Military

2. Untrained staffs seek TTP as a method to facilitate planning shortcuts. However, most LTP brigade staffs lack doctrinal and practical staff experience required to apply TTP. In fact, planning TTP confuse, complicate, and frustrate untrained staffs.

3. While at LTP, XOs and staff members are normally unsuccessfully at applying planning TTP to the staff MDMP.

OBSERVATION 3: Aviation liaison officers (ALOs) are rarely integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. New ALOs, especially those assigned to recently formed staffs, are not always integrated into the staff.

2. Many ALOs are unfamiliar with the Army's decision-making process, especially wargaming.

3. Close air support (CAS) continues to be cited at NTC as the largest killer during brigade force-on-force engagements.

OBSERVATION 4: Armor task force (TF) staffs are consistently unable to plan following the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP-the sequence, the events constituting the planning process, and what products are generated.

2. Failure to understand and be able to apply the MDMP makes transitioning to an abbreviated format nearly impossible for the staff, given the limited level of experience the staff members have in planning combat operations.

OBSERVATION 5: The special staff is seldom integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION: The forward support battalion (FSB) commander and XO rarely ensure integration of the special staff into the MDMP and orders drill.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) do not adequately integrate CSS into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force planning cells and chain of command display an indifference to CSS integration and do not supervise the BOS, resulting in a lack of integration among the CSS staff and their products.

2. The S4 is not fully integrated into the planning process at the task force level. While the S4 is present at times for mission analysis, he is not fully integrated into any formal process and in effect is not part of the battle staff. Lack of integration results in an obvious disconnect between the battle staff and the CSS side of the planning process. Ultimately, this disconnect results in a CSS plan that does not effectively support the task force scheme of maneuver.

3. The S4 writes an OPORD Paragraph 4 and issues this in the task force orders process; however, there is no identification of who has ownership for the CSS players (support platoon, medical platoon, BMO, chaplain, S1) and who is responsible for delivering these key players an OPORD. The trend is that the S4 does not take ownership of these players and does not give an OPORD to the CSS players.

4. CSS rehearsals are "hit or miss" and not an institutional part of task force operations. When they are conducted, they are not to standard.

5. CSS annexes are not produced.

6. CSS graphics continue to be inadequate and are incomplete. Graphics do not include main and alternate routes (MSRs and ASRs), dirty routes, decontamination points, aid stations, maintenance collection points, graves registration points, casualty collection points, etc.

7. CSS sub-elements are left to fend for themselves, are not read in on the plan, and do not have adequate situational awareness to be effective.

OBSERVATION 2: The signal officer (SIGO) does not participate early enough in the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION: Task forces seldom integrate the SIGO into the planning process early enough to develop a plan and make recommendations for command and control assets.

OBSERVATION 3: The fire direction officer's (FDO's) responsibilities during the military decision-making process (MDMP) are not well defined. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION: The staff does not analyze the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) further than broad statements such as suppress lead MRBs, attrit the lead MRB, and provide smoke, FASCAM, Copperhead, etc.

OBSERVATION 4: Combat Service Support (CSS) is not adequately integrated into the battalion military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most battalions demonstrate the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and reconstitute logistics. However, CSS operations are seldom integrated into the battalion's battle rhythm and do not facilitate the battalion's tactical posture.

2. The S4, S1, and XO are not primary players during the orders process. CSS is often an afterthought and seldom addressed.

3. The S4 often leaves the wargame to gather information or solve problems that should be handled by the administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC).

4. CSS is briefed but rarely rehearsed during battalion rehearsals. Who, what, when, where, and how should be briefed during the battalion rock drill for R3SP, LRPs, medical support plan, MSRs, resupply triggers, and reconstitution of battalion assets.

5. The S4s are not using a CSS execution matrix and their CSS plan is rarely rehearsed.

6. The S4s are not using a checklist during the battalion orders process, hindering their ability to both validate and synchronize the plan and ensure it supports the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs).

7. The S3 does not provide timely ammunition guidance or establish future requirements, thus hindering the S4's ability to develop an adequate resupply plan.

8. Battlefield calculus is rarely conducted, and ammunition requirements/triggers are not clearly identified (155-mm).

OBSERVATION 5: An engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) is rarely completed as part of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION: Most assistant battalion engineers (ABEs) are proficient in completing an engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) in accordance with FM 5-71-3 prior to arriving at the NTC. However, due to battlefield friction, reduced planning timelines, and simultaneous monitoring of current operations, EBAs are generally not conducted to standard during the MDMP.

OBSERVATION 6: Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct horizontal planning to a degree, but the vertical planning process remains unstructured. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer staffs do not conduct planning in accordance with FM 5-71-3.

2. The engineer battalion XO does not closely coordinate with the battalion S3 and is seldom able to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.

3. Although the battalion S3, S2, and the assistant battalion engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis and the brigade wargaming process, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate are missing, as the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.

4. The brigade engineer (battalion commander), with his staff, is not developing a detailed scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) and then integrating the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming. Key engineer tasks are left out of both the brigade's SOEO and the engineer battalion's plan as each works through his respective processes.

5. The engineer battalion conducts its own separate wargame and identifies critical vertical tasks after the brigade plan is completed, so the tasks are not integrated or coordinated.

6. Published engineer orders lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations. Since the engineer battalion did not conduct a structured planning process, the battalion order is merely a plagiarized version of the engineer annex. It does not provide the detailed sub-unit orders and service support instructions to units remaining under battalion control.

7. The brigade engineer annex is incomplete. The annex does not include all information critical to the brigade engineer plan or required for subordinate engineer planning.

OBSERVATION 7: Brigade staffs do not possess an understanding of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Prior to LTP, active component (AC) brigade staff members have only approximately three to five months in position.

2. During unit in-briefs, staffs report that their Home Station training had not focused on "staff planning procedures." In fact, most AC brigade staffs state that they have had little recent exposure to the MDMP.

3. Reserve component (RC) staffs have a tough time applying planning TTP to doctrine to be successful in a time constrained, planning environment.

4. All brigades attending LTP come without a working or validated planning standard operating procedure (SOP) or tactical SOP (TACSOP). Staff officers cannot reference their unit's SOP to understand how to accomplish their individual and collective tasks.

OBSERVATION 8: Task forces have difficulty completing the military decision-making process (MDMP) in a time-constrained environment. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces are well aware of the necessity to perform MDMP in a time-constrained environment during their NTC rotation. However, far too many task force staffs arrive for their LTP experience without first making an assessment of their ability to perform the MDMP; they then attempt to force their staffs toward a performance standard that they are unable to achieve.

2. The frustration of identifying training weaknesses in the midst of the LTP planning process does little to aid the task force staff in becoming more proficient with the MDMP in a time-constrained environment. When a task force staff has difficulty performing the MDMP, attempting to conduct it rapidly often leaves the task force with a plan that lacks both detail and synchronization.

MAINTENANCE PLANNING AT TASK FORCE (TF) LEVEL:

1. The BMO should be included in the planning process. At a minimum, there must be a maintenance representative for the TF commander or TOC.

2. At the end of each battle, the TF must focus on the combat power that could be developed over the next 2, 6, and 12-hour periods using sound maintenance practices.

BRIGADE STAFF UNDERSTANDING OF THE MDMP:

1. Brigade commanders and staffs must collectively practice and gain full understanding of the MDMP before their LTP session. Regardless how well the staff understands doctrinal planning procedures, they must collectively experience the process before they become efficient and proficient planners. LTP provides time away from Home Station training detractors for the XO and staff to work on those staff planning skills.

2. Brigade commanders cannot maximize their unit's LTP experience when their staffs are struggling with fundamental doctrine and unit planning procedures. Commanders should accomplish the following prior to their LTP session:

3. When brigade commanders receive the NTC CG's 120-day LTP letter, they have an opportunity to input their training objectives and schedule training for their brigade.

4. Center the reconnaissances on the terrain that the unit is planning to fight in the LTP order. With sufficient time, Operations Group can deconflict the rotational and LTP schedule and develop the order on terrain available on days of the reconnaissance. Unit commanders and staffs can focus their reconnaissances on the terrain as it relates to the order and make better use of their reconnaissance time. If there is specific terrain that the brigade commander wants his units to see, then he should schedule it at another time during the training.

5. In an effort to save time, brigades have tasked subordinate units to see specific terrain in their AOI. In the LTP, brigade reconnaissance days are generally centralized at brigade level, offering the brigade commander time to address issues and concerns to the entire brigade. Once the commander has completed his reconnaissance objectives, the LTP will decentralize the reconnaissance to task force and company level. Assigning specific reconnaissance objectives to subordinate commanders will prevent an unfocused reconnaissance. Again, there is time in the schedule to reconnaissance other maneuver areas if the brigade commander plans wisely.

6. The best use of staff AARs is afforded to units who elect to conduct two orders during their LTP session. Here is why. The first order allows the XO and staff to work on the process and staff procedures. The AAR, followed by another planning exercise, allows the staff to immediately train the lessons learned instead of weeks after the staff returns to home station. Units electing the two-order option usually plan both orders and fight only the second one on the JANUS system. Unit staffs that exercise the two-order option have had tremendous improvements. Once again, scheduling the two-order option must be carefully planned and scheduled well before to the unit's LTP arrival date.

7. All units conduct at least one brigade staff AAR and one brigade execution AAR while at LTP. While the LTP theater is fairly hi-tech, it does not provide units with recorded AARs to take home. Appoint someone as scribe during the AAR to record the valuable lessons learned.

8. Plan and schedule early.

AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER INTEGRATION INTO THE MDMP:

1. The brigade's ALO is responsible for employing CAS IAW the commander's intent. He is the ground commander's senior Air Force advisor and often controls a brigade asset with the equivalent destructive combat power of a mechanized task force.

2. When ALOs fully participate in staff planning sessions, the potential for enormous target effect exists. Training time with the units, Air Force/Army doctrinal expertise by ALO and Army staffs, and everyday Army "lingo" contribute to the ALO's ability to do his job.

3. Successful employment of CAS is dependent on the ALO's ability to fully understand his role, responsibilities, and contributions during MDMP.

4. As a doctrinal self-help tool, staffs can use the Integrated Task List for the Air-Ground Training Feedback System available from the CALL Web Site, URL http://call.army.mil/call.htm.

ARMOR TASK FORCE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MDMP:

1. The MDMP is thoroughly described in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Units should practice the process during Home Station exercises so that they are familiar with the sequence, events, and products before deploying to NTC.

2. Total familiarity with the MDMP before arriving at NTC gives brigade and TF staffs the foundation needed for transition to an abbreviated process when time is limited. When staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP upon arrival at NTC, they must be trained on each event of the process, followed immediately by a "hot-wash" AAR. Unfortunately, this is a time-consuming technique that the LTP schedule seldom permits. On those occasions when we can afford these "hot-wash" AARs, they prove extremely profitable to the unprepared unit.

INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL STAFF INTO THE MDMP: Integration of the FSB staff and special staff can be accomplished if participation is required at all levels, from brigade order drills through NTC rotations. By enforcing the integration of special staff at Home Station until it is routine, the proper mix of players will be present for advanced training at NTC.

TASK FORCE INTEGRATION OF CSS INTO THE MDMP:

1. Mirror the task force maneuver format for the orders process and state the task and purpose of each CSS asset.

2. Clarify which unit is responsible for supporting another and when that support begins and ends.

3. Ensure that the CSS BOS is integrated into the task force orders process and that the S4 issues an order to subordinate leaders and soldiers. He must issue a five-paragraph order to the CSS operators to address how the CSS plan will happen.

4. Once all the players know the plan, conduct a CSS rehearsal. Do not wait until the rehearsal to develop the plan.

5. The problem with inadequate graphics can be fixed by implementing a checklist and following it. Develop the checklist during a properly conducted mission analysis, identifying all required CSS control measures and graphic symbols. Make sure the S4 has the checklist for reference.

INTEGRATION OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER (SIGO) INTO THE MDMP:

1. The task force should integrate the signal officer into the planning process at the early stages.

2. The SIGO and NCOs can make a tentative plan as long as they have a general idea of the enemy situation, the friendly situation, and the commander's intent.

FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER (FDO) INTEGRATION INTO THE MDMP: All members of the battalion staff must have a good understanding of the staff planning process and all members must contribute to the process in varying degrees. The information and tools each member should bring to the planning table must be defined.

1. The FDO can contribute significantly to the planning process by reviewing the following information from the maneuver order:

2. By front loading the planning process with an understanding of these areas, the FDO can determine:

3. After COA analysis and comparison and the decision brief, the staff begins a deliberate wargame of the selected COA. During this phase, the FDO focuses on the entire scheme of fires, to include the specifics of the EFST (i.e., FASCAM aimpoints and number and type of rounds per aimpoint, Copperhead EAs and artillery positions, smoke aimpoints and number of rounds, mass missions, and munitions and volume required to fire).

CSS INTEGRATION INTO THE BATTALION MDMP:

1. A battalion logistician (S4/S1 or battalion XO) should be present at all battalion orders drills, aggressively representing the CSS arena, and ensuring integration and synchronization of CSS operations. Better integration of CSS operations provides necessary time to reconstitute Class III (B) and V and reconfigure ammunition, thus posturing the battalion's CSS for the future battle.

2. The battalion XO orchestrates the orders process by acting as the chief of staff, ensuring all necessary players are present and participating.

3. The S4 must know the battalion's current logistical status before conducting mission analysis.

4. Develop a battalion OPORD CSS checklist that lists critical CSS functions which must occur before, during, and post battle, including grid locations of CSS entities. The list should be completed by phases of the battle and should include:

5. At a minimum, answer the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) before leaving the battalion wargaming process and include them in any rehearsals.

6. Clear, timely ammunition guidance from the S3, better battlefield calculus, and ammunition positioning improves ammunition operations.

7. Focus on integrating resupply operations with the battalion operation whether it be centralized or decentralized. This facilitates resupply operations in a more stable environment with less distraction and economizes the use of battalion logistical assets.

8. The S4 should maintain situational awareness and status of logistical assets and provide the S3 advice on the execution of the logistics operations.

COMPLETION OF AN ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT:

1. ABE sections and engineer battalion plans sections should incorporate the time constraints, battlefield friction, and stresses of continuous operations into Home Station training.

2. Detailed SOPs, to include distribution of labor within the sections, are a useful tool as well as cross-training among the sections to allow leaders more flexibility in who completes/assists in the completion of the EBA.

ENGINEER PLANNING AND PRODUCTS:

1. Based upon the unique relationship of having an engineer battalion whose assets are usually task organized under maneuver battalion control, the engineer battalion must conduct parallel planning with the supported maneuver brigade. Engineer parallel planning requires a focus on both vertical planning (identification, integration, synchronization of tasks to support the engineer mission) and horizontal planning (integration, synchronization of tasks to support the maneuver brigade).

2. The engineer battalion, with the assistant battalion engineer (ABE), should study and know the planning process as outlined in FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored). The battalion XO should take ownership of how planning is structured within the engineer battalion.

3. The XO and S3 must coordinate critical junctures when the engineer staff is required to supplement S3/ABE efforts in the brigade planning process. This will drive development of the battalion planning timeline.

4. Once the timeline is set, the S3/XO must determine what products will result from each part of the process and whether the products come from the battalion staff or the S3/S2/ABE. There should be a continuous exchange of products/information between these two cells to facilitate effective engineer planning for both the maneuver brigade and the engineer battalion.

COMPLETION OF THE MDMP IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT: Task force XOs should have a solid understanding of where their staffs are in terms of the ability to perform the MDMP before they arrive at LTP. By doing so, they can then accurately structure the pace of planning they wish to perform for their single tactical mission at LTP and enhance their rotation training preparation.

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 1

Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends: Command and Control BOS, Part 3