Military

CA performs an important liaison function between the military force and the local civil authorities and IOs, NGOs, and PVOs established in the Area of Operations. CA provides the commander the means to shape his battlespace in regards to these significant actors, and to synchronize their actions with those of the military force.

CA assists the military force in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating, and orchestrating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civilian population, government, and economy in the AO where the activities of the military force and the collection of supporting IOs, NGOs, and PVOs overlap.(162)Civil Affairs personnel ensure that the civil-military functions undertaken are linked to the operational objectives of the military force.(163)Once the military force has created and sustained the necessary pre-conditions for effective civil governance, CA, through its liaison with civil authorities, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs, supports the successful transition from military operations to a self-sustaining peace maintained by those civil organizations and agencies who will remain active long afterwards and who will achieve the ultimate desired end state.(164)

CA build public support for the military force and its objectives, which affects the legitimacy of supporting political institutions and the political underpinnings of the peace operation itself.(165)By building public support for the military force, CA reduces the threat from acts of civil disobedience and civil disturbances, and enhances force protection. CA personnel publicize CA activities to leverage their effects beyond the immediate audience. By exploiting existing local media through press conferences, talk shows, local newspapers, and by leveraging their participation in forums of civilian governmental leaders, CA foster support for, or at the very least, tolerance of, the military force and its mandate.(166)In OJE, OJG and OJF, CA units were tasked to publicize their activities in the local and international press, as well as to provide information to aid the local population in the form of civil information.(167)

In providing civil-military information to the civilian leadership and population, CA personnel must be certain to reinforce the established Information Campaign themes to ensure consistency and unity of effort throughout all axes of the information campaign. Civil Affairs is particularly important to information operations because CA activities involve influencing or controlling indigenous infrastructure and interface with key organizations and individuals.(168)CA, PSYOP, and PA elements are able to use the same communications media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and PSYOP address local populations, while PA personnel address friendly forces and national and international news media. PA, PSYOP, and CA all communicate information to critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of the operation. Planning and execution of the information campaign across the three disciplines "must be synchronized, and the messages they communicate must be truthful and mutually supportive to ensure that credibility is not undermined."(169)A coordinated IO plan incorporating both PA and CA is critical for building legitimacy for host nation, coalition, U.S. and world support - especially in MOOTW.(170)

CA provide a collection means for the commander to collect CCIR through their liaison and interaction with local civil authorities and IOs, NGOs, and PVOs in the AO.(171)In peace operations, the CCIR are often obtained through other-than-the-conventional information-gathering entities. CA information gathering activities in peace operations encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the AO to provide the commander his information requirements in these areas, primarily in the form of HUMINT.(172)In conducting information-gathering activities, however, CA personnel shall avoid appearing to be intelligence agents, or risk degradation of their primary mission.(173)In OJE, OJG and OJF, CA personnel enjoyed greater freedom of movement on the battlefield as they were excepted from the four-vehicle convoy rule and could travel in two-vehicle convoys. This facilitated their ability to both gather and disseminate information.

CA DST Commander meets with a local Bosnian official.

Civil-Military Information Supports Information Campaign

Civil Affairs in peace operations include civil-military information programs designed to inform the local populace about on-going military operations to secure their acquiescence and non-interference. An example of such an operation was the mine-awareness puppet show presented to Bosnian children in Multi-National Division-North AO. TFE CA produced a puppet show that was shown to children throughout BiH. The Coalition Press Information Center provided publicity. The CA unit supporting TFE used volunteer soldiers to present the puppet show with the assistance of interpreters.(174)The puppet shows were given to local school children in groups as large as 100. The puppets represented people of different color and ethnic backgrounds. Themes focused on people of diversity living in peace and harmony. The puppet show was very popular with the children who seemed to understand and accept the moral lessons the show presented. An additional benefit was that the puppet show provided the opportunity for CA personnel to meet and talk to mayors and other local leaders, who otherwise would have been inaccessible.(175)

Another example of Civil-Military Information Operations supporting IO is found in the spin-off effects of the routine liaison with local civilian officials. Civil Affairs Direct Support Team (DST) Commanders routinely establish liaison with the leaders of the civilian communities in the unit's area of operations. These CA DST Commanders are presented with opportunities to address influencers and leaders of the community at official functions, and, in so doing, can reinforce Information Operations Campaign Themes. Current Information Operations doctrine recognizes that CA personnel provide valuable information and intelligence by performing "liaison with key actors and influencers (and) with NGOs, PVOs, and civil authorities."(176)Doctrine further states, that "the nature of CA activities and the need for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace puts them in a favorable position to gather information."(177)However, not addressed is the ability of CA personnel to support the Information Operations Campaign Themes.(178)

The CA officer is the point of contact for civil-military cooperation between the friendly force and the local communities. After a period of successful interaction with local leaders, the CA officer is likely to be treated as an honored guest as the official representative of the U.S. or Coalition force and will likely be invited to attend official functions and community activities. It is on these occasions where the CA officer may be called upon to say a few words on behalf of the U.S. or Coalition force.

In July 1997, a CA DST Commander who regularly worked with the mayor of the town outside the base camp was invited to attend the dedication of a memorial in the town square. Being the senior representative of SFOR on the scene, he was asked to say a few words on what was a very solemn and very significant event for the people of the town. Local media were on hand to capture the event, and, potentially, to broadcast or print the remarks of the DST Commander throughout the region. Being knowledgeable of the SFOR Information Campaign themes, the DST Commander was able to confidently give a short speech which both reinforced the IO Campaign Themes and strengthened the working relationship between SFOR and the community.

Civil Affairs DST Commanders routinely liaison and interact with local officials while conducting civil-military cooperation. In the course of those duties, DST commanders may be called upon to speak on behalf of the U.S. or Coalition force to an audience of community influencers and leaders, or to an assembly of the community's citizens. The remarks made at such occasions will either re-enforce or degrade the objectives of the IO Campaign. Therefore, CA DST Commanders must be thoroughly familiar with Information Operations Campaign Themes to reinforce those themes when interacting with local communities.

1. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Command and Control Warfare, Joint Publication 3-13.1, (Washington, DC, USGPO), 7 February 1996, p. J-5. The term "co-opt" means to appropriate as one's own.

2. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report - Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR - Task Force Eagle Initial Operations, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), May 1996, p. 61.

3. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Operations, TRADOC PAM 525-5, Fort Monroe, VA, 1 August 1994, Chapter 3.

4. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-0.

5. Ibid., p. 4-3.

6. CJCS, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, Joint Publication 3-13.1, op. cit., p. v.

7. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Field Manual 34-1, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 27 September 1994, p. 7-4.

8. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Warfare - A Strategy for Peace...The Decisive Edge in War, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 1996, p. 13.

9. CJCS,Command and Control Warfare, Joint Publication 3-13.1, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 7 February 1996, p. v.

10. CJCS, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, op. cit., p. J-5.

11. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Battlefield Deception, Field Manual 90-2, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 3 October 1988., p. 2-1. Although this manual is now obsolete, there is no follow-on Deception Manual yet published. Deception will be covered in the next edition of Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations.

12. Maj. Gen. David L. Grange, U.S. Army, and Col. James A. Kelley, U.S.Army, "Information Operations for the Ground Commander," op. cit., p. 9.

13. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), (Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, p. 3-6.

14. See Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," Military Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 5, September-October 1996, p. 57.

15. See Jeffrey P. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 8, Summer 1995, p. 31.

16. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 40.

17. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, p. 3-28.

18. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 10 July 1996, p. V-2.

19. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, pp. 1-3 and 3-9.

20. Ibid, p. 3-25

21. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 10 July 1996, p. II-5.

22. Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," Military Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 5, September-October 1996, p. 60.

23. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, op. cit., p. IV-4.

24. Ibid., p. IV-7.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. V-1.

27. Larry K. Wentz, National Defense University, CCRP, Information Operations: The IFOR Experience, National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, p. 18, downloaded 19 January 1999 from http://www.dodcrp.org/bo_infoop1.html.

28. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), (Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, p. 1-2.

29. William B. Buchanan, U.S. European Command Support of Operation JOINT GUARD (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis), IDA Paper P-3389, 1998, p. III-25.

30. Pascale Combelles Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, (Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, p. 99.

31. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, p. 1-3.

32. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 10 July 1996, p. I-8.

33. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, op. cit., p. II-4. See also Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Concept for Information Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 1 August 1995, p. 16.

34. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), (Washington, DC: USGPO), 18 February 1993, p. 3-9.

35. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 27 August 1996, p. 5-5.

36. Ibid, p. 3-7.

37. Ibid, p. 3-5.

38. In those areas occupied by the Bosnian Serbs, IFOR soldiers were the targets of an information campaign that was already in full operation when the IFOR troops arrived. According to Mr. Larry Wentz, ".the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) was at a disadvantage at the outset because it had to compete immediately with an already established and effective campaign that could get inside of the IFOR decision loop and outmaneuver some of the initial IFOR efforts." Larry K. Wentz, ed., Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, (Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, p. 65.

39. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT2, Initial Impressions Report - Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR - Continuing Operations, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), September 1996, p. 80.

40. See Deede Doke, "Radio Team Broadcasts Message of Peace," Stars and Stripes, Vol. 56, No. 89, 15 July 1997, p. 17.

41. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 10 July 1996, p. III-6.

42. Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," Military Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 5, September-October 1996, p. 61.

43. Associated Press, "Planes Sent to Silence Serb Rhetoric," The Kansas City Star, 12 September 1997, p. A-5.

44. Jeffrey P. Jones, and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1995, No. 8, pp. 28-33. See also Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3-53, (Washington, DC: USGPO), July 1993, p. A-2.

45. See Tracy Wilkinson, "Trying to Extract War From Journalism," The Los Angeles Times, Sunday, October 26, 1997, p. 12A. One PSYOP officer remarked that since most Bosnians had little knowledge of Anglo-American politicians and philosophers from history, the leaflet would have been more effective if relevant quotations from more well-known regional figures had been used.

46. William B. Buchanan, U.S. European Command Support of Operation JOINT GUARD (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis), IDA Paper P-3389, 1998, p. A-4.

47. Ibid.

48. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT XI Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), April 1998, p. 6.

49. This section was originally published as CALLCOMS Observation 10008-93025 in B/H CAAT IX Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), op. cit., March 1998, pp. A-99 to A-101.

50. One of the first challenges to the PSYOP mission was gaining access to the most reliable and capable print facility for publishing a high-quality product. The PSYOP forces from home station assumed that they would have access to the best machinery at the Rodelheim Print Plant. Unfortunately, when a real-world mission emerged, they discovered that the only printers they could access were antiquated Heidelberg Presses, which could print neither high quantity nor quality. Speed and an attractive appearance were viewed as essential to mission success. By January 1996, when the third edition of the HOP was published, the CJICTF contracted with a publishing company in Zagreb, Croatia. This contract lasted for three months. The quality and speed of production at this facility greatly enhanced the CJICTF's ability to disseminate their messages. For political and economic reasons, the CJICTF deployed a Modular Print System (MPS) to Sarajevo. This system produced several editions of the Herald of Peace and innumerable posters and handbills. The final editions of the paper were published by OKO Printers, as were the initial editions of the Herald of Progress.

51. The CJICTF decided to produce articles in both Latinic and Cyrillic. One half of the periodical was in one alphabet, the other half in the other. They were essentially and technically two different papers in one. One half of the paper was for Bosniacs and Croats, while the other side was for Serbs. This format allowed only eight pages of information in a 16-page periodical.

52. The driving force for having products printed in Bosnia was the initiative, consistent with PSYOP doctrine and U.S. protocols, to patronize local economies through contracting with local companies. The inclusion to this program of a protocol with a publishing company in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska (RS) spread money to a Serb company. This reinforced SFOR's directive to be even-handed and having the collateral benefit of circumventing inactivity by some elements in SFOR in disseminating products by having the publisher distribute copies to kiosks in the RS.

53. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Concept for Information Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, (Fort Monroe, VA), 1 August 1995, p. 9.

54. Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, DC: USGPO), January 1994, p. 244.

55. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-5.

56. Struble, Dan, Lt. Cdr., USNR, "What Is Command and Control Warfare?" Naval War College Review, Summer 1995, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, p. 91.

57. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-5.

58. See Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Initial Impressions, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), May 1996, p. 61.

59. Larry K. Wentz, ed., Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, (Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, p. 23.

60. Lawrence E. Caspar, Irving L. Halter, Earl W. Powers, Paul J. Selva, Thomas W. Steffens, and T. Lamar Willis, "Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, No. 13, p. 85.

61. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 30 December 1994, p. 17.

62. Associated Press, "NATO Pulls Plug on Serb Telecast," The Kansas City Star, October 19, 1997, p. A14.

63. Pascale Combelles Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, (Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, pp. 160 and 161.

64. See Tracy Wilkinson, "Trying to Extract War from Journalism," Los Angeles Times, Sunday, October 26, 1997, p. 12A.

65. See Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT Elections, Initial Impressions Report (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), March 1998, p. 83.

66. Larry K. Wentz, IFOR C 4ISR Experiences, a report prepared for the National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, p. 5. See the CCRP Website at http://www.dodccrp.org/bosnia.htm#REPORTS/BRIEFINGS.

67. Philip Shenon, "U.S. and Allies Plan to Curb Bosnian Propaganda," The New York Times, 24 April 1998.

68. William B. Buchanan, U.S. European Command Support of Operation JOINT GUARD (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis), IDA Paper P-3389, 1998, p. IV-15.

69. Dennis Steele, "Hill 562: Boots in the Mud," Army, Vol. 48, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 39-41.

70. See SGT Jerry Parisellad, "Broadcasts of Violence Stop with SFOR Help," 362d Military Public Affairs Detachment, Task Force Eagle Talon, Vol. 3, No. 40, October 10, 1997, Eagle Base, Tuzla, Bosnia.

71. Dennis Steele, op. cit. p. 41.

72. Press Release, Multi-National Division-North, Coalition Press Information Center, Operation JOINT GUARD, Release No. 0828-3, p. 1.

73. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, Tuzla Night Owl, Vol. 2, Issue 241, August 29, 1997, Eagle Base, Bosnia, p. 1.

74. See Jerry Merideth, "They Got Me Good, GI Relates," The Stars and Stripes, Vol. 56, No. 134, August 29, 1997, pp. 1 and 4.

75. SGT Mark Schulz and PFC Todd Edwards, 372d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, "Rioters: Soldiers React to Civil Unrest," Talon, Vol. 3, No. 36, 05 September 1998.

76. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 2-4, emphasis added.

77. Ibid. p. 3-5. Physical destruction is defined as "The application of combat power to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and installations," (emphasis added).

78. MND-N, CPIC, OJG, Press Release No. 0828-5, Eagle Base, Bosnia, 28 August 1997.

79. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. For information on MOUT, see Field Manual 90-10-1, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 12 May 1993, and Field Manual 90-10, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 15 August 1979.

80. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, Field Manual 34-1, op. cit., p. 2-21.

81. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Division Operations, Field Manual 71-100 (Washington, DC: USPO), 28 August 1996, p. 2-13. See also Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Warfare - A Strategy for Peace....The Decisive Edge in War, op. cit., p. 13.

82. William W. McCollum, "The Role of the Intelligence Community in Preparing to Win the Information War," a strategy research report submitted to the faculty of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 10 April 1997, pp. 12-13.

83. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Concept for Information Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69, op. cit., p. 9.

84. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, op. cit., p. 8-3.

85. William B. Buchanan, U.S. European Command Support of Operation JOINT GUARD (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997), (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis), IDA Paper P-3389, 1998, p. A-8

86. Headquarters USAREUR, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, USAREUR Headquarters After-Action Report, May 1997, pp. 75 and 88.

87. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, 30 December 1994, op. cit., p. 39.

88. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS), Field Manual 34-10-1, 18 June 1991, does not specifically address employment of REMBASS or Improved-REMBASS (I-REMBASS) in a peace operations environment.

89. Martin C. Libicki, "DBK and Its Consequences," in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, Eds., (The Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press), revised edition, April 1996, pp. 40-41.

90. Headquarters, USAREUR, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, USAREUR Headquarters After-Action Report, op. cit., p. 198.

91. Ibid.

92. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, Washington, DC, 24 January 1997, p. 1-1.

93. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998, p. II-4.

94. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Division Operations, Field Manual 71-100, June 1990, p. 3-14. The 1996 version is not as specific, but the process outlined on page 30 is consistent with that in Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Staff Organization and Operations, Field Manual 101-5, p. 4-13.

95. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, op. cit., p. 8-3.

96. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, op. cit., p. vi.

97. Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, National Operations Security Doctrine, (Greenbelt, MD: USGPO), January 1993, p. 2.

98. The operating concept of transparency in peace operations, and its relationship to security is addressed in Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994), p. 17.

99. Gary E. Phillips, Col., U.S. Army, Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping, a monograph submitted to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth KS, 22 May 1998, p. 40.

100. Headquarters, TRADOC, The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, Coordinating Draft, 24 December 1991, p. 5-5. Oddly, the specific linkage between OPSEC and PA is not mentioned in the 1995 manual.

101. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 36.

102. CJCS, Command and Control Warfare, Joint Pub 3-13.1, op. cit., p. II-2.

103. Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 97-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, January 1997, p. 46.

104. Kenneth Allard, "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment," Chapter X in Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Larry K. Wentz, ed. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 1998), p. 268.

105. Brian E. Fredericks, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Warfare at the Crossroads," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, No. 16, p. 101.

106. Gary E. Phillips, Col., U.S. Army, Information Operations - A New Tool for Peacekeeping, a monograph submitted to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 1997, p. 41. See also Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, op. cit., p. 36.

107. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 36.

108. Ibid. Army Force Protection policies are explained in AR 525-13, Force Protection. The pillars of force protection listed in the Army regulation are: OPSEC, Personal Security, Law Enforcement, and Counter-Terrorism/Anti-Terrorism programs.

109. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, Fort Monroe, VA, 28 February 1995, p. 55.

110. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998, pp. III-3 and III-4.

111. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, Field Manual 100-25, Washington, DC: USGPO (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), 12 December 1991, p. 13-5.

112. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 34-60, Counterintelligence, Washington, DC, 3 October 1995, Chapter 4.

113. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998, p. III-7.

114. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT IX Initial Impressions Report, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, April 1998, p. A-17.

115. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Battlefield Deception, Field Manual 90-2, op. cit., p. 1-33.

116. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Army Regulation 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC), (Washington, DC: USGPO, Unclassified, Distribution Limited), March 1995.

117. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Battlefield Deception, Field Manual 90-2, op. cit., p. 1-0.

118. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 37.

119. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Decisive Force, The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, op. cit., 31 May 1995, p. 8-13.

120. Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Draft Air Force Operational Doctrine Manual, Information Operations, AFDD 2-5, December 1997, p. 11 (the 5 August 1998 edition does not specifically mention PA and merely directs commanders to coordinate deception operations with "their senior commander," p. 14). See also, HQ TRADOC, The Army in Theater Operations, 24 December 1991, Coordinating Draft of FM 100-7, which makes this association on p. 5-5. See also, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, Joint Publication 3-58, Washington, DC, 31 May 1996, pp. v and I-4, which discuss the necessary coordination and relationship between PA and military deception.

121. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, op. cit., p. 8-3.

122. Larry K. Wentz, Information Operations: The IFOR Experience, op. cit., p. 11.

123. Pascale Combelles Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University (Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, p. 117.

124. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8, op. cit., p. 3-15.

125. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Battlefield Deception, Field Manual 90-2, op. cit., p. 1-2.

126. HQDA, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20 (Washington, DC: USGPO), 5 December 1990, p. 4-7.

127. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, op. cit., p. II-4.

128. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Battlefield Deception, Field Manual 90-2, op. cit., p. 1-9.

129. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War (Boston: Little Brown and Company), 1991, p. 294.

130. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7, pp. 7-22 and 3-8.

131. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Corps Operations, Field Manual 100-15, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 13 September 1989, p. 4-25.

132. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 47.

133. HQ, TRADOC, Information Operations Division, Brochure, Information Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 22 January 1997, p. 7.

134. Brian E. Fredericks, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Warfare at the Crossroads," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, No. 16, pp. 97-103.

135. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-14.

136. Dennis M. Murphy, Lt. Col., U.S. Army, "Information Operations on the Nontraditional Battlefield," Military Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 6, November-December 1996, p. 9.

137. While PA operations which provide news and information are proactive and, therefore, offensive in nature, C2-Protect can be offensive or defensive, see Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-9.

138. Erin Gallogly-Staver, Maj., U.S. Army, and Raymond S. Hilliard, Maj., U.S. Army, "Information Warfare: Opposing Force (OPFOR) Doctrine -- An Integrated Approach," News from the Front!, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September-October 1997, p. 15.

139. Ronald T. Sconyers, Col., U.S. Air Force, "The Information War," Military Review, Vol. LXIX, No. 2, February 1989, p. 48.

140. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 48.

141. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), op. cit., p. 2-2.

142. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-14.

143. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, op. cit., p. 48.

144. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Concept for Information Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC), 1 August 1995, p. 14.

145. For an overview of PA missions, see Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., Figure 3-5, and Coordination and Support tasks on page 3-15.

146. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 48.

147. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report - Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR - Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), September 1996, p. 33.

148. Allard, Kenneth, "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment," Chapter X in Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Larry K. Wentz, ed. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 1998), p. 268.

149. Headquarters, USAREUR, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR After-Action Report, May 1997, pp. 239-240.

150. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 2-5.

151. United Nations International Police Task Force, Office of the Commisioner, Policy of Local Police Checkpoints, May 1997.

152. See Srecko Latal, "Serbian Official Alleges Brutality by U.S. Soldiers," Stars and Stripes, Vol. 56, No. 71, 27 June 1997, pp. 1 & 4.

153. See Chuck Roberts, "Colonel Denounces Serbian Claims," Stars and Stripes, Vol. 56, No. 72, 28 June 1997, pp. 1 & 2.

154. Armed Forces Press Report issued 031445 GMT by HQ SFOR, Sarajevo, Bosnia.

155. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit. p. 3-4.

156. Headquarters, USAREUR, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, USAREUR Headquarters After-Action Report, op. cit., p. 245.

157. Ibid., pp. 237 and 241.

158. Center for Army Lessons Learned, In the Spotlight, Media and the Tactical Commander, Newsletter No. 92-7, December 1992, p. 3.

159. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT 2 Initial Impressions Report - Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR - Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), September 1996, p. 33.

160. Ibid., p. C-65, CALLCOMS observation number 10000-85613.

161. Ibid., p. C-64, CALLCOMS observation number 10001-58746.

162. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8, op. cit., p. 2-19.

163. For a description of the civil-military operations associated with CA and PSYOP in MOOTW, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20, (Washington, DC: USGPO), 05 December 1990, p. 2-22.

164. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 31.

165. Pamela Brady, "Joint Endeavor - The Role of Civil Affairs," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, p. 47.

166. Bruce Castka, "The National Support Element in Hungary," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, pp. 48-49. See also, Michael D. Starry, Col., U.S. Army, and Charles W. Anderson Jr., Lt. Col., U.S. Army, "Field Manual 100-6: Information Operations," Military Review, November-December 1996, Vol. LXXVI, No. 6, p. 8.

167. Pascale Combelles Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations, Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University (Washington, DC: NDU Press), 1998, p. 107.

168. Brian E. Fredericks, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Warfare at the Crossroads," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, No. 16, p. 102.

169. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., pp. 3-12 and 3-14.

170. David L. Grange, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army, and James A. Kelley, Col., U.S. Army, "Information Operations for the Ground Commander," Military Review, op. cit., p. 8. See also, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, op. cit., p. 18.

171. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-0.

172. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, Field Manual 41-10 (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Washington, DC: USGPO), 11 January 1993, pp. 6-2 and 6-3.

173. Ibid., p. 6-2.

174. Multi-National Division-North, Coalition Press Information Center, Press Release Number: 0827-1 Date: 27 August 1997.

175. Center for Army Lessons Learned, B/H CAAT XI, Initial Impressions Report (Unclassified, Distribution Limited, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), April 1998, p. 12, CALLCOMS observation 10000-08008.

176. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6, op. cit., p. 3-0.

177. Ibid, p. 3-12.

178. Except for one sentence in the Civil Affairs section of Chapter 3 of Field Manual 100-6, "CA.personnel provide news and information to the local populace on the effects of combat operations," CA support to Information Operations Campaign Themes is not covered. See Field Manual 100-6, op. cit. p. 3-12.

Chapter Three, Operations, Part 4

Chapter Four, Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII)