEC process need not be applied in a sequential manner - "a recognized strength of the OPSEC process is that its elements are very fluid."(97)

OPSEC in peace operations is a careful balance between the transparency of operations required to demonstrate impartiality and force protection.(98)In a peacekeeping mission, transparency of operations will predominate, while in peace enforcement, force protection remains paramount.(99)Joint OPSEC doctrine requires coordination of the OPSEC plan with Public Affairs. In peace operations, this coordination is especially important because of the political sensitivity of these operations.(100)Army Peace Operations doctrine states that OPSEC in peace operations includes communications security (COMSEC); neutrality; prohibitions on photography; preparation of sites, accommodations and defensive positions; use of roadblocks and traffic control points; assessments of personnel vulnerabilities, personal awareness, security measures, sniper threats, coordination, and an evacuation plan.(101)

Given the combination of transparency of operations and a less constrained media presence in the peace operation battlespace, or "peace space," OPSEC is more difficult to achieve in peace operations. "The presence of the news media in the operational area, with the capability to transmit information on a real-time basis to a worldwide audience, has the potential to be a lucrative source of information to adversaries."(102)Representing an even greater OPSEC challenge than the open media is the heavy presence of local civilian noncombatants interacting with the peace operations force on a daily basis. During NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, hundreds of civilians entered American base camps on a daily basis performing interpreter duties and other tasks. These persons may sympathize with, or have been members of, FWF military and para-military units, police or special police units, security forces, or intelligence forces of the former government.

Absent the immediate threat of combat in peacekeeping and mature peace enforcement, soldiers may become complacent regarding OPSEC.(103)Soldiers must be reminded that even unclassified information may be "sensitive" in nature, that is, its loss, misuse or unauthorized access by adversaries could adversely affect the national interest. Soldiers may divulge unclassified, but sensitive information with local national-hired workers, and local civilians as they engage in friendly conversations. Photography of sites occupied or used by the peace operations force should be prohibited. Photographs of base camps and other operational sites taken by soldiers of the peace operations force can easily end up in the hands of adversaries planning terrorism or espionage. Commanders must develop clear guidance on the prohibitions on photography for the friendly force to reduce OPSEC vulnerabilities.

The tradeoff between force protection and transparency is most evident in COMSEC as unsecure communications systems permit the FWF to monitor telephone conversations and radio traffic. Within TFE, the communications architecture and C4I systems architecture is a mixture of U.S. and foreign systems characteristic of multi-national operations. However, several nonmilitary INFOSYS make up the overall architecture of communications for SFOR and Task Force Eagle. An example of the variety of systems cobbled together into a working whole is found in the telephones used by TFE. Two sets of commercially contracted telephone services, the two pre-existing UN phone systems, and the indigenous phone system all operated alongside U.S. and allied MSE-type phones. Such a complex array of systems presented greater C2-Protect challenges as signals security (SIGSEC) and OPSEC measures had to be developed across all systems and links.

The computer INFOSYS employed by modern militaries provides substantial increases in information management during operations. TFE employed computers throughout the force, down to the company level for U.S. Forces. These computers were connected over secured and unsecured Local Area Networks and Wide Area Networks (LANs and WANs). Through these systems, U.S. Forces were able to share information in the form of FRAGOs, WARNOs, spot reports, briefings, etc., forming a Relevant Common Picture (RCP) that enhanced overall situational awareness (SA). The proliferation of computers represented a C2-Protect information systems security problem: one IO analyst estimated that 50 percent of TFE's personal computers had suffered from computer viruses.(104)However, the computer INFOSYS also represented another C2-Protect OPSEC challenge. Task Force Eagle employed teams from the Land Information Warfare Activity to identify vulnerabilities in its deployed automated information systems.(105)Elements opposed to the peace settlement could achieve tactical to strategic results by intruding into the peace operator's computer systems to alter data or introduce falsified data that would skew analysis and decisions made from that analysis that could jeopardize the mission.(106)

FM 100-23, Peace Operations, lists Neutrality as an OPSEC principle in peace operations.(107)Neutrality reinforces the impartial relationship between the peace operations force and the FWF. Ensuring that all parties to the conflict receive the same information reinforces the perception of neutrality and enhances the legitimacy of the peace operations force. If any of the FWFs suspect that the peace operations force may be giving one side better information, the cooperation between the peace operations force and the FWFs could disappear. Even-handed neutrality removes any incentive for the FWFs to engage in espionage against the friendly force to obtain information they suspect is being withheld.

In peace operations, OPSEC, military deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide are all part of Force Protection.(108)OPSEC and military deception, are also elements of C2W. Force protection measures that fortify these sites against terrorist attacks, infiltration, pilferage, surveillance, and sniper threats contribute to an improved OPSEC posture. Security measures, such as roving security patrols and sentries, Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), and R&S patrols identify, correct, and prevent security deficiencies and threats, and maintain the soldier's personal awareness to the security threats around him. Acts of terrorism are a constant threat in most peace operations.(109)Elements not party to the dispute which prompted the peace operation, who are hostile to the United States, may see the deployment of U.S. Forces to a peace operation as an opportunity to strike against deployed American soldiers. All security measures should be coordinated with local police and military of the FWF and with civil agencies and charitable organizations operating in the AO.

Most peace operations have been multi-national operations. U.S. participation in peace operations brings U.S. information-based technology, weapons systems, intelligence-gathering, and other capabilities to the multi-national force. These capabilities are often shared, integrated, and synchronized in multinational operations, improving the capabilities of the entire force. This integration of U.S. and allied or coalition information, information-based process, and information systems creates additional vulnerabilities which an adversary can exploit by conducting information operations against the peace operations force.(110)In addition, the heavy intelligence aspect of peace operations, and the dissemination of classified information to lower levels of command mean that unit staffs can expect to handle more classified documents in peace operations. Many general-purpose force units are not accustomed to handling and safeguarding such volumes of classified information. These points only demonstrate that peace operations require even more attention to OPSEC, due to the heavy reliance on intelligence and the multi-national character of the peace operations force.

Multi-disciplinary counterintelligence (MDCI) analysis provides commanders with detailed assessments of hostile all-source intelligence and security threats near their operational bases and in their operational areas. These hostile threat assessments are critical to the unit's OPSEC and base defense programs. MDCI analysts compare their threat data base with the friendly force profiles provided by S3 OPSEC personnel to determine actual friendly vulnerabilities. The MDCI analysts evaluate the effectiveness of OPSEC measures.(111)

Within TFE, the Military Intelligence (MI) Task Force organized MDCI elements into Force Protection Teams (FPTs), allowing the MI Task Force commander to allocate his MDCI assets as the situation required. The FPTs were composed of CI Agents, interrogators, and civilian and military interpreters who worked in general support of TFE and in direct support of the subordinate battalion Task Forces including non-U.S. units. The FPTs conducted intelligence collection operations focused on force protection (CI-Force Protection Source Operations, or CFSO). Counter-intelligence doctrine states that CFSO "are focused on protection information on local terrorists, saboteurs, subversive activities, and other hostile activities affecting the security of deployed forces."(112)CI activities support OPSEC by providing information and conducting actions that protect friendly information and defend friendly INFOSYS against espionage, sabotage, or terrorist activities.(113)

In addition to the MDCI support, TFE requested an IO Vulnerability Assessment Team from the Land Information Warfare Activity to conduct a vulnerability assessment and recommend improvements to the Division OPSEC program.(114)Units may conduct their own assessments by conducting an OPSEC survey. OPSEC surveys are specifically designed to identify the patterns that potential adversaries may detect and provide that information to the commander.(115)No field manual is dedicated to explaining Army Operations Security (OPSEC) doctrine; however, Army OPSEC policy is explained in AR 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC).(116)OPSEC officers and commanders seeking to improve OPSEC programs in their units should contact the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, 6411 Ivy Lane, Suite 400, Greenbelt, MD 20770-1405, or their web site at http://www.opsec.org/associations/IOSS.html, for OPSEC training publications, video tapes, and computer-assisted training programs. For soldier and small unit-level OPSEC TTPs employed by TFE, see CALL Newsletter No. 97-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, January 1997, pp. 46 and 47.

Throughout our military history, commanders have traditionally "viewed deception only as a warfighting need," but deception is applicable in peace operations.(117)Army peace operations doctrine recognizes that the transparency of military operations required for traditional peacekeeping may preclude the use of deception, but note that deception operations may be both appropriate and necessary for peace enforcement.(118)Deception is more difficult to achieve in peace operations where the operational-level objectives have more diplomatic content than military significance.(119)As with OPSEC, the characteristics of the modern information environment mean that deception operations require "careful coordination with Public Affairs (PA) operations."(120)FM 100-7, Decisive Force: the Army in Theater Operations, notes that most peace operations usually require little deception beyond normal OPSEC.(121)

Although conducting peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, SFOR policy during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR AND JOINT GUARD disallowed the use of deception operations.(122)SFOR's requirement for the PSYOP and Public Information (PI) campaigns to be mutually reinforcing and complementary prevented the use of deception, which could compete with PI messages in the target audience.(123)While military deception is a legitimate function for peace enforcement operations, the multi-national and inter-agency character of these operations may complicate the deception plan as these elements could be easily confused by deception efforts if not aware of them in advance. Foreign Area Officers, MNF Liaison Officers, and SOF and State Department personnel should be used in the planning phase to ensure the messages sent to potential adversaries are perfectly clear.(124)

Tactical military deception consists of Distortion, Concealment, Manipulation and Falsification of indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities, or dispositions.(125)In a peace operation, the FWFs may view it in their interest to practice deception aimed at either other FWFs or the peace operations force.(126)Military deception is focused on desired behavior, not simply to mislead thinking. The purpose is to cause adversary leaders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage.(127)

Although SFOR policy did not permit deception operations, the METT-T analysis in future operations may lead to the use of deception to enhance force protection and OPSEC. The now obsolete, but not yet replaced, 1988 Battlefield Deception manual categorized deception activities into two types, which are useful here for understanding the basic fundamentals of deception operations: A (for ambiguity deception) and M (for misdirection deception). "A deception increases doubt in the target's mind and lowers the probability of a correct perception by taking from or adding to alternatives. M-deception reduces uncertainty in the target's mind by having him become convinced of a particular falsehood. Either form of deception can be accomplished, incidentally, by telling only the truth."(128)During the Gulf War, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's tactics of emphasizing certain aspects of operations to the media to build a deception story based on true facts is a convincing example of this principle and was a M-deception effort. His emphasis on the amphibious landing rehearsals, for example, convinced the Iraqis that such an operation was likely and caused them to tie up large numbers of men and equipment defending coastal positions.

The Operation DESERT STORM amphibious assault deception provides an example of how a viable branch plan not used can be the foundation of a deception plan.(129)The deception plan is often developed from a viable course of action not chosen during the concept development phase. The deception plan is, therefore, a viable branch that may be pursued if the actual plan is compromised; therefore, at the operational level, the deception plan is as important as the real operation.(130)If deception is used, the deception plan is closely guarded, and this makes coordination difficult, but coordination is essential to ensuring success of the plan.(131)Finally, the deception plan must be developed to ensure a close fit with the collection capabilities of the target for the intended target to receive the deception story.

"Peace operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny..Because reports of peace operations are widely visible to national and international publics, PA is critical in peace operations. News media reports contribute to the legitimacy of an operation and the achievement of political, diplomatic, goals. PA must monitor public perceptions and develop and disseminate clear messages."(132)

The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) is the commander's advisor on media relations, the effects of the media on operations, and the PA implications of current and future operations and events. The PAO manages two information programs for the commander: the public information program and the internal information program, perhaps more familiarly known as the Command Information Program. The public information program is directed at external audiences, while the internal information program is for the force itself. In executing the public information campaign, the PAO "communicates accurate, balanced and credible information to critical leaders and the public to influence their perceptions, understanding and decisions."(133)To be consistently effective, the public information campaign must be perceived as credible and must provide a reliably steady flow of timely, accurate and balanced information.(134)

Commanders use their internal information programs to communicate directly to soldiers and leaders, to explain the mission and their part in it. "Soldiers need and want information from both external and internal sources and are interested in the public perception of an operation."(135)The internal information program (formerly the command information program) is more than a post newspaper or processing hometown news releases; it is a force enhancement tool that provides an outlet for the commander to ensure that the force receives clear guidance and instructions on what is expected from them. The internal information program also helps soldiers to combat the effects of enemy propaganda or misinformation.(136)In executing both the public and internal (command) information campaigns, PA conduct C2-Protect operations in refuting and defeating adversary propaganda, and in providing accurate and timely information on the operation to positively influence domestic, international and local opinion.(137)

PA in peace operations is a means to counter adversary propaganda and to overcome censorship. In peace operations, where one or more of the FWFs may oppose the objectives of the peace operations force, adversaries will exercise censorship and public affairs programs aimed at the local populace, using the media and other neutral players, such as NGOs, as the media to transmit propaganda and disinformation.(138)In MOOTW, adversaries can also be expected to use an old Soviet technique to "plant" disinformation in the local or international media, or with NGOs or PVOs, and then pick up the story to support its propaganda effort after it has been reported, repeating it in the media it controls as a credible message obtained from a third party source.(139)Voids in information supplied to the media by the peace operations force may likely be filled with hostile propaganda or media speculation.(140)By closely monitoring the various media, PA remains ready to defeat enemy propaganda, by whatever media it is disseminated. The purpose of such disinformation propaganda may be directed at weakening the unity of effort of the coalition force, just as the Iraqis attempted a divisive PSYOP campaign aimed at weakening the multi-national coalition force.(141)

The PAO is the link between the media and the military force. On the battlefield, or in MOOTW, the PAO is the facilitator between the media and military operations. In addition to communicating information in the public and command information programs, the PAO leverages his connections to the media to monitor national and international media, identify and assess information relevant to the operation, and provide another information source to the commander.(142)As part of the public affairs media strategy, such conditions will require deliberation with the media to determine the ground rules for the conduct of media on the battlefield and rules for reporting and citing sources. Ensuring the adherence to these ground rules is essential to accomplishing the PA mission.(143)In TFE, the PAO controlled media operations on the ground, specifying the ground rules for reporters, and facilitating their deployment with units in the field to let soldiers tell the Army story.

Missions for the PAO in Peace Operations include:

(10) Scheduling and coordinating media events for the commander.

The PAO must have the capability to monitor the national and international media and identify and assess information relevant to the operation. The media will cover the operation from several perspectives and, in so doing, provide open-source intelligence on the operation that can contribute to RII on the battlespace. In addition, the PAO remains abreast of how the operation is being reported to ensure that domestic public support for the operation is not jeopardized by inaccurate or incomplete reporting. The extremely political nature of peace operations and the open, independent nature of reporting support the principle of making information readily available within the constraints detailed by the source of authority.(146)Command Information publications released to the public can have positive effects on public opinion and support for the troops deployed.

Task Force Eagle PAO formed a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to provide timely information to the media and to track their activities and compliance with Army and DoD PA "ground rules for the media." The JIB maintained a Daily Media On-Hand report that provided the PA staff with an up-to-date status report on media in the AO as well as contact information to allow immediate notification.(147)The JIB was later renamed the Coalition Press Information Center, which reflected the multinational character of TFE. TFE used the CPIC as a platform for IO directed at both the international and local audiences. The CPIC director in TFE was a key figure in developing and implementing effective IO in support of the peace enforcement operation. The crucial mission of the CPIC was to provide assistance and advice to the command group daily on the media aspects of planned and current operations.(148)

To support PA operations in TFE, several Reserve Component (RC) Military Public Affairs Detachments (MPADs) were alerted and deployed to Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD AND JOINT FORGE. The importance in getting PA on the battlefield early can be seen in the fact that the selected callup for RC PA units occurred significantly earlier than for other major RC augmentation for the operation. RC MPADs from 21 states deployed in the first three rotations of RC units to OJE.(149)

Commanders can enhance IO by making PAOs aware
of "newsworthy" events within the command.

Press Conferences as Tools in Information Operations

"C2-Protect includes countering an adversary's propaganda to prevent it from affecting friendly operations, options, public opinion, and the morale of friendly troops."(150) --FM 100-6, Information Operations

TFE used its weekly coalition press conference as an IO platform to refute disinformation and propaganda disseminated by hardliners of the FWFs opposed to the implementation of the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Press conferences comprise a valuable tool to U.S. and Coalition forces in conducting information operations designed to counter adversary propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The press conference forum was the most efficient and effective way for friendly forces to get the word out over the indigenous media to decisionmakers and the local populace.

On June 21, 1997, U.S. soldiers disestablished an illegal checkpoint operated by RS police near the town of Brcko. The UN International Police Task Force Checkpoint policy required all checkpoints to be registered and approved with the IPTF. The policy stated that "unauthorized checkpoints will be removed, with SFOR support, if necessary, (and) ID cards of the police officers involved will be confiscated."(151)The U.S. SFOR soldiers attempted to confiscate ID Cards and weapons of the RS police officers operating the illegal checkpoint. When the police officers resisted, the U.S. patrol exercised appropriate force in subduing the officers and confiscating their ID Cards and weapons.

In a June 23, 1997, letter to the Commander, SFOR, the Interior Minister of Republika Serpska (RS) accused American SFOR soldiers of using excessive force in dismantling an illegal checkpoint. The letter stated that the American SFOR soldiers "in a hostile mood.heavily armed and ready to misuse their weapons," had "jumped on the policemen, tied, searched and beat them, and took away their belongings."(152)Interior Minister, a hardliner in the RS government, deliberately misrepresented the facts and fabricated a false version of events to derail support of SFOR among the RS populace.

In a June 27 Coalition Press Conference, the Director of the MND-N Coalition Press and Information Center used the press conference as a platform from which to "shoot down" disinformation by issuing a statement to the press representatives from all three FWFs. The Director strongly refuted the lies presented as information and presented the truthful account to the gathered media.(153)The denouncement was also released on PSYOP radio programs.

Another example of the press conference being used to counter adversary propaganda and disinformation occurred on July 4, 1997. On July 3, 1997, the official RS radio station controlled by hardliners loyal to indicted war criminal, Radovan Karadzic, aired a report which claimed that SFOR soldiers had been ordered to arrest the former RS President and fellow indicted war criminal, General Ratko Mladic. The report further stated that the arrests would be carried out by July 15, 1997.(154)The report was picked up and disseminated by Reuters News Service.

CPIC Press Conference, July 4, 1997

On the following day, at a regularly scheduled press conference at Tuzla Base, the Director of the Coalition Press and Information Center issued a statement refuting the disinformation and again presenting the truth, explaining that no such order had been made and that SFOR's mandate had not changed in any way. In both cases, SFOR was able to speak to the media representatives of all three warring factions and present the truth. "Discrediting adversary propaganda or misinformation against operations of US/coalition forces is critical to maintaining favorable public opinion."(155)The press conference proved to be a flexible and routine conduit for C2Protection aimed at countering propaganda.

TTP: Press conferences comprise a valuable tool to US and Coalition forces in conducting information operations designed to counter adversary propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The press conference forum is the most efficient and effective way for friendly forces to get the word out over the indigenous media to decision makers and the local populace.

Internal Information Program

The TFE Public Affairs Internal Information Program's primary product were the weekly Command Information Publications, The Talon, and the Tuzla Talk. Each Talon magazine had 12 pages produced on high-quality gloss paper with full-color photographs. The production schedule called for 5,500 copies of the magazine to be published every Friday. Additionally, the magazine was presented as a fully digitized product on a homepage dedicated to the operation - http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/ talon/index.html. The USAREUR Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA) emphasized in his initial planning guidance for OJE that it was important for soldiers to hear news from command information sources rather than speculation in the open press.(156)

Making the command information publication accessible over the Internet allowed families of deployed soldiers to keep up on current events in accordance with USAREUR's OCPA guidance to "keep the soldiers and family members informed," and "tell the troops and families first."(157)A lesson from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was that family support groups (FSGs) needed an information pipeline, which they did not have, for receiving command information from official sources.(158)Posting command information publications on the Internet provided that needed pipeline.

The Talon on-line also provided information to in-bound units and personnel, and provided on-the-ground information to U.S. Forces not in theater. It had a complete archive for retrieval. Articles for the magazine were developed and written by staff members from the magazine. The division PAO was the editor-in-chief and served as the publishing approval authority on behalf of the commanding general of the division. The second internal information publication the DIV PAO produced was the weekly Tuzla Talk newsletter. The Tuzla Talk newsletter was typically a two-page flyer which focused on events at Eagle Base, Guardian Base, and Comanche Base.

Another means of transmitting internal information to the soldiers was via Radio and Television operations run by the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service AFRTS, and Europe-based TV AFN. Broadcast assets from AFN-Europe were used to provide information and entertainment to U.S. and other soldiers and civilians deployed to the theater. The affiliate broadcast to listeners at all locations in Bosnia, Tazar, Hungary, and Zagreb, Croatia. On the same installation as Task Force Eagle headquarters, the radio station was established to provide information and entertainment on a 24-hour basis to U.S. and other soldiers. Although these elements had a mission other than command information, and were not under TFE PAO control, AFRTS radio and AFN both aired "commercials" that were often command information messages. Message breaks were filled with local interest items such as maintenance, safety, and command interest issues.

AFN Broadcaster in Action

One of the important contributions of the PA's internal information program was to provide the daily commander's media guidance. During initial operations in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, media representatives in TFE's area of operations often requested interviews with, or comments from, Task Force Commanders and their spokespersons on recent or rumored/known upcoming operations. To ensure that all levels of command spoke with one voice, the JIB, and its successor, the CPIC, maintained a daily report for the commander which contained "talking points" that included details on force flow, casualties, accidents, missions, FWF compliance, etc.(159)Information from the daily report was compiled on a weekly basis in the Information Operations Weekly Message for Commanders. The messages provided guidance to subordinate commanders via e-mail down to the company-level commander to prepare him for interactions with the media.(160)

The PAO also prepared individuals for interviews, when those interviews were approved by the JIB/CPIC. In one case during OJE, a Florida radio station director contacted the JIB to arrange an on-air interview with the Tuzla Armed Forces Network (AFN) morning radio disc jockey. The JIB passed the request to the AFN DJ ("dee-jay," short for disc jockey) who then contacted the Florida radio station. When the AFN DJ established telephone contact for the on-air interview, the Florida radio personality appeared to be friendly, but when the on-air interview began, the Florida DJ tried to bait and trap the AFN DJ into embarassing the Army by insulting both the AFN DJ and the Army. The JIB had prepared the AFN DJ with the weekly command messages and was able to stick to those messages and then terminate the interview when it became obvious that the Florida DJ had launched an "ambush interview" intended to discredit the DJ and embarrass the Army. This experience reinforced the importance of preparation and coordination tasks between the interviewer and interviewee, which include:

• Establishing what will be discussed during the interview to provide the lane boundaries for the interviewee.
• Developing a list of pre-interview questions to know what the interviewer is looking for.
• Establishing a set of ground rules that include being able to terminate the interview at one's discretion.(161)

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Chapter Three, Operations, Part 3
Chapter Three, Part 5

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