SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS (TA.7) (cont)
TREND 3
SUBJECT: Materiel Readiness
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) frequently get directly involved with recovery operations rather than remaining the command and control node for all maintenance operations within the task force (TF). (TA.7.3.2.2)
DISCUSSION: None.
OBSERVATION 2: Reporting of non-mission capable (NMC) vehicle status within the task force (TF) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. There is inadequate communication between company maintenance team chiefs and the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).
2. There is seldom an established system or SOP to track vehicle damage during the battle and enforcement of the repair timeline for evacuation to the field trains.
3. The lack of adequate communications and tracking SOPs result in confusion on the status and location of non-mission capable (NMC) vehicles, which slows recovery and repair time.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1. CSS units consistently experience problems with their maintenance information flow. (TA.7.3.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. An inadequate flow of DA Form 2404/5988E from the company/teams to the UMCP often causes a serious breakdown in the maintenance system.
2. ULLS clerks have no daily tracking system.
3. Company/team level maintenance mechanics rarely verify deficiencies.
4. Inaccurate reports are provided to the task force commander.
OBSERVATION 2. A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable (NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems. (TA.7.3.2.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Units often arrive at the NTC thinking their systems are fully mission capable (FMC), and are surprised when their system is deadlined due to improper conduct of -10 PMCS.
2. Units are often using the wrong PMCS -10 manual and have no change updates; they claim they are unable to get the manual or did not know there was a change published.
3. Units do not know what seemingly minor mechanical faults will deadline their key weapons systems.
4. Most leaders do not take the time to understand the specific mechanical requirements of the VOLCANO and MICLIC warfighting systems, and the proper conduct of -10 PMCS is not enforced to standard during Home Station training.
for Materiel Readiness
RECOVERY MISSIONS:
1. The BMO can move forward with the forward recovery assets, but should not become decisively engaged with recovery operations.
2. The BMO must establish a good recovery plan during the planning process, ensure that his recovery assets are briefed on the plan, and attend the TF CSS rehearsal prior to the mission.
NON-MISSION CAPABLE (NMC) VEHICLE STATUS REPORTING:
Each TF must establish a reporting system to track vehicles damaged during the battle (see CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-20, Battalion/TF Logistics).
DA FORM 2404/5988E TRACKING:
1. Develop a daily tracking system for the ULLS clerks.
2. Promote leadership emphasis at the company/team level.
3. Make sure the mechanics verify all deficiencies at the company/team level.
4. The team chief must ensure that all parts on the DA Form 2404/5988E are looked up prior to submitting the paperwork to the ULLS clerk.
5. Refer to the article "Redesigning PMCS to Build Combat Power," page 28 of CTC Quarterly Bulletin, No. 97-18, 4th Qtr FY 97.
ENGINEER UNIT PMCS:
1. The majority of these problems would be solved if leaders would enforce the standard of "by the book" PMCS for their weapons systems.
2.Most units know 6 to 12 months out they will be coming to the NTC. They should establish maintenance "hot pits" that focus on the proper analysis of the -10 for the VOLCANO system, to include the prime mover (HEMTT/M548) and the MICLIC system. Ensure the operator conducts the proper PMCS and then verify it through company/battalion hot pit programs.
3. The battalion must have an aggressive publications program that keeps up with the latest publications and their changes. The establishment of a GTA card that focuses on specific VOLCANO/MICLIC maintenance checks may be one approach or revitalizing the technical manuals with all the latest changes may be the other solution.
TREND 4
SUBJECT: Medical Support Planning and Execution
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Leaders lack an understanding of how to conduct company/team level health service support (HSS). (TA.7.4.4)
DISCUSSION:
1. Medical assets are not effectively positioned or utilized from company/team through task force levels. This results in a high died-of-wounds (DOW) rate due to lack of timely medical treatment while awaiting evacuation.
2. Company teams seldom use their M113 ambulances to evacuate casualties to battalion aid station (BAS) treatment teams for fear of leaving the unit without medics. Instead, company/ team first sergeants request BAS ambulances to come forward to evacuate patients from their casualty collection point (CCP). As a result, medical platoons tie up their ambulance squads evacuating casualties from the company team CCPs.
OBSERVATION 2: Combat health support (CHS) is not being integrated early enough in the planning process and is not being planned by the right people. (TA.7.4.4)
DISCUSSION: None.
OBSERVATION 3: Units typically do not have a method to integrate the medical plan into the CSS plan and the maneuver plan. (TA.4.4.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. The medical platoon does not know the plan until the CSS rehearsal.
2. Troop-leading procedures (TLP) are not conducted and adjacent unit coordination is not completed prior to the CSS rehearsal.
3. Questions brought up at the CSS rehearsal are not answered.
4. When the battle starts, needed information is not properly disseminated to the unit.
for Medical Support Planning and Execution
ALLOCATION OF MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL:
1. Evacuate casualties from the point of injury or platoon CCP to the company/team CCP by using damaged combat vehicles (FM 7-7J, page 2-192) or the 1SG's and maintenance team's M113s before using the combat medic section's M113. The platoon's combat lifesaver can perform triage at the platoon CCP to set a priority for casualties to be evacuated as well as the platform needed.
2. The senior medic manages the company team CCP. If there is a shortage of medics, this triage point is the priority for manning; this allows trained medical personnel to treat patients and other personnel to transport/evacuate.
3. Prepare and utilize the commander and 1SG's HMMWVs as non-standard casualty evacuation platforms to move patients to the BAS or treatment team (see FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for diagrams on how to rig the vehicles).
PLANNING FOR CHS:
1. To be effective, CHS specifics (locations, times, and composition of BDE assets) should be included in the brigade OPORD so that it gets down to maneuver first sergeants via TF S4s.
2. The brigade medical planners, the brigade S1, and the medical company commander (or his designated representative) must standardize taskings to subordinate units, composition of medical assets, lines of communication, and on-hand Class VIII supplies throughout the depth of the battlefield by type of battle. This standardized information should become part of the brigade tactical SOP (TASCOP).
3. The brigade medical planners must begin planning after receipt of the initial warning order and go forward with an initial plan to the brigade planning process. The brigade order should include specific information such as locations (grids) of planned ambulance exchange points (AXPs) and times they will be active.
INTEGRATION OF THE MEDICAL PLATOON INTO THE PLANNING PROCESS:
1. The S4 should develop an SOP for dissemination of information during the planning process. Include a process for receiving input from all CSS operators to synchronize the CSS plan.
2. Develop and disseminate information early to permit CSS operators to conduct adjacent unit coordination and have answers to all questions at the CSS rehearsal.
3. When the CSS battle is rehearsed, all participants at the CSS rehearsal must leave with a true understanding of how all aspects of the CSS battle will flow.
TREND 5
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)
| Observation frequency: | 1-2QFY96 | 3-4QFY96 | 1-2QFY97 | 3-4QFY97 | 1-2QFY98 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
3-4QFY97
OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) seldom have an adequate CASEVAC or maintenance evacuation plan for scout platoons. (TA.7.4.4.2)
DISCUSSION: Scouts must often rely on platoon assets which are unsuitable and which degrade reconnaissance capabilities to conduct MEDEVAC and maintenance evacuation on the battlefield. As a result, the scout platoon is slow to fully regenerate personnel and vehicles and is unable to conduct further reconnaissance, surveillance, or security missions.
1-2QFY98
OBSERVATION 1: Casualty reporting and tracking within the combat engineer battalion administrative and logistics command post (ALOC) is not to standard. (TA.7.4.4.2)
DISCUSSION:
1. Recently, engineer battalion ALOCs have not used tracking methods that maintain detailed and accurate accountability of casualties on the battlefield.
2. Units have relied solely on FM radio casualty reports that lack the detail necessary for PAC personnel to generate required feeder reports and awards. Reports usually include little more than battle roster numbers.
3. Engineer units, which usually rely on supported unit assets to evacuate casualties, often send formal feeder reports only through those supported unit channels, bypassing engineer channels altogether.
OBSERVATION 2: A Casualty Feeder Report (DA Form 1156) is not being filled out and collected for each casualty assessed on the simulated battlefield. (TA.4.1.3.1)
DISCUSSION:
1. Units use non-doctrinal methods of collection, usually at the battalion aid station, instead of using the chain of command.
2. Soldiers and leaders do not know what DA Form 1156 is, what it does, or how to properly fill it out.
3. Responsibility is not clearly assigned to someone to ensure that 100 percent of DA Forms 1156 are collected, or the person with the responsibility is not in a position to accurately or effectively execute that responsibility.
4. Soldiers do not have the form available to fill out.
5. The results of improperly completing, verifying, or submitting DA Form 1156 are:
for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)
SCOUT PLATOON MAINTENANCE AND CASEVAC: Task forces (TFs) should assign responsibility (as a sub-unit task) to the closest company/team for the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and maintenance evacuation of the scouts. The TF should consider providing additional assets to the company/team for this medical and maintenance coverage.
CASUALTY REPORTING AND TRACKING:
1. Units should accurately track casualties by event and type as well as by individual.
2. Units must receive formal Casualty Feeder Reports/Witness Reports as well as the initial FM radio report. Initial reports need to include the details necessary to allow ALOC personnel to track casualty by type (i.e., return to duty, litter, or killed) and by incident. Brief but detailed information in initial casualty reports provides a tool by which ALOC personnel can better track losses, generate reports and awards in a timely manner, and provide immediate analysis and feedback to the commander. A suggested method is shown below.
- Battle roster number.
- Type of casualty (RTD, WIA, KIA, non-battle).
- Location.
- Date-time.
- A quick event description so that personnel losses are tied to specific actions or equipment losses on the battlefield.
CASUALTY FEEDER REPORTS:
1. Use the chain of command to fill out, collect, verify, and pass on DA Form 1156. This begins at the team leader/tank commander level.
2. Assign somebody in the company with the primary responsibility (i.e., 1SG, XO, or commander) to ensure that 100 percent accountability is achieved and that the form is completed accurately.
3. Conduct training in the use of DA Form 1156 at NCODP/SGT's time, and use the form when conducting force-on-force field operations.
4. Ensure that an adequate supply of forms is available. Each soldier should carry a form filled out with his information along with two blank forms to use for other casualties.
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Combat Service Support BOS, Part 1
Section
IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS
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