SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS
MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY/NBC BOS (TA.6)
SUBJECT: Force Protection
OBSERVATION 1: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) area security is often not adequate. (TA.18.104.22.168)
1. Units routinely do not establish basic security, from initial occupation of the UMCP through construction of individual fighting positions.
2. There is little uniformity in the way units occupy UMCPs or establish the UMCP area.
3. Individual soldiers are rarely oriented on defensive positions or where each individual goes when directed to defend.
OBSERVATION 2: Brigade fratricide risks are high during brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. (TA.22.214.171.124)
1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) is poorly supervised by the S3, exposing friendly soldiers to high-risk, friendly fire conditions.
2. Too many brigades view the R&S effort as a secondary or separate planning effort.
3. Brigades commonly have 15 to 20 soldiers infiltrating or air inserted throughout the depth of the brigade's area of operations. Task force (TF) scouts can add an additional 20 to 30 soldiers operating in the same general areas. Brigade S3 sections seldom practice battle space management and expose their scouts, COLTs, and ETACs to potential fratricide incidents.
4. Every unknown, unsupervised, or poorly planned insertion of a surveillance asset exponentially increases the potential for disaster.
OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) CSS elements, particularly the CTCP, UMCP, and medical platoon, often do not take measures to protect themselves from enemy ground, artillery, air, or chemical attacks. (TA.126.96.36.199)
1. CSS assets rarely have effective security or defense plans with sectors of fire, rehearsed or understood save plans, or adequate coordination with adjacent units for security. These units are highly vulnerable and an easy target for enemy attacks.
2. Often CSS soldiers do not have ammunition for their personal weapons and are unprepared for enemy contact, resulting in disrupted support and unnecessary casualties.
OBSERVATION 2: Engineer battalion headquarters and headquarters companies (HHCs) are not trained to standard on defending their portion of the BSA perimeter against threat Levels 1 and 2. (TA.188.8.131.52)
for Force Protection
Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) SECURITY:
1. Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) must develop SOPs that provide for security while moving and halted.
2. UMCPs must rehearse occupation of the UMCP area.
3. UMCP NCOs must utilize all available personnel and equipment at the UMCP for security.
4. The UMCP NCOIC should assign security duties to M1/M2 crews waiting on repairs to their vehicles:
FRATRICIDE RISKS DURING RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) OPERATIONS:
1. R&S efforts are operational missions and intrinsically high-risk in nature. R&S planning and execution requires the knowledge, experience, and supervision of the primary maneuver BOS representative.
2. The brigade operations section must practice battle space management. The current operations section must track current unit movement, activities, and locations and provide FSE accurate information to clear fires.
CSS UNIT PROTECTION:
1. CSS elements should address security plans in their SOPs.
2. They should conduct troop-leading procedures (TLP) just as they would for any other unit.
3. Units should plan for and rehearse actions under each of the seven forms of contact. Train the battle drills in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, or FM 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley) to provide the basis for this reaction.
4. CSS elements should stress terrain selection for trains locations.
5. Give additional attention to basic soldier skills and NCO supervision of security efforts.
DEFENSE OF THE BSA:
1. There are three key factors to successful defense of the BSA:
- Trained on the various essential tasks (i.e., construction of fighting positions and reaction to contact drills).
- Given time to train their soldiers on individual and collective tasks.
- Held accountable for the execution of the priorities of work IAW the commander's OPORD.
2. HHCs should develop SOPs for company defense operations.
3. HHCs should use "sergeant's time" to train basic skills such as construction of fighting positions with range cards and rehearsing reaction to contact drills.
4. HHCs should execute a Home Station FTX to train collective tasks such as displacing to a new BSA site and executing the priorities of work.
SUBJECT: Obstacles Coordination and Integration
OBSERVATION 1: Obstacle groups typically lack density and integration with direct and indirect fires. (TA.6.2.2)
1. During the defense, many assistant task force (TF) engineers (A/TFE) do not develop a complete Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA). The EBA usually focuses on friendly engineer capabilities, often omitting the impact of terrain or the enemy breaching capability.
2. While the TF commander's intent is understood, the A/TFE does not develop an obstacle group design based on the resource planning factors and the width of the avenue of approach (AA). As a result, the TF does not achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, or BLOCK on the enemy formation.
3. Obstacles are not designed to defeat enemy breaching assets. Designs do not use combinations of "more-visible" and "unseen" obstacles in each group to manipulate the enemy's maneuver in the desired direction. The A/TFE's countermobility timeline does not consider emplacing obstacles during the day versus night based on enemy reconnaissance in sector.
4. Many TFs do not array obstacles with sufficient depth. Obstacles are rapidly bypassed or reduced by enemy engineers.
5. The company/team fire plans do not effectively integrate direct and indirect fires to support the obstacle group design.
OBSERVATION 1: Most assistant battalion engineers (ABEs) develop the situational obstacle plan based on the very narrow band of battle space in which the brigade expects to make contact. (TA.6.2.1)
DISCUSSION: Brigade planning staffs often focus their planning only on where they most likely expect to make direct fire contact with the enemy. The ABE follows suit, limiting his situational obstacle plan to that narrow area. As a result, the brigade and ABE are caught without a plan if the enemy exposes a weakness elsewhere, is moving slowly and does not enter the band, or the brigade makes contact with the enemy before the brigade arrives at the band.
OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)
for Obstacles Coordination and Integration
1. Tactical obstacle design should be based on the formation of the attacking enemy and intended obstacle effect.
2. Initial design and array of each obstacle group should incorporate the commander's intent, the resource planning factor (RF), and the total width of the AA.
3. Determine the total quantity of standard minefields required to achieve the intended effect using the obstacle group design calculation shown below. Other anti-vehicular obstacles such as AT ditch or 11-row concertina roadblock can substitute for up to 20 percent of the standard minefields in a group. Situational obstacles such as VOLCANO, MOPMS, or ADAMS-RAAMS can be planned as part of the groups or used to reinforce an AA based on a new threat. By understanding the task and purpose of fires for each obstacle group design, all units can achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, TURN, FIX, or BLOCK on the enemy's formation.
4. ABEs should consider the following three areas when developing their situational obstacle plans for the BCT scheme of maneuver:
SUBJECT: Security Operations
OBSERVATION 1: Field trains security plans are inadequate. (TA.184.108.40.206)
1. Field trains security is not planned and integrated within the brigade support area (BSA).
2. Units generally do not address security in the priorities of work when establishing the field trains as part of the BSA.
3. The security plan is not developed, disseminated, or rehearsed.
OBSERVATION 2: Air and ground operations are seldom integrated during security missions. (TA.6.3.2)
1. The aviation unit's friendly situational awareness of the ground maneuver elements is usually lacking, particularly the front line ground trace, COLT and scout locations, and artillery firing positions.
2. Ground observation plans and aviation observation plans are not integrated or synchronized to enhance each other's capabilities and provide mutually supporting OP positions.
3. The aviation limit of advance (LOA) is often tied to the ground maneuver LOA, which limits aviation's early warning capability.
4. Although aviation assets usually make first contact with enemy forces in security missions, they seldom have priority of fires.
5. The ground commander too often does not identify the decisive point for his engagement, causing aviation forces to piecemeal their assets to meet the continuous security requirements defined by the ground maneuver commander.
OBSERVATION 3: HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations. (TA.6.3.4)
1. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability when compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys, and are unable to destroy anything they do observe. Scouts located behind "shooters" cannot see as far as the "shooter's" systems.
2. Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful in security operations by confusing the "shooters" on identification of enemy vehicles, especially beyond 1200 meters. Scouts often observe enemy reconnaissance targets for only three to five minutes, which is not enough time to accurately vector a direct fire killing system onto it.
3. Similar looking vehicles such as HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area, create confusion.
for Security Operations
INTEGRATING AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS:
1. Aviation planners should have early and direct involvement in the planning process, and conduct joint rehearsals with the ground maneuver element. These practices will resolve the issue regarding friendly situational awareness.
2. Aviation units should have priority of fires in security missions.
3. The limit of advance (LOA) for aviation must be forward of the ground LOA.
4. In order to support extended security mission requirements, aviation commanders must learn to stagger their crews and integrate dismounted OP positions.
5. Aviation commanders must know the ground maneuver commander's decisive point in his plan to surge aviation assets to meet the objective.
SCOUTS USED FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS:
1. Security operations should be given solely to company/teams.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing observation posts (OPs) behind the security force. This enables the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, and scouts are limited to destruction with indirect fire.
FIELD TRAINS SECURITY PLANS:
1. The HHC commander, 1SG, and XO must take a proactive role in establishing field trains security.
2. The security plan must be coordinated with the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and integrated into the BSA defense plan.
3. Security of the field trains must be addressed in the unit's priorities of work.
4. The field trains leadership must execute troop-leading procedures (TLP).
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Air Defense BOS
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Combat Service Support BOS
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