Military

2. Clear standards are not identified or enforced while at the NTC.

3. Leaders are reluctant to make corrections, assume responsibility, or be held accountable.

4. Unit leaders generally fail to assign responsibility for key actions and do not hold personnel accountable.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)

OBSERVATION 2: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon leaders do not use troop-leading procedures (TLP) or establish timelines effectively. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Situational awareness is lacking.

2. Operation orders (OPORDs) are hasty and inadequate, and do not include five paragraphs or a risk assessment.

3. Rehearsals are ineffective or nonexistent.

4. Graphics are inadequate or missing.

5. Link-ups with company/teams are frequently late.

6. There is little or no face-to-face cross-talk between air defense artillery (ADA) section leaders and the element for which they are providing coverage.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force signal officer and NCOIC troop-leading procedures (TLP) are inadequate. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many times the soldiers do not fully understand their mission, their reporting procedures, or their route. This creates confusion during mission execution phases.

2. There is poor situation awareness without TLP at every level. Placing the retransmission system on the wrong slope of a hill will put the lives of the retransmission team at great risk, as well as the lives of the soldiers the commander can no longer reach.

OBSERVATION 4: Troop-leading procedures (TLP) at both company and platoon level are often inadequate and lack the required substance to properly allow the company, platoon, and squad to succeed. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. TLP are often overlooked or are completed so quickly they have no effect on the mission.

2. Engineer units often develop timelines (from already late maneuver timelines) that do not identify key engineer essential planning and execution tasks.

3. Development of a tentative plan usually falls short because of incomplete application or a misunderstanding by the company XO during the tactical planning process.

4. Generally, engineer company XOs do not identify essential, specified, and implied tasks that are critically important to mission accomplishment.

5. Unit orders lack clarity regarding the unit commander's intent, scheme of engineer operations, and sub-unit tasks.

6. Unit commanders misunderstand the importance of time management.

7. Rehearsals and backbriefs are executed poorly.

OBSERVATION 5: Engineer battalion headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commanders rarely conduct troop-leading procedures (TLP) after receiving engineer battalion or forward support battalion (FSB) operation orders (OPORDs). (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION: None.

OBSERVATION 6: FA battery level pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and rehearsals are not conducted to standard. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. FA batteries generally do not effectively conduct PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals.

2. Batteries normally focus on the FASCAM and do not consider the other PCCs/PCIs that allow them to survive and move on to their next essential task. They rarely add realism to their rehearsals to simulate the fog of war. Instead, they conduct a simple rehearsal in a static environment with tubes simply following along.

OBSERVATION 7: Fire support teams (FISTs) often do not conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) before a combat mission. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Unless PCCs/PCIs are properly conducted, leaders do not identify potential problems prior to execution, and have no time to react to correct them.

2. Many units deploy to NTC with adequate checklists in their SOPs, but units seldom follow what is published in their SOPs.

3. At pre-rotation inbriefings, task force FSOs often brief they have no knowledge of the capability of the company/team FIST to execute PCC/PCIs because this was not emphasized during Home Station training.

4. Often during a rotation, company/team FISTs are plagued with discovering problems with their vehicle or equipment after the line of departure (LD). EXAMPLE: FISTs are unable to use the G/VLLD because of missing or broken power cables in the targeting head, or because they have no charged batteries.

OBSERVATION 8: Personnel at the combat trains command post (CTCP) are not effectively utilized. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Staff officers seldom delegate or assign priorities of work. As a result, they often run the command post operation with minimal support provided by NCOs and junior soldiers. For example, S1s and S4s are often observed with two to three hand mikes and a fist full of map board markers.

2. Standard job descriptions are not defined; soldiers do not know what their function is.

3. Functions normally not accomplished include:

BATTALION MAINTENANCE OFFICER (BMO) TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. The BMO and the UMCP establish a timeline that can support the upcoming missions.

2. The BMO must ensure that the maintenance platoon understands the mission requirements.

3. Maintenance platoons must stay aware of the tactical situation. The main focus is to return combat power to the battle, and maintenance leaders must ensure mission accomplishment.

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WEAPONS CLEANING:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) must ensure that his subordinates enforce weapons cleaning and service.

2. The BMO must coordinate with the S4 for ammunition supply.

UNIT DISCIPLINE ON THE BATTLEFIELD:

1. NCOs must be the backbone of unit standards; however, all leaders play a key role in setting and enforcing standards.

2. Senior leaders must assign responsibility for actions and hold personnel accountable.

BSFV PLATOON ROP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. Platoon leaders should follow troop-leading procedures, establish a timeline, and be persistent in application.

2. Delegate some tasks to NCOs within the platoon (i.e., graphics).

3. Develop portions of the platoon OPORD parallel with the planning process (i.e., paragraph 3 can be developed during the wargame process and paragraph 2 can be developed during mission analysis while cross-talk is being done with the S2).

4. The key is to find ways to save time and facilitate the 1/3 - 2/3 rule.

TASK FORCE SIGNAL OFFICER AND NCOIC TLP: The SIGO, commo chief, and all the NCOs must exercise the TLP steps. They should be clear and concise when conducting a platoon or section OPORD. Signalers must fully understand the scheme of maneuver or the commander's intent in order to support the mission.

ENGINEER UNIT TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. Two elements are absolutely critical to the successful execution of superbly executed TLP--operational guidance and specific timelines. Commanders must command their company. Their focus should be on:

2. Commanders should train their XOs in the tactical planning process. This does not happen overnight, but rather with months of coaching, mentoring, and repeated, multiple warfighting experiences, coupled with focused candid feedback. The company XO needs to understand that he is a critical member of the combined arms team. He must also understand all aspects of tactical planning in order to effectively integrate and synchronize the mobility and survivability battlefield operating system (BOS).

3. FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, pg. 7-1 to 7-11, and FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team, provide excellent cookbook approaches to tactical planning.

ENGINEER BATTALION HHC TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. The HHC commander must use TLP with the estimate of the situation, METT-T, IPB products, and risk assessment products to develop a systematic approach to formulating tactical plans. Without using TLP, the commander will have great difficulty commanding and controlling the company.

2. The HHC commander must use TLP and risk assessment worksheets, no matter how abbreviated, to plan, coordinate, prepare, direct, and control the execution of CSS missions for every battalion mission. It is particularly important to issue an OPORD, even if it is given vocally, to focus subordinate's efforts.

FA BATTERY LEVEL PCC/PCI AND REHEARSALS: Battery commanders should place more emphasis on conducting PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals as part of Home Station training. If the battery conducts quality PCCs/PCIs and completes rehearsals, they will validate their plan, prepare for an uncooperative enemy, and be positioned for success on the battlefield.

1. PCCs/PCIs ensure the sections are prepared for their essential tasks.

2. Rehearsals clarify the commander's intent, synchronize the plan, and ensure everyone understands their role.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM PCC/PCI:

1. The task force fire support element needs to have a standard set of mission-specific PCC/PCI checklists in the unit SOP. Once specific PCC/PCIs are identified, leaders must supervise and ensure they are conducted, and that they are conducted to standard.

2. Leaders must also ensure proper actions are taken to correct identified deficiencies.

3. Conduct of PCC/PCIs needs to be trained and supervised at Home Station and incorporated into FIST certification.

UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL AT THE CTCP:

1. Develop a SOP that clearly defines the responsibilities of each member of the CTCP, both in the CP proper and outside of the CP in the combat trains.

2. Train and authorize NCOs and junior soldiers to operate the CP without the officers and to make appropriate logistics decisions in the absence of the officer in charge (OIC).

3. Get the OIC off the radio and the map so he can look at the big picture.

4. Assign enlisted soldiers as radio telephone operators (RTOs) and make them responsible for logs and updating information on charts and disseminating it to the rest of the CP personnel.

5. Put a NCO in charge of external operations for the purpose of integrating, briefing, and ensuring security to attached elements (See CALL Newsletter No. 95-07, Tactical Operations Center).

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 3

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 5