SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS (TA.7)
SUBJECT: Supply Management
OBSERVATION 1: Units do not adequately report and track Class III and V supplies. (TA.7.5.2)
DISCUSSION: The field trains command post (FTCP) generally does not receive accurate logistical status from the company/teams and separate platoons in the task force (TF). This impacts the field trains' ability to replenish personnel and combat systems and forecast Class III and V requirements.
OBSERVATION 2: Task forces have difficulty planning and distributing Class IV and V materials to engineer units for defensive operations. (TA.7.5.2)
OBSERVATION 1: Units have difficulty tracking task force (TF) key classes of supply within the CTCP or FTCP. (TA.7.5.2)
1. Units do not know how much fuel and ammunition are in the field trains, combat trains, or the company/teams.
2. Daily logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports are bypassing key people in the task force CSS team. Either they go straight to the field trains without the S4 knowing what is on them, or they go to the CTCP and then are either late to the field trains or do no go there at all.
3.Supply crises arise without warning and require immediate resolution by the unit S4.
4. Supplies cannot be predicted, which forces the S4 to make decisions regarding the allocation, forecasting, and cross-leveling of scarce supplies without accurate information on which to base this decision.
OBSERVATION 2: Units too often deploy with no developed or published unit basic loads (UBLs). (TA.7.5.2)
1. The battalion is not aware of what they need and have not divided the required classes of supply into battery amounts.
2. The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP so batteries cannot properly develop their load plans.
3. Distribution plans are not developed, resulting in the unit's inability to identify what host nation support they may need.
OBSERVATION 3: Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify rearm, refuel, resupply, and survey point (R3SP) requirements but often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan. (TA.7.5.2)
1. There is a lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process, causing poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.
2. The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance, which impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.
3. There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger. The R3SP often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.
5. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.
6. There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC, causing delays and confusion during the operation.
for Supply Management
CLASS III AND V REPORTING AND TRACKING:
1. Put into place a redundant system to receive accurate logistics status from TF subordinate units.
2. Key FTCP personnel (S1 and S4 NCOIC) must use this status to replenish personnel and combat systems.
ENGINEER CLASS IV AND V MATERIALS:
1. Per FM 5-10, Combat Engineer Platoon, there are two types of Class IV and V loads: mission and basic.
2. Class IV and V resupply for the defense is one of the most demanding logistic operations the task force (TF) must carry out and requires all the assets that can be made available. A total cooperative effort by the TF, including engineers, is required if the defense is to be adequately resourced.
3. Units must exercise and wargame Class IV and V supply and distribution at Home Station. Develop and refine SOPs for resupply operations before deploying to the NTC.
4. Palletized standard loads (combat configured loads [CCLs]) and use of the palletized loading system family of vehicles help solve the planning and distribution problems commonly seen at the NTC.
TRACKING TASK FORCE SUPPLY STATUS: A good track of the supply status allows good decisions and enables the resupply effort to be more responsive and timely for the unit's needs.
1. Develop a system of charts that easily and accurately displays the logistics status of the unit.
2. Ensure that the LOGSTAT report includes a column for on-hand as well as requested quantities of supplies.
3. Determine standard times or events that cause the CTCP and FTCP to share logistics information.
4. Ensure that unit LOGSTAT reports go to the CTCP as well as to the FTCP. (Method: Turn in two copies at LOGPAC pickup. The S4 or his representative makes notes on and approves the requests. He takes a copy with him to the CTCP, and the support platoon leader or some other field trains person takes a copy to the FTCP.)
FA UNIT BASIC LOADS (UBLs):
1. Refer to historical data, supply usage requirements, operations logistics planner software, FORSCOM Reg 700-3, FM 101-10-1/2, FM 8-10-5, and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs.
2. Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply, and pertinent information should be included in the unit TACSOP.
3. Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply.
4. Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing supplies.
FA BATTALION R3SP OPERATIONS:
1. The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. The most efficient method, however, is to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.
2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.
3. The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.
4. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.
5. The S4, considering battery ammunition status, remaining mission requirements (estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who, in-turn, begins configuring ammunition.
6. The ammunition platoon sergeant (PSG) configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.
7. Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used. If they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced immediately.
8. Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.
9. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.
10. The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, communications checks, and establishment of the R3SP prior to units arriving.
11. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.
12. The reconnaissance survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.
13. The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.
14. Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, timelines, a pre-R3SP advance-party link-up checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.
SUBJECT: Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration
OBSERVATION 1: Task force CSS elements frequently make no effort to conduct a formal or informal logistics, casualty, or personnel estimate. (TA.4.2.2)
1.CSS units are unable to identify key logistical shortcomings and tactical resupply requirements or consider how to resolve these shortcomings.
2. Units conduct the planning process with no consideration of the current maintenance posture or projected combat power in the next 6, 12, or 24 hours. They then enter the COA development and wargaming process with a distorted view of potential combat power.
3. Unit casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners do not balance anticipated casualties against their available evacuation resources, and do not estimate casualty densities or identify likely casualty zones. As a result, shortcomings in CASEVAC capabilities are not identified.
4. Requirements for, positioning of, and command and control requirements for nonstandard medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets are not identified, resulting in soldiers who could otherwise have been saved becoming DOW casualties.
OBSERVATION 2: Maintenance planning at the task force (TF) level is poor. (TA.4.3)
1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is frequently left out of task force planning, OPORD preparation, and the rehearsal process.
2. The BMO, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) personnel, and forward recovery teams are not aware of the enemy situation or the task force mission.
OBSERVATION 3: CSS is rarely integrated into the brigade planning process. (TA.4.3)
DISCUSSION: Some units do not consider bringing the necessary personnel to LTP to effectively integrate CSS into the brigade planning process.
OBSERVATION 4: Engineer Class IV/V operations are seldom integrated into the brigade combat team (BCT) plan. (TA.184.108.40.206)
1. While most engineer battalions understand the need for a combined arms approach to logistical support of the brigade's defense, they rarely execute an integrated Class IV/V plan.
2. Combined arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials and for operating Class IV/V supply points are usually outlined in the engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP), but are rarely addressed in the brigade's orders.
3. Most engineer battalions end up being the sole executors of the planning, preparation, and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation by other members of the BCT in the execution of Class IV/V operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility and survivability during brigade defensive missions.
OBSERVATION 5: Field artillery (FA) battalions are not adequately integrated into the brigade's plan to build combat power during Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSO&I). (TA.4.4.5)
1. FA units too often do not integrate their battalions into the brigade's plan to build combat power. Without an integrated brigade plan, field artillery units find themselves with no priority to draw classes of supply or receive maintenance support.
2. FA units are not identifying their own glide path to incrementally build platoons, batteries, and the battalion.
3. FA battalions are not including radar, survey, metro, command and control headquarters, and CSS assets.
for Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration
1. Incorporate estimates into the staff planning process and train at Home Station.
2. Involve the S1, BMO, and medical platoon in the CSS estimate.
1. The BMO should be included in the planning process. At a minimum, there must be a maintenance representative for the task force commander or TOC.
2. At the end of each battle, the task force must focus on the combat power that could be developed over the next 2, 6, and 12-hour periods using sound maintenance practices.
CSS INTEGRATION: Brigade commanders wanting to maximize their unit's training time need to bring the right players. Doctrinally, the planners are the brigade's S1, S4, surgeon, and the FSB SPO. The brigade surgeon is not trained as a planner, so the Medical Company commander is the logical medical planner. For brigade CSS planners, the brigade's S1 and S4, FSB SPO, and Medical Company commander must attend LTP to achieve full training value.
INTEGRATION OF ENGINEER CLASS IV/V OPERATIONS:
1. Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations.
2. This support must be addressed in the maneuver order. Class IV/V operations are so critical to the defense that these responsibilities should be addressed in the Scheme of Maneuver and Sub-unit Mission subparagraphs, and not simply relegated to the Engineer Annex.
3. In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, the task force and BCT TACSOPs must also delineate responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.
FA UNIT BUILDING OF COMBAT POWER DURING RSO&I:
1. Plan early with the brigade. Remember that RSO&I is an operation heavy with logistical implications. Battalion XOs and S3s need to take an early interest in the plan and not depend totally on the battalion S4 to "make it happen."
2. Organize requirements in a logical sequence and assign responsibilities.
3. Establish priority vehicles and units, manage and supervise the plan, and adjust as necessary.
4. A recommended force package 1 to be ready NLT RSO&I 02 would consist of:
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Mobility/Survivability/NBC BOS
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Combat Service Support BOS, Part 2
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