Military

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) fire support elements (FSEs) do not adequately maintain situational awareness. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION: Units do not closely coordinate with adjacent units to exchange information on clearance of fires, transition of priority of fires (POF), or security/control measures. As a result, TF FSEs repeatedly experience difficulty maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle handover.

OBSERVATION 3: Battle tracking in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) command post (CP) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. UMCP CP personnel do not maintain current company/team positions on the tracking boards.

2. UMCP CP personnel do not update situation templates (SITEMPs) on their maps.

OBSERVATION 4: Battle tracking in the field trains command post (FTCP) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is generally no accurate and up-to-date picture of the task force (TF) mission and tactical situation in the FTCP. As a result, the HHC commander is unable to anticipate logistical requirements based on the tactical situation.

2. Unit positions and status are not tracked in the FTCP during the battle.

3. FTCP personnel are unable to monitor the TF command net.

OBSERVATION 5: Task force (TF) staffs do not effectively battle track during the planning and preparation phases of an operation. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF tactical operations centers (TOCs) set up during planning and preparation for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

2. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.

3. Critical information concerning the R&S effort and "hard-intel" passed from brigade often never reach the S3, Battle Captain, or other BOS elements.

4. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are not proactively tracked, inhibiting the staff's ability to accurately depict the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

OBSERVATION 6: Battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs) often do not disseminate the current enemy situation to subordinate units. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION: S2s are tracking the battle at the battalion TOC; however, the current situation is not being disseminated down to the TAC command post (CP) and companies.

OBSERVATION 7: Company/team commanders are often unable to develop the situation when they make contact with the enemy. (TA.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Inadequate reporting by subordinates negatively affects the company/team commander's situational awareness.

2. Common results of a commander's lack of situation awareness:

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not adequately track the battle and manage information. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force TOCs frequently do not have established procedures for information display, message handling, and battle tracking.

2. There appears to be a lack of training on information management; most units do not know what information to track. They often track information that is not critical, are unable to identify information that is critical, or attempt to track an overabundance of information that makes it unmanageable.

OBSERVATION 2: The engineer battalion tactical operations center (TOC) staff has difficulty with clearly and accurately tracking mobility, countermobility, and survivability data. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 3: Light infantry task force staffs do not have good situational awareness from mission analysis to execution. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not have or are not updating the adjacent task force's mission, disposition, and task and purpose.

2. Task forces plan their operation in a vacuum, not considering the impact of the heavy task force operations on their actions.

OBSERVATION 4: The main command post (CP) is rarely able to provide the task force commander with a predictive analysis during the fight. (TA.4.2.2)

DISCUSSION: The main CP is not able to analyze information that they receive, provide the commander with a picture of what the enemy will do, or make recommendations.

MECHANIZED AND ARMOR COMPANY/TEAMS:

1. Information on the company CP is now found in FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, pages 2-53 and 2-54 (January 1998). Additional TTP for a company level CP or operations center are found in FM 17-97, Armored Cavalry Troop.

2. Company/teams can establish a CP of any configuration, but clear designation of what information needs to be tracked, and for what purpose, is critical.

3. Commanders should establish a timeline with their first WARNO. They must ensure that the TF timeline is adhered to and incorporated into the company timeline.

4. Unit SOPs should ensure that:

5. CP personnel must maintain contact with subordinate elements and track progress of task completion.

6. The CP must track vital reports such as:

7. A tracking routine should be established.

TASK FORCE (TF) FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE):

1. Close coordination between adjacent units is mandatory. This ensures that each unit fully understands how the other intends to operate. Coordination includes:

2. References:

UNIT MAINTENANCE COLLECTION POINT (UMCP) COMMAND POST (CP):

1. The UMCP CPs post current graphics/company positions and enemy situation on their map.

2. The CP NCOIC ensures that all recovery assets and personnel leaving the UMCP have the current graphic posted on a "take along" map.

FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST (FTCP):

1. The FTCP must receive and post TF operational and enemy situational overlays.

2. A method to track unit positions and status must be developed, posted, and updated as the battle progresses.

3. The FTCP must be able to monitor the TF command net through a retransmission or relay element.

4. The HHC commander must anticipate logistical requirements (specifically Class III and V) and be prepared to provide these to the TF.

TASK FORCE (TF) STAFFS AND COMMAND POSTS (CPs):

1. The chief of staff must identify what information he wants to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections to ensure that it is tracked. End state: The commander can go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of the TF in preparation for combat operations.

2. During planning and preparation, TF TOCs should establish a central node similar to the one in place during the fight and track it with the same aggressiveness. This will enable the unit to prepare for combat and re-prioritize efforts.

3. Effective battle tracking begins with:

4. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions at Home Station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.

5. CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center, provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.

BATTALION TACTICAL OPERATION CENTER (TOC): Place command emphasis in dissemination of current enemy situation to TAC CPs and line companies.

COMPANY/TEAM COMMANDERS' SITUATIONAL AWARENESS:

1. For the company/team commanders to make timely decisions on the battlefield, the subordinates must know how to completely and adequately report what is developing and make recommendations for the appropriate actions/reactions.

2. All members of a unit, including elements that are or can be attached, must be knowledgeable of and thoroughly trained in the proper reporting format (by SOP) and its contents, and have a basic understanding of the appropriate Army doctrine and how this is applied to the current situation.

3. The company/team commanders must train their platoons at Home Station on SOP reporting formats. At a minimum the platoons should know how to:

TASK FORCE TOC BATTLE TRACKING:

1. Decide what standard information the TOC expects from subordinate units.

2. Ensure subordinates understand what information is expected and when it should be provided. Units must ensure that a satisfactory number of individuals, other than and including the battle captain, understand the system for information management. Information is lost when only a few individuals understand the system.

3. When a task force commander decides additional tracking information is required for a specific mission, these new requirements must be disseminated to subordinate units.

4. The task force XO must monitor his staff sections to ensure that the information management system is to standard.

5. The task force commander and staff should be able to quickly visualize the accurate status of the task force from one source in the TOC.

ENGINEER BATTALION BATTLE TRACKING:

1. A clear, visible tracking system that combines map and wing board data is the most effective. If you do not use it, you do not need it (see CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center).

2. Information must be accurate, and organized so it is easy to read. Key graphics and charts required in the engineer battalion TOC to sustain combat operations are:

LIGHT INFANTRY TASK FORCE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: Position a disciplined liaison officer at the brigade main.

TASK FORCE PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS:

1. The battle staff should provide the commander with a clear picture of current and future events and COAs to assist him in the fight. The event matrix, SITEMP, and decision support matrix are tools for tracking events and making recommendations.

2. The task force XO, S2, assistant, and FSE need to track the battle at the map board or table and think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Combat Service Support BOS, Part 2

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 2