Military

3. Commanders usually include critical activities in their company OPORDs but do not monitor their accomplishment.

4. Most engineer companies arrive at the NTC with a good tactical SOP (TACSOP) that clearly addresses TAA procedures, but they do not follow it.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) staffs do not effectively manage a TF timeline. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Staff sections do not complete required products in a timely manner.

2. Results of poor time management include:

OBSERVATION 3: Task force (TF) executive officers (XOs) do not effectively manage timelines. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF XOs do not successfully manage planning time. During the conduct of LTP, this responsibility is continually delegated to junior battle captains.

2. Routinely, staff members lack the experience and understanding of how long each phase of the planning process should take. As a result, the process quickly looses structure, focus, and productivity.

OBSERVATION 4: Time management at brigade and task force (TF) level remains a notable weakness. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION: Commanders have dismissed the one-third/two-third planning philosophy and routinely disregard subordinate elements' need to plan.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: ADA platoons, particularly the platoon leaders, are often not prepared to perform the air defense mission due to poor time management. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The platoon leader's timeline seldom includes key tasks (i.e., orders issue, rehearsals, resupply, maintenance, boresight, link-up times with company/teams) or other specified tasks to be accomplished prior to the mission.

2. The timeline seldom includes who will be responsible for performing tasks and conducting the checks.

3. Platoon SOPs are inadequate; they do not address priorities of work at squad level.

4. The platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP) is not used.

OBSERVATION 2: Company/team level time management skills are poor. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders tend to possess inadequate time management and delegation skills (i.e., trying to do everything themselves), resulting in a significant amount of unfinished business by the LD time.

2. Inexperienced company/team commanders are often unfamiliar with planning and preparing time for combat operations. They are often surprised and sometimes overwhelmed when experiencing the limited time available for planning and preparing for combat operations.

ENGINEER COMPANY TIME MANAGEMENT AND TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA (TAA) DISCIPLINE:

1. Engineer company commanders must conduct aggressive time management. They must be immediately informed of any problems in order to adjust priorities in tempo.

2. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and junior NCOs must apply the discipline to make it happen. Unit discipline must be maintained during TAA occupation, including adherence to their tactical SOP (TACSOP).

3. Critical pre-battle activities must be accomplished to ensure mission success. These activities should be integrated with:

4. Timelines must be passed to subordinate units as soon as possible. Company leaders must ruthlessly enforce the completion of these activities in accordance with the timeline.

TASK FORCE (TF) TIMELINE MANAGEMENT:

1. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.

2. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop-leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times, etc.).

3. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events should be added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.

4. Key events from the synchronization matrix should be incorporated into the timeline. This is a valuable tool for tracking critical tasks throughout the battle.

5. Upon completion of the planning process, the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and brief it as part of the TF operations order (OPORD).

6. In the timeline, include critical troop-leading procedures (TLP) to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and logistics package (LOGPAC) schedules. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage company/teams, but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level, the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

7. Time management will improve only when it becomes an absolute priority of brigade and task force commanders. Emphasis must be placed on the application of time management techniques at all levels.

8. Adopt a structured schedule that requires brigades and TFs to issue their OPORDs on directed timelines, thus forcing one-third/two-third planning times on to the respective staffs.

ADA PLATOON TIME MANAGEMENT:

1. The platoon leader must understand his responsibilities as both platoon leader and task force ADO, and balance his time between both.

2. Information must be pushed to the platoon despite the physical separation when the platoon leader is at the task force TOC. Use a LNO, PSG, or driver to push the information to the platoons from the TOC.

3. When involved in the military decision-making process (MDMP) with the task force, the platoon leader must delegate to his subordinates, specify tasks to be accomplished, and appoint individuals to confirm task completion.

4. Use backward planning to prioritize tasks and allow subordinates the ability to develop their own timeline with any additional tasks at crew level. Many of the tasks that need to be accomplished during the preparation phase should be identified in the platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP), eliminating confusion and wasted time.

5. References:

COMPANY/TEAM LEVEL TIME MANAGEMENT:

1. Company/team commanders must practice procedures to make best use of their planning and preparation time. Use well-trained battle drills to give the commander the flexibility to save time through standardized reactions to routine situations. Whether the subject matter is actions on contact or preparation for combat operations, commanders must develop standardized procedures for their units.

2. While LTP does not afford commanders the chance or the opportunity to delegate preparation tasks to subordinates, company/team coaches can suggest where and when planning and preparation tasks can be delegated.

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Decision-Point Development

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Engineer commanders and staffs rarely develop decision points with supporting criteria that will ensure continued support to the brigade throughout fluid combat operations. (TA.4.2.3)

DISCUSSION: Because brigade combat missions are dynamic, the engineer unit's task and purpose change constantly. Corresponding changes to task organization and priorities are often required. Commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all possible situations, but are often issuing incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) as a means of adapting their units to the changing combat situations. The FRAGO method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and creates difficulties in command, control, and support for the executing unit.

1. Commanders and staffs should develop clear decision points with pre-established plans to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare, and execute the mission to standard.

2. Refer to CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 97-4, Jan 97, Decision-Point Tactics (Fighting the Enemy, Not the Plan!).

TREND 12

SUBJECT: Planning for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Operations

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade planning and preparation for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) operations are rarely integrated into the scheme of fires. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. COLT insertions are normally planned fairly well, but detailed tasks and purpose for each COLT are not delineated during the brigade wargame.

2. Brigades often do not plan the attack function for the COLT, thus degrading the COLT's ability to trigger fires.

3. The brigade often does not perform battlefield calculus and analysis of where the enemy is in relation to COLT observation posts (OPs). This negates the brigade's ability to use the COLT to employ Copperhead munitions; all conditions necessary to execute the Copperhead missions cannot be met. As a result, COLTs become another source for reporting enemy movement rather than the more desirable killer source.

1. The entire staff should plan for COLT employment.

2. The fire support officer (FSO) and S2 need to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of COLTs. Specifically, they must understand the ranges at which the COLT can actually acquire a particular target and under different conditions.

3. The following is a good outline to follow for the employment of COLTs:

TREND 13

SUBJECT: Command Post (CP) Locations/Displacement

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Command post (CP) site location and displacement planning are not effectively integrated into the TF planning process. (TA.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The tactical operations center (TOC) is seldom able to effectively command and control during critical points of the battle.

2. Command and control nodes are not able to support the TF, maintain situational awareness, effectively conduct predictive analysis or make timely recommendations to the commander.

1. During the planning process, the staff must first identify the location of critical points on the battlefield. The staff then conducts backward planning to determine where the tactical operations center (TOC) must be located at that point to facilitate command and control.

2. Triggers/decision points must be developed to determine when the TOC moves to ensure that they are set during these critical points.

3. The TOC movement/displacement plan is not necessarily tied to the maneuver of the TF. For example, the TOC does not have to move in the center of the TF formation; it may travel initially behind the lead company/team or along a route that was previously cleared by the scouts or other TF assets. The imperative is that it is set and ready to fight at these anticipated critical points.

TREND 14

SUBJECT: Reporting Requirements/Procedures

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Reporting within the units too often does not facilitate the commander's situational awareness and enhance battle command. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. SPOT reports, contact reports, commander's situation reports (SITREPs), forward area rearm/refuel point (FARP) SITREPs, and battle damage assessments (BDA) lack format, contain vague information, and are not submitted in a timely fashion.

2. Unit C2 reporting architectures cause confusion with the company commanders. Typically, company commanders do not know if they are to report to the battalion commander (in an AH-64) or the S3.

OBSERVATION 2: Fire support teams (FISTs) frequently do not report information in accordance with doctrinal report formats. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 3: Casualty assessments and battle damage assessments (BDAs) are seldom to standard. (TA.4.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. During the brigade planning process, most units do not report realistic casualty or battle damage assessments. Some units do not complete these assessments at all.

2. Poor assessments contribute to commander's inaccurate delineation of available combat power.

3. Medical assets cannot be arrayed to support medical evacuation.

UNIT REPORTING: The commander should identify reporting requirements and include these requirements in the unit SOP. Considerations for report requirements should include:

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (FIST) REPORTING:

1. FISTs should report information and call for fire in accordance with the formats in FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below, and FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.

2. The FIST forward observer's primary mission is to call for fires for their maneuver element. But when fires are unavailable, their next responsibility is to report. The task force needs to enforce reporting standards (i.e., call for fire, SALUTE reports, and SALT reports).

CASUALTY REPORTING AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS (BDA):

1. At each phase or critical event in the planning process, the S1 should give a realistic casualty assessment and the S4 should provide the BDA.

2. The S2 should provide the BDA on the OPFOR. This will give the brigade commander an accurate picture of the available friendly combat power versus the enemy's combat power.

3. Medical planners who train at NTC must understand that casualty assessments and BDA are skewed. We often do not stop operations when units are rendered combat ineffective and are not capable of sustaining further combat operations. As a general rule, they should plan for mass casualty situations.

4. See CALL Quarterly Bulletin No. 95-11, "Brigade Rear Operations: A Force Protection Dilemma" and CALL Newsletter No. 97-14, NTC Goldminer's TTPs for CSS.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 5

Acknowledgements