Military

2. Regardless of the type of rehearsal conducted, the following must be verified:

3. The fire support officer (FSO) must coordinate with the TF XO/S3 to ensure that the fire support rehearsal is included in the TF timeline. Schedule the TF fire support rehearsal as early as possible after the company FISTs have rehearsed their plans. Preferably, this will occur before the TF maneuver rehearsal.

4. References: FM 6-20-40, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy), and CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, Rehearsals.

DIRECT FIRE PLAN REHEARSALS:

1. Commanders at all levels must set the standard for rehearsals.

2. Commanders should use a standardized terrain model kit, which is a useful tool and cuts down on set-up time.

3. Commanders must properly allocate time for rehearsals and closely guard this time to ensure that rehearsals are not bypassed.

4. Companies and battalions should routinely conduct rehearsals at Home Station to allow subordinates to understand the standards to which rehearsals should be conducted and work out the TTPs that best facilitate every member of the team in understanding the mission.

5. Once the unit has established and validated their TTP for rehearsals, they should incorporate them into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

CSS REHEARSALS: An effective CSS rehearsal can multiply the effectiveness of the task force CSS plan; however, a bad or nonexistent rehearsal can have the opposite effect.

1. Develop a page in the task force SOP to address the CSS rehearsal.

2. Define the attendee list and the outline for the rehearsal.

3. Ensure that key topics are covered: For example: Give an overview of enemy COA and the friendly maneuver plan, fuel, ammunition, medical, maintenance support at BCT and task force level, and subordinate unit CSS plans.

4. Capture any issues that are identified.

5. Allow enough time to make an accurate sketch or terrain model and use it.

6. Develop a SOP for a radio rehearsal (Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals).

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Communication and Signal Operations

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Armor and cavalry signal officers (SIGOs) are not able to effectively employ FM radio retransmission (retrans) systems in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION: Trends show that signal officers are inadequately trained in basic tactics. Throughout mission analysis and wargaming, SIGOs are too often unable to identify critical implied tasks that are crucial for successful communications and survivability on the battlefield.

OBSERVATION 2: Battalion/brigade signal officers (BSO/SIGOs) are often improperly utilized to only place retransmission nodes. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 3: Poor communications continue to impact engineer combat operations. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION: Engineer battalion commanders often settle for various forms of relay, have no redundancy in systems/procedures, and do not clarify or enforce frequency management plans. These circumstances often result in poor communication architectures.

ARMOR AND CAVALRY SIGO EMPLOYMENT OF FM RADIO RETRANSMISSION (RETRANS) SYSTEMS:

1. SIGOs can be successful if they apply some of the following rules:

2. FM 11-43, The Signal Leader's Guide, is an excellent guide for the SIGO.

BATTALION/BRIGADE SIGNAL OFFICER (BSO/SIGO) ROLE:

1. The BSO/SIGO should be assigned to plan and synchronize an approved command and control system. The BSO/SIGO operates in the unit to ensure the commander has command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) for his warriors.

2. The BSO/SIGO plans and synchronizes the communication nodes with the flow of the battle and recommends places for the tactical operations center (TOC), Joint-TOC, combat trains command post (CTCP), and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) assets.

ENGINEER BATTALION COMMUNICATION PLANNING:

1. Communication planning requires the focused attention of the battalion's senior leadership. It is a top-down responsibility and requires proactive staff supervision.

2. The battalion signal NCO should develop mission-specific communications plans that support maneuver plans. To do this requires the NCO to have detailed knowledge of terrain (use available terrain visualization products) and the scheme of maneuver.

3. Use Terrabase (or equivalent) line-of-sight (LOS) shots to support triggers for repositioning the retrans team.

4. Include a clear, enforced communications annex in each OPORD.

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Operation Order (OPORD) and Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Preparation

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: The engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and operation order (OPORD) preparation processes of many engineer companies need improvement. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company commanders often conduct their own engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) and write both the task force (TF) engineer annex and engineer company OPORD at Home Station, during TF level engineer NTC training and during preparation computer exercises. These company commanders expect to personally produce these products during the NTC campaign as well.

2. Engineer company executive officers (XOs) are not trained to conduct an EBA or write the TF engineer annex and the company OPORD.

3. After arrival at the NTC, one of two things occurs. Either:

4. As a result, both company and TF suffer incomplete engineer planning.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer plans are seldom read or understood by task force (TF) maneuver elements. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces (TFs) typically place the engineer plan in an annex of the OPORD. The maneuver elements seldom read that portion of the OPORD and do not understand the scheme of engineer operations (SOEO). This can be disastrous when it includes specified tasks to non-engineer subordinate units.

2. TFs are not allowing the engineer planner to brief during mission analysis and the COA presentations, omitting critical mobility and survivability information.

3. Engineer command posts (CPs) are not fully integrated in the TF tactical operations centers (TOCs), causing a breakdown of the brigade engineer's intent at TF level.

4. Mobility, countermobility, survivability tasks are seen as engineer-unit specific.

OBSERVATION 3: Critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) and concept of fires are seldom developed to standard. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION: Fire support coordinators (FISCOORDs) and brigade fire support officers (FSOs) make attempts to identify and define critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) (task, purpose, method, and end state) based on the commander's guidance and friendly course of actions. Their stated purpose(s), however, do not always provide sufficient information to set the parameters of when, where, and how long. As a result, the FS system cannot easily or realistically quantify the required end-state in terms of volume and duration or amount of destruction, suppression, or obscuration.

ENGINEER COMPANY PLANNING PROCESS:

1. Engineer company commanders must train their XOs at Home Station to conduct EBA and to prepare both the TF engineer annex and engineer company OPORD.

2. Company commanders should be able to give the XO clear guidance on the mission, intent, and end-state, and then make the XO responsible for producing the three products. The engineer company commander can then focus on troop-leading procedures (TLP) and pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

INTEGRATION OF ENGINEER UNITS:

1. The TF engineer must ensure that required engineer missions, instructions, constraints, and limitations are included in the TF OPORD (not buried in the engineer annex).

2. The TF must allow the engineer planner to brief during both the mission analysis and the COA presentations so that critical mobility and survivability information is communicated to all elements of the TF.

3. The scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) should be refined during wargaming and is the basis for the engineer company order.

CRITICAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS (CFSTs) AND CONCEPT OF FIRES DEVELOPMENT:

1. When defining CFSTs, the task should specify:

2. Doctrinal terms, such as, delay, limit, disrupt, and destroy can be useful, but what is essential is that fire supporters and maneuver understand each other clearly.

3. The task is focused on the enemy. The purpose, on the other hand, is focused on friendly maneuver and sets the parameters on how long we must delay, where we must limit, and when we must disrupt or destroy in terms of friendly maneuver events. The clearer the effects of fires are tied to a maneuver purpose, the more likely that we can integrate fires and maneuver to achieve a unified effect.

4. The end-state should be quantifiable in terms that allow the field artillery to determine the volume of fires, munitions, duration and other technical parameters, and that will achieve the stated task and purpose.

EXAMPLE:

- How long does the AG company need to destroy the FSE?

- What number and type of vehicles = delay required?

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Development and Use of Tactical SOPs

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2 sections often do not have or use standard operating procedures (SOPs). (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections are often not sure of the intelligence requirements for the different phases of the staff planning process.

2. When a comprehensive SOP exists, it is seldom followed.

3. Some existing SOPs do not specifically address the requirements for the brigade S2 section. Each staff planning session is fraught with discovery learning to determine what is required to support the staff planning process, rather than improving requirements that are already defined.

OBSERVATION 2: Company/team tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) are incomplete or non-existent. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. In almost every instance, company commanders come to their LTP without a viable, workable TACSOP. The standard reply when asked about their TACSOPs is, "We are refining it out here." With 120 days remaining before their NTC rotation (fewer training days for NG/USAR units), there is no time to refine, develop, and implement an effective TACSOP.

2. For a TACSOP to be effective, all members of a unit must be knowledgeable and thoroughly trained in its contents. This includes all elements that are cross-attached to a commander's unit.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Most task force's tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) are not adequate or are not used. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many task forces (TFs) arrive at LTP with a TACSOP that was newly created specifically for their upcoming NTC rotation.

2. Some TFs have had the same TACSOP for years, and have not reviewed it for needed refinements.

3. Most often, the TF TACSOP is not disseminated to the lowest levels, and is seldom used as a legitimate document that governs the tactical operations of a unit.

OBSERVATION 2: Many company commanders do not have tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) or do not use them. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders seldom bring a TACSOP to LTP. Those who do are unfamiliar with their content.

2. Without a unit SOP, company/team coaches cannot observe the efficient use of the unit's SOP and cannot make recommendations for improvements.

3. Commanders cannot review, test, and train with their SOPs while undergoing the unit's training.

1. At Home Station, each S2 section should develop and use an SOP that provides a checklist and formatted charts.

2. Continually stress the importance of TACSOPs and the need for company/team commanders to come to LTP with a complete and workable TACSOP.

3. To be beneficial during the NTC rotation, TACSOPs must be disseminated, trained, and adhered to closely throughout the Home Station train-up. Some of the critical characteristics a TACSOP must possess to be adopted by task force operators include:

4. Battalion commanders can maximize their subordinate's LTP training if company commanders bring a completed TACSOP.

TREND 9

SUBJECT: Battle Staff Mission Analysis

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The staff is seldom briefed on the mission analysis prior to the initial brief to the commander.

2. The battle staff does not:

3. Frequently, the ADO and logisticians and other attached staff officers are not informed when the main CP receives the order; they are not aware that the mission analysis is about to be conducted.

OBSERVATION 2: Battalion/brigade signal officer (SIGO) mission analysis is inadequate. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION: Battalion/brigade SIGOs too often do not conduct a thorough mission analysis prior to the execution phase of some missions. They do fix problems that develop, but many of those problems could have been avoided had they anticipated them (e.g., developing a back-up retransmission, ensuring mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT) coverage in the TOC, and moving personnel to best support the mission).

1. The battle staff should conduct mission analysis, integrating all the key players. This initial step in the decision-making process focuses the staff on the upcoming operation and provides information on tasks they must accomplish according to the brigade OPORD.

2. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."

3. The SIGO should thoroughly analyze the unit's mission, determine the elements critical for success, and assign resources to ensure achievement of the commander's intent.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 4

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 6